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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the Cold war, new actors began to carry out a wide range of tasks with 
regard to the use of force. For instance, States relied on private business entities to perform 
military and security services which before had been performed by national armed forces. 
PMSCs are requested by governments, international organizations and NGOs or other 
corporations to provide with land-based or maritime military and/or security services that 
traditionally belonged to States. These services usually include the armed guarding and the 
protection of persons and objects, the maintenance and operation of weapons system, 
intelligence and technical assistance, prisoner detention and interrogation of suspects and 
transport, advice of and/or training of local forces/security personnel, and –in some cases- the 
direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Consequently, the engagement of PMSCs with several and different tasks and the 
transnational nature of their operations increase concerns about the effectiveness of their 
regulation, both at international and national levels.  However, some questions concerning their 
responsibilities for any misconduct committed by them are raised. Most actually, PMSCs are 
usually being involved in violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law during their operations. However, the absence of a coherent and binding 
international legal framework to regulate PMSCs and oversee their activities in conjunction 
with the lack of national regulatory and advocacy frameworks which have jurisdiction directly 
over PMSCs' misconduct relieved private contractors to escape from prosecution and 
accountability from alleged human rights violations. 
 
Within the aforementioned context, the present thesis attempts to find out whether the 
PMSCs and their activities could be regulated throughout the context of human rights law. 
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Therefore, the current thesis is divided into two main parts; the first part on the international 
and national efforts for regulation of PMSCs; and the second one on obligations of States to 
regulate PMSCs’ activities and punish the perpetrators. In particular, this thesis examines the 
obligations of States to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities with regard to the Montreux 
Document’s standards and it also focuses on the need of the adoption of a new coherent 
international regulatory regime which is going to demonstrate precisely the obligations and 
responsibilities of States, international organisations and PMSCs for land-based and maritime-
based activities. 
 
Moreover, it presents and analyses the national regulatory mechanisms for punishment 
and prosecution of PMSCs’ employees for human rights violations. By using examines 
different national legislative frameworks, the present thesis considers that the absence of an 
international framework to punish private contractors for human rights violations allows for 
non-compliance with human rights law.  
 
Furthermore, the application of human rights law on the regulation of PMSCs’ activities 
constitutes an important part of the present research. So as, it examines the States’ human rights 
obligations to regulate PMSCs’ activities and demonstrates the States’ efforts to fulfil their 
obligations under human rights law regarding the regulation of PMSCs’ and their employees’ 
activities. In conclusion, the present thesis goes one step further. It explores whether the human 
rights judiciary bodies, and particular the ECtHR have the jurisdiction to adjudicate PMSCs’ 
employees for human rights abuses.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of Cold war brought great increase of new actors who carry out a wide range of tasks 
with regard to the use of force1. The last two decades, States relied on business entities to 
perform military and security services which before had been performed by their own armed 
forces. This practice has initially started during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; nonetheless 
the use of private entities is widespread, covering anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa 
to combatting drug trafficking in Latin America2. To that extent, Bassiouni argued that the 
proliferation of non-state actors in conflicts and post-conflicts environment emerged the 
                                                          
1 Steven R. Kochheiser, ‘Silent Partners: Private Forces, Mercenaries and International Humanitarian Law in the 
21st Century’ [2012] 2 National Security and Armed Conflict Review, 86, at 90; Kate Neilson, ‘Ending Impunity: 
Bringing Superiors of Private Military and Security Companies Personnel to Justice’ [2011] 9 New Zealand 
Yearbook of International Law, 121, at 143; Matija Kovac, ‘Legal Issues Arising from the Possible Inclusion of 
Private Military Companies in the UN Peacekeeping’ [2009] 13 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 
309, at 315; Jeffrey F. Addicott, ‘Contractors on the ‘Battlefield’: Providing Adequate Protection, Anti-terrorism 
Training and Personnel Recovery for Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat and 
Contingency Operations’ [2006] 28:2 Houston Journal of International Law, 323, at 334. 
2 See Kateri Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law and Ethics (Routledge, 2010); 
Deborah V. Avant, The Market of Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); See also Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as Means of Impending the Exercise 
of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Why We Need an International Convention on Private Military and 
Security Companies (U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/CRP.1, 17 May 2011) para. 1. See also Tanya Cook, 'Dogs of 
War or Tomorrow's Peacekeepers? The Role of Mercenaries in the Future Management of Conflict' [2002] 5 (1) 
Culture Mandala, Article 1. 
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concept of the ‘’new culture of wars’’3. Moreover, the concept of the ‘’new culture of war’’ is 
based on a general enthusiasm of States to outsource their functions and also on a growing 
reluctance by them to intervene in conflicts which are not of their particular strategic interests4.  
 
PMSCs are requested by governments5, international organizations and NGOs or other 
corporations6 to provide with land-based or maritime military and/or security services that 
traditionally belonged to States7. PMSCs are universally defined as:  
 
‘legally established international firms (which) offering services that involve the potential to 
exercise force in a systematic way and by military or paramilitary means, as well as the 
enhancement, the transfer, the facilitation, the deterrence, or the defusing of this potential, or 
the knowledge required to implement it, to clients’8.  
 
                                                          
3 Cherif M. Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflicts by Non-
State Actors’ [2008] 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 711, 717. 
4 See Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to the Market: The Rise and Regulation of 
Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1. 
5 Laura Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World or Privatized Foreign 
Affair, (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 37. 
6 Lindsey Cameron, ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status under International Humanitarian Law and Its 
Impact on Their Regulation’ [2006] 88 International Review of Red Cross, p. 573. 
7 International Committee of Red Cross, ‘’Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), August 29, 2012, 
available at https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/private-military-security-companies-glossary.htm (last 
accessed on May 2016). 
8 Carlos Ortiz, Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: 
Praeger, 2010), p. 48 
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Their services usually include the armed guarding and the protection of persons and 
objects, as well as the maintenance and operation of weapons system, intelligence and technical 
assistance, prisoner detention and interrogation of suspects and transport, advice of and/or 
training of local forces/security personnel9, and even direct participation in hostilities10. 
 
Accordingly, Singer in his book Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military 
Industry distinguishes PMSCs into three different “sectors”: 1. military provider companies, 
which supply a State party to a conflict with direct, tactical and military assistance; 2. military 
consulting firms that advise and train members of the national armed forces; and, 3. military 
support companies that are responsible to provide logistic maintenance and other services to 
armed forces11. As a consequence, the widespread use of outsourcing of governmental military 
and/or security functions to PSMCs has seen further growth very rapidly with the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq12.  
 
Consequently, the extensive use of PMSCs, their engagement with several and different 
tasks and the transnational nature of their operations increase concerns about the effectiveness 
                                                          
9 Emmmanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Business Do to War: Private Military and Security Companies and International 
Humanitarian Law’ [2006] 863 International Review of Red Cross, 525, at 526; Peter W. Singer, ‘Private Military 
Firms’, in Roy Gutman, David Rieff and Antony Dworkin (eds.), Crimes of War: What Public Should Know 
Revised and Updated Edition (W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2007) 335. 
10 Cameron supra note 6, p. 573. 
11 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2003).  
12 For instance, it is estimated that in 2010, the 54% of the United States Department of Defence’s workforce in 
Iraq and Afghanistan consisted of private contractors. M. Schawartz, Department of Defence Contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis (Congressional Report Services, 2 July 2010). 
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of their regulation13, both at international and national levels14.  However, some questions 
concerning their responsibilities for any misconduct committed by them are raised15. Most 
notably, PMSCs are usually being involved in violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law during their operations16. Several States, such as the U.S.A., the 
U.K., the South Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan have been confronted by violations of human 
rights law by private contractors. To that extend, the UN Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries has reported human rights violations perpetrated by PMSCs’ employees as 
‘summary executions, acts of torture, cases of arbitrary detention, trafficking of persons and 
                                                          
13 Alexander Kees, ‘Regulation of Private Military Companies’ [2011] 3(1) Gottingen Journal of International 
Law, p. 199-216. 
14 Deborah Avant, ‘The Emerging Market for Private Military Services and the Problems of Regulation’, in 
Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 4, p.181. 
15 For a further analysis of PMC’s activities in Iraq see Jordi Palou-Loverdos and Leticia Armendariz, The 
Privatization of Warfare, Violence and Private Military & Security Companies: A Factual Approach to Human 
Rights Abuses by PMSC in Iraq (Nova - Institute for Active Non-violence, 2011). 
(http://www.consciousbeingalliance.com/Informe_PMSC_Iraq_Nova.pdf); David A. Iseberg, Shadow Force: 
Private Military Contractors in Iraq, (New York: Praeger Security International, 2009). 
16 See Swisspeace, ‘The Impact of PMSCs on the Local Population in Post – Conflict Countries: A Comparative 
Study for Afghanistan and Angola’’, Bern, 2007. See also José Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘Impact in Human Rights 
of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities’, U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, page 
2, 
<http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Impact%20in%20Human%20Rights%20of%20Private%20Milit
ary%20and%20Security%20Companies%27%20Activities.pdf> accessed on January 2015. Moreover, Perrin 
denotes that the widespread involvement of PMSCs in modern warfare and other insurgencies harmed more 
civilians than the ‘traditional armed conflicts’ do. See Benjamin Perrin (ed.), Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, 
Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations and the Law (UBC Press, 2012), p. 2. 
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serious health damages caused by the activities of PMSCs’ employees, as well as attempts 
against the right of self-determination’17. 
 
The most notorious episodes took place during the second war in Iraq. In 2004 the 
killing of four employees of “Blackwater” in Fallujah and the torture of detainees at Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq committed by two United States-based PMSCs, CACI and Titan18. A 
military investigation, that is published as ‘’Tabuga Report’’, explicitly indicates the extensive 
sexual abuse and humiliated treatment of detainees by private contractors.19 It showed that 
American soldiers and private contractors were involved in ‘sadistic, blatant and wanton 
criminal abuses’ of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq20. However, whilst the military officers 
were subjected to court-martials and were sentenced to prison, none of these PMSCs were 
prosecuted21, since the USA Higher Court of Appeals granted them immunity for working for 
                                                          
17 Jose Luis Gomez Prado, ‘The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies 
(PMSC)’ [2014] Global Research, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-privatization-of-war-
mercenaries-private-military-and-security-companies-pmsc/21826?print=1 (visited on May 2016). 
18 Blackwater is one of the most high-profile PMCs operating in Iraq, with around 1,000 employees as well as a 
fleet of helicopters in the country. 
19 The ‘Tabuga Report’ On Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade, Part One: Detainee Abuse 15, 
<http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.2> accessed on January 2016. See also, Katja 
Nieminen, ‘The Rules of Attribution and the Private Military Contractors at Abu Ghraib: Private Acts or Public 
Wrongs?’ (2004) XV Finnish Yearbook of International Law 289. 
20 Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Pratel 
(eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 405-477, at 416; See 
also Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, UN Doc A/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010, p. 20. 
21 Peter Spiegel, ‘’No Contractors Facing Abu Ghraib Charges’’, Financial Times, 9 August 2005. 
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American military forces22. The main reason for granting such immunity was that the USA 
Army was unsure whether they had any jurisdiction over them23. This revealed a legal vacuum 
under which PMSCs employees operate24 and raised also ambiguities regarding the norms that 
govern their operations and the legitimacy of their activities25.  
 
Moreover, the killing of 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians at Nisour square in Baghdad 
strengthened the questions of private contractors’ responsibilities. Five contractors have been 
charged with counts of voluntary and attempted manslaughters; they managed to escape from 
prosecution, as the District Court identified a violation of the right to fair trial, since statements 
                                                          
22 Ibrahim vs. Titan Corp 556 FSupp2d 1 (DDC 2007) (Ibrahim II), aff’d Saleh vs. Titan 580 F3d 1 14-16 (DC 
Cir 2009) (Saleh II). 
23 Peter W. Singer, Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go to War without 'Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency, (Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2007), p. 7; Fred Rosen, ‘Contract Warriors: How Mercenaries 
Changed History and the War on Terrorism’, (Alpha, New York, 2005), p. 222.  
24 Singer was the first who introduced the term of ‘legal vacuum’ with respect to PMSCs’ activities. Peter W. 
Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’ [2004] 42 
Columbia Journal of International Law, p. 521.  On the other hand, Lehnardt denotes that speaking for a legal 
vacuum is a kind of ignorance several States obligations which apply in complex environment whereas PMSCs 
operate. Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt, 
supra note 4, p. 42. 
25 See Mark W. Bina, ‘Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability after Abu Ghraib’ [2005] 38 John 
Marshall Law Review, p. 1237; Heather Carney, ‘Prosecuting the Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and Private 
Military Firms’ [2006] 74 George Washington Law Review, p. 317; Laura Dickinson, ‘Government for Hire: 
Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law’ [2005] 45 William and 
Mary Law Review, p. 135. 
17 
 
given by the five Blackwater guards had been improperly used26. However upon appeal, the 
defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear their case. So, after seven years 
of delays, finally, Blackwater’s contractors were charged with convictions of first-degree 
murder and manslaughter, since the use of lethal force at that occasion was unnecessary27. To 
this end, the ‘’Memorandum: Additional Information on Blackwater U.S.A’’ denoted that 
Blackwater’s personnel have been involved in more than 195 incidents in Iraq from 2005 to 
200728. Apart from the aforementioned incidents, PMSCs have been also accused for attacking 
civilians in Colombia29 and even for buying and keeping women and girls in sexual slavery in 
Bosnia30. 
 
Despite the involvement of private contractors in human rights abuses, in the most of 
the cases none of them has been prosecuted effectively31. The absence of a coherent and binding 
                                                          
26 Timothy Williams, ‘Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped’, The New York Times, 2 January 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/02blackwater.html?_r=0 (visited on May 2016). 
27 ‘’Trial of Blackwater Guards Charged with Killing Iraqis to Open in US’’, 10 June 2014 available at 
http://www.voanews.com/content/trial-of-blackwater-guards-charged-with-killing-iraqis-to-open-in-
us/1934146.html (visited on May 2016). 
28 House of Representatives, Committee, on Oversight and Government Reform, Congress of the U.S.A., 
‘Memorandum: Additional Information on Blackwater U.S.A’, 01/10/2007, 6. 
29 Institute for Human Rights and Business, Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal 
Periodic Review – Session 16: Colombia, October 2012, 1 <http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/UPR/UPR-Colombia-2012-
FINAL.pdf> accessed on January 2015. 
30 Robert Capps, ‘Outside the Law’, (Salon, 26 June 2010) <http://www.salon.com/2002/06/26/bosnia_4/> 
accessed on January 2015.  
31 Peter W. Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law’ 
(Columbia JTC, 2003/4), p. 521. 
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international legal framework to regulate PMSCs and oversee their activities32 in conjunction 
with the lack of national regulatory and advocacy frameworks which have jurisdiction directly 
over PMSCs' misconduct relieved private contractors to escape from prosecution and 
accountability from alleged human rights violations33. As a result, the private military and 
security industry remains ‘’less regulated than the cheese market’’34 and/or ''the toy industry''35. 
Plainly, the absence of those mechanisms is coming after and above, if not beyond, the law36. 
Nevertheless Lehnardt argues that the lack of private contractors’ accountability is matter of 
enforcement of law rather that the problem of applicable law37. The same has been highlighted 
                                                          
32 Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi argued that the multinational character of (PMSCs) operations and the ‘amorphous 
structure’ of those companies make them immune from the control of States. Therefore, it requires to be regulated 
at international level. See Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, ‘Liability for Multinational Corporations 
under International Law: An Introduction’ in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability for 
Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2000), p. 3.  
33 Emily Kelly, ‘Holding Blackwater Accountable: Private Security Contractors and the Protections of the Use 
Immunity’ (2013) 35 (3) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, p. 17. 
34 Peter W. Singer, The Private Military and Security Industry in Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to Next 
(Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Force, Policy Paper, 2004) 14. 
35 See the abstract of José Luis Gómez del Prado, 'A U.N. Convention on PMSCs?' [2012] 31(3) Criminal Justice 
Ethics, p. 262. One of the primary reasons that this market continues to be unregulated is the transnational 
character of PMSCs’ activities. See Deborah V. Avant, supra note 2, p. 144. 
36 Peter W. Singer, supra note 11, p. 238; Carney, supra note 25, p. 319; Liu Hin-Yan, ‘Leasing the Corporate 
Dogs of War: The legal Implications of the modern Private Military company’ [2010] 15(1) Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law, p. 159; Emily Crawford, ‘The Civil-Military Contractors and the Principle of Distinction’ 
[2011] 11 (45) Sydney Law School Research Paper, p. 3;  
37 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law’, (2008) 
European Journal of International Law, 1015, at 1016. 
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by herself by stating that ‘’speaking of a legal vacuum we ignore the numerous State 
obligations that apply in the environment in which Private Military Companies operate’’38.  
 
In an attempt to fill the existing regulatory and accountability gaps regarding the 
PMSCs and their employees, the international community has launched some significant 
initiatives in order to encourage States to implement regulatory frameworks with regard to 
PMSCs39. For instance, the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations 
and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security 
Companies during Armed Conflict (the Montreux Document)40 is the first international 
document that emphasizes States’ obligations to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities and 
highlights the obligation to enact proper legislative measures to punish perpetrators for 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law41. Moreover, the Montreux 
Document is focused on two particular areas: firstly which security functions could be 
outsourced and which not; and secondly, the legal status of PMSCs42. This initiative also 
                                                          
38 Lehnandt, supra note 24, p. 142. 
39 Janos Kalman, ‘The International Regulation or Private Security Providers: A Brief Analysis in ‘Janos Kalman 
(ed.), Legal Studies on the Contemporary Hungarian Legaal System (Universitas – Gyor Ltd, 2014), p. 148. 
40 The Montreux Document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/63/467–S/2008/636) 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/467> accessed on May 2016. 
41 See The Montreux Document, Part I: Pertinent International Legal Obligations Relating to Private Military and 
Security Companies, supra note 8, A. 5, B. 11, C. 16 and D. 20. Cockayne analyses more the contribution of the 
Montreux Document in improving the standards of accountability for private contractors’ misconduct. See James 
Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and 
Promise of the Montreux Document’ [2008] 13(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p. 401. 
42 The International Committee of Red Cross emphasized that its intention was not to completely ban PMSCs’ 
operations, but to regulate their activities by stating the responsibility of States for their actions. See ‘’Switzerland 
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demonstrates the States’ obligations under international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law in which PMSCs are registered (home States), are engaged (hiring States), 
or operate (host States). In addition, the Montreux Document illustrates 73 ‘‘good practices’’, 
which may be the reason of further regulation of PMSCs through contracts, codes of conduct 
and national regulations’43.  
 
Yet, this does not go far enough since the Montreux Document is ‘‘not a legally binding 
instrument and so does not affect existing obligations of States under customary international 
law or under international agreements to which they are parties’’44. As a piece of soft law, the 
Montreux Document has to deal with the problem of its legitimacy, since only 17 States were 
represented at the drafting process45. The contribution although of ICRC to disseminate the 
Montreux Document and call all States to endorse it increased somehow its legitimacy46. 
Notwithstanding the issue of its legitimacy, the Montreux Document applies only to situations 
of armed conflicts on land and does not cover conflict situations at sea or anti-piracy services 
as well47. 
                                                          
is set to host a meeting of experts in November tackling the thorny issue of private security companies operating 
in a legal no-man's-land’’, Swissinfo.ch, September 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-wants-to-regulate-mercenaries/5429506 (last accessed on March 2015). 
43 See Cockayne, supra note 41, p. 401. 
44 The Montreux Document, para. 3. 
45 Currently 50 States have signed the Montreux Document.  
46 See Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, ‘Private Military and Security Companies and the UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries’ [2008] 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p. 429. 
47 Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Use of Private Contractors in the Fight against Piracy: Policy Options’, in Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.) War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private 
Contractors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 51. 
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Irrespective of the significant contribution of the Montreux Document to the regulation 
towards to PMSCs’ activities, its non-binding nature and its limited application – since it 
applies only during armed conflicts – was unable to fill the accountability gap for human rights 
abuses by private contractors48. The same critical argument against the Montreux Document 
was made by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries as well. In its 2009 report the UN 
Working Group recognizes the Montreux Document’s contribution to promote the existing 
principles under international humanitarian law and human rights law, but it fails to ‘address 
the regulatory gap in the responsibility of States with respect to the conduct of PMSCs and 
their employees’49. 
 
Recognizing the significance of the Montreux Document, the Human Rights Council 
welcomed the elaboration of a legally binding document with regard to PMSCs and their 
employees. The final document - named as the UN Draft Convention50 - constitutes the first 
effort to create a catalogue concerning the States' obligations for using of force by PMSCs, the 
licensing and authorization of PMSCs' activities and addressing accountability issues for 
PMSCs for human rights violations. Since it is still an ongoing process, the UN Draft 
Convention constitutes a kind of a law with regard to PMSCs, in order to assist all the efforts 
                                                          
48 Nigel D. White, ‘Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level’ in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), 
Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, European and 
Domestic Norms (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2012) 11, 12. 
49 Report of the UN Working Group (UN Doc. A/HRC/10/14, 21/01/2009) para. 44. 
50 This process is still undergoing. For the draft of a possible Convention on PMSCs see Report of the Working 
Group (U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25, 2010) Annex 19. See also Benjamin Perrin, ‘Searching for Accountability: The 
Draft UN International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight, and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Companies’ [2009] 47 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p. 299. 
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made by States towards the regulation and controlling of PMSCs' operations51. Therefore, as it 
derived by the both of the aforementioned initiatives, it is more than necessary for States to 
take decisive legislative measures to regulate PMSCs’ activities and hold accountable private 
contractors for human rights violations. According to Schneiker52 there are two main reasons 
which indicate the emerged need of such regulation. To begin with, States remain responsible 
for violations committed by PMSCs – by outsourcing certain security activities to them53. In 
the second place, even the national regimes are less effective than an international one54, 
national regulations are easier to be enforced. Accordingly, Caparini55 highlights that there is 
a general need to clarify under whose jurisdiction PMSCs' employees operates and who has 
competence over their activities. For example, whether a Colombian contractor working for a 
Belgian PMSC commits grave violations of human rights law, than who has jurisdiction to 
prosecute him/her and under which could he/she should be tried? 
 
                                                          
51 Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, supra note 46, p. 429. 
52 Andrea Schneiker, ‘National Regulatory Regimes for PMSCs and their Activities: Benefits and Shortcomings’ 
in Thomas Jager and Gerarld Kummuel (eds.), Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, 
Pitfalls and Prospects (Verblag Fur Sozialwissenchaften 2007). 
53 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military 
and Security Companies (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper – No 6, 
2005), p. 117. 
54 The possible ineffectiveness of national regulations derived from the transnational nature of PMSCs' operations. 
As Singer argues, in the most cases, PMSCs are registered in one country, they operate within the territory of 
another one and they hire contractors from a third State. See Singer, supra note 11. 
55 Marina Caparini, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: the U.S.A. Approach’ in Andrew 
Alexandra, Deane –Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private, Military Companies: Ethics, Politics and 
Civil-Military Relations (Routledge: London and New York, 2008). 
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At the same time, the private security industry throughout different associations has 
undertaken efforts to come up with issues of legitimacy of PMSCs’ activities, of regulation and 
monitoring their activities, and -in cases of human rights allegations- of effectiveness and 
accountability for PMSCs’ activities56. Thus, the adoption of the ICOC57 is the most recent and 
coherent international effort that imposes directly human rights obligations to PMSCs 
regarding the prevention of human rights abuses committed by their employees.  
 
According to its Preamble, the ICoC constitutes the follow-up process of the Montreux 
Document, in order to extend its principles to private security industry as well58. In doing so, 
PMSCs have to support the rule of law; to protect, prevent and respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and to protect the interests of their clients. The main goal of this 
initiative is to ensure that signatory PMSCs fully comply with ICoC’s standards and principles 
during their operations59. Even if the Montreux Document gives particular emphasis to the 
regulation of PMSCs and their obligations during armed conflicts, the applicability of the ICoC 
is extended to both armed and unarmed PMSCs’ services. In contrast, the ICoC does not enlist 
PMSCs’ services as the Montreux Document does60, but it uses the term of ‘’any other activity 
                                                          
56 Sorcha MacLeod, ‘The Role of International Regulatory Initiatives on Business and Human Rights for Holding 
Private Military and Security Contractors to Account’, in Francioni and Ronzitti, supra note 47.  
57 The ICoC is a stakeholder initiative convened by the Swiss government. It aims to set principles and standards 
to private security industry based on international human rights and humanitarian law. This document adopted on 
9th of November 2010 by private companies and it is available at http://www.icoc-psp.org.  
58 ICoC, Section A, para. 3. 
59 ICoC, Section B, para. 13. 
60 For instance, the Montreux Document illustrates that the PMSCs’ services include armed guarding, the 
protection of person and military objects, the maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention 
and advice of or training of local forces and security personnel. See the Montreux Document, Preface, para. 9.  
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for which the personnel of the companies are requires to carry or operate a weapon in the 
performance of their duties’’61. Furthermore, in 2012 stakeholders and private security 
providers agreed on the establishment of an oversight mechanism by adopting the ICoC’s 
Association62. 
 
Thesis Structure 
This study seeks to address its seminal research question in a systematic manner: 
 
‘’Does the human rights law provides with States obligations to prevent human rights 
abuses committed by PMSCs?’’ 
 
In order to evaluate that question, this study is divided into two main parts. The first 
part explores the international and national efforts for regulation of PMSCs; and the second 
one focuses on the States’ obligations to regulate PMSCs’ activities and punish the 
perpetrators. In particular, followed the approach of the Montreux Document and the ICoC, the 
thesis demonstrates the obligations of States to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities with 
regard to the Montreux Document’s standards. Furthermore, it argues PMSCs’ obligations 
under the Montreux Document and ICoC regarding any potential improvements to oversee the 
activities of their contractors and establish accountability for their harmful activities. Overall, 
it focuses on the emerge need of the adoption of a new coherent international regulatory regime 
which is going to demonstrate States’, international organisations’ and PMSCs’ international 
                                                          
61 ICoC, Section B. 
62The Articles of the Association are available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf, (visited on December 2014). 
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obligations and responsibilities for land-based and maritime-based PMSCs’ activities and to 
specify criminal liability for PMSCs’ contractors in case of human rights infringements 
(Chapter IV). 
 
Apart from the examination of the international legal framework, the present study 
focuses on the examination of national regulatory mechanisms for punishment and prosecution 
of PMSCs’ employees for human rights violations (Chapter V). More precisely, this chapter 
examines four different types of national regulatory regimes pertaining to PMSCs’ operations 
(USA, UK, South Africa and Germany). It explores the existing national legislative framework, 
under which private contractors may be held accountable for their misconducts. Further, it 
considers that the absence of an international framework to punish private contractors for 
human rights violations allows for non-compliance with human rights law. 
 
Additionally, the second part of the present thesis is focused on the application of the 
human rights law in regulation of PMSCs’ activities (Chapter VI). That happens because in the 
absence of a coherent and binding international legal framework to regulate PMSCs’ and 
prosecute their contractors for human rights violations, the need to find out option to regulate 
PMSCs for another domain of international law is has been emerged.  So as, the present chapter 
explores the existing States’ obligations to regulate PMSCs’ activities under the human rights 
law. Considering that PMSCs are operating in unstable environments, the study assesses the 
States’ procedural obligations under human rights law with respect to allegations of the right 
to life and the prohibition of torture. Moreover, it demonstrates the States’ efforts to fulfil their 
obligations under human rights law regarding the regulation of PMSCs’ and their employees’ 
activities. Above all, this chapter advocates that human rights law has a significant role in the 
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regulation of PMSCs and the prevention of the commission of human rights violations by 
PMSCs and their employees.  
 
Following the analysis regarding the human rights obligations of States to regulate and 
monitor PMSCs’ activities, this study goes one step beyond the existing literature. This study 
- by using as an example the ECtHR -  assesses whether the human rights judiciary bodies 
could adjudicate human rights violations committed by PMSCs and their employees.  
Furthermore, by examining the existing jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the present thesis 
demonstrates the jurisdiction of the EcHr over private entities – as PMSCs are. Moreover, 
Chapter VI describes the obligations of the hiring State, host State and home State to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress human rights violations under human rights law. Above all, this 
chapter focuses on the contribution of the ECtHR in the harmonization of the national legal 
orders towards the establishment of a common accountability regime for abuses committed by 
PMSCs.  
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CHAPTER II: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Historically, States had the exclusive and overall control over the use of legitimate force. Their 
forces –national armed forces- used to have an important role as guarantors of the security of 
their citizens and the fulfilment of their defensive policies. Chesterman and Lehnardt argue that 
the end of the Cold War led to the rise of the private military and security industry63. Currently, 
PMSCs are hired by States, international organizations and other multinational corporations to 
carry out functions that traditionally belonged to States64. To that end, this chapter examines 
the legal status of PMSCs and analyse the effectiveness of the legal frameworks governing 
them. 
 
PMSCs are considered as private business entities that offer their services to States, 
international organizations, NGOs and other corporations. These services mainly include firstly 
military maintenance as ‘strategic planning, intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air 
reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, manned or unmanned, satellite surveillance, 
military training and logistics, and material and technical support to armed forces’; and 
secondly security services such as ‘armed guarding or protection of buildings, installations, 
property and people, police training, material and technical support to police forces, 
                                                          
63 Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to the Market: The Rise and Regulation of 
Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 1 
64 Ibid. 
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elaboration and implementation of informational security measures’65. Certainly, PMSCs 
replaced importantly members of national armed forces in several situations ranging from 
participation into hostilities, and security in peace-building operations to intelligence and 
interrogation of suspects at prisons. 
 
The issues of the privatization of security and the outsourcing of the use of force are 
very well documented by the literature. However, PMSCs constitute a recent phenomenon and 
the publications around this topic are very controversial. The published work covers a range of 
aspects such as the nature of the PMSCs and their functions66, their status under international 
law67, their responsibilities for violations of humanitarian law and human rights law68 and also 
                                                          
65 The Montreux Document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/63/467–S/2008/636) 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/467> accessed on May 2016. 
66 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (New York, Cornell 
University Press, 2003); Deborah D. Avant, The Market of Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christopher Kinsley, Corporate Soldiers and International 
Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (Routledge: London/New York, 2006); Fred Schreier and 
Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies 
(DCAF: Geneva, 2005). 
67 Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies in International Law 
(Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2014); Francesco Francioni, ‘Private Military Contractors and 
International Law: An Introduction’ [2008] 19 (5) European Journal of International Law 961-964. 
68 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Hannah Tonkin, State Control over Private 
Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private 
Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011);  
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the obligations of States to regulate their activities69 and of private military and security 
industry for self-regulation70. In order to provide a coherent overview of the existing literature 
on PMSCs, the present study uses the adoption of the Montreux Document as a milestone. So 
as, the following lines present the existing published work with regard to the issue of PMSCs 
before and after 2008.  
 
Initially, the present research is heavily reliant on published sources. To that extent, it 
is worth mentioning that the thesis gathers the most recently published developments with 
regards to the regulation of the PMSCs’ activities and their impact on the protection of human 
rights. For more and foremost, the most influential publication around the topic of PMSCs is 
Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2003). In this book, Singer provides with a general overview of the 
rise of privatized military and security industry. He begins for the post-colonisation era in order 
to explain why PMSCs currently have an active role in the battlefields worldwide. He 
concludes that governments  
 
‘transfer some of their public duties to the private sector. They may also do so because of issues 
of cost, quality, efficiency, or charging conceptions of governmental duties. Health care, 
                                                          
69Evgeni Moyakine, The Privatized Art of War: Private Military and Security Companies and State Responsibility 
for their Unlawful Conduct in Conflict Areas (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2015); Carsten Hoppe, 
‘Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies’ [2008] 19 (5) European Journal of 
International Law 989 – 1014. 
70 Daphné Richemond-Barak, ‘Can Self-Regulation Work? Lessons from the Private Security and Military 
Industry’ [2014] 35 (4) Michigan Journal of International Law 773; Renee De Nevers, ‘The Effectiveness of Self-
Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry’ [2010] 30 (2) Journal of Public Policy 219-240. 
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police, prisons, garbage collection, postal services, tax collection, utilities, education and so 
on are examples of services that have been shifted back and forth between viewed as essential 
public responsibilities of the government to something best left to the private market’71.  
 
Moreover, Singer presents the historical development of the outsourcing of the 
governmental functions from the ancient history until the end of the Cold war72. Through this 
analysis, he observes that ‘the State’s monopoly of both domestic and international force was 
a historical anomaly. Thus, […] we should not expect that organized violence would only be 
located in the public realm’73.  
 
Furthermore, Singer classifies the industry and distinguishes PMSCs into three types. 
The first type of PMSCs are the military provider companies. This type of PMSCs supplies a 
State party to a conflict with direct, tactical and military assistance. For example, Sandline 
International and Executive Outcomes provided their clients with direct combat participation 
mostly in Angola, Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea74. However, the direct participation 
into hostilities may affect the stability of the host country since the dynamic character of the 
market for force75. The military consulting firms constitute the second category of PMSCs. 
They are used to advice and train members of the national armed forces and they are placed in-
                                                          
71 Singer, supra note 66, p. 7. 
72 Ibid., p. 19. 
73 Ibid., p. 39. 
74 See also David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary 
Firms (Centre for Defense Information, 1997). 
75 Anna Leader, ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military 
Companies’ [2005] 33 (3) Millennium Journal of International Studies 803. 
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between the front line of an armed conflict and non-combat support. For instance, the role of 
these type of PMSCs in Colombia constitutes a significant example of that type of PMSCs’ 
operation76. As the last type of PMSCs, Singer identifies the military support firms. Such 
companies are responsible to provide logistic maintenance and other services to armed forces77. 
 
Despite the fact that Singer emphasizes some monitoring challenges regarding the 
contracts of outsourcing governmental functions to PMSCs, he does not conclude in a 
particular model –international or national- on how the oversight of PMSCs’ operations could 
be ameliorated78. Similar to Singer’s approach, Deborah Avant –with her book ‘The Market of 
Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security’ – comments the emergence of the use of 
PMSCs79 and the impact of the privatization of the use of force on the State control80. 
 
However, the significance of her contribution rests upon the mentioning of possible 
dilemmas around the regulation and control of the private military and security services81. Yet, 
according to her approach, a potential way to regulate PMSCs’ activities is the strengthening 
of the regulations regarding the exports of arms82. Through the analysis of the three largest 
exports of military and security services –the USA, the UK and the South Africa- she 
demonstrated that the transnational nature of the private military and security industry has 
                                                          
76 Christopher Spearin, ‘Accountable to Whom?: An Assessment of International Private Security Companies in 
South America’ [2003] 6 (1) Civil Wars 1-26. 
77 Singer, supra note 66.  
78 Ibid., p. 153. 
79 Avant, supra note 66, p. 3. 
80 Ibid., p.  45. 
81 Ibid., p. 143. 
82 Ibid. 
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serious impact on the political, social, economic and functional control of States on the exports 
of arms83.  
 
Three years before the adoption of the Montreux Document, Avant managed to provide 
a brief overview of the application of the international mechanisms of the status of PMSCs and 
their employees84. To that extent, she deduces that despite the wide interpretation of the 
international humanitarian law, it still stands an uncertainty to explicit clarify the circumstances 
in which a PMSCs’ employee could be considered as combatant or civilian and even when 
he/she could be responsible for any misconduct85. 
 
Before the adoption of the Montreux Document, concerns about the regulation of 
PMSCs’ activities has drawn the attention of the most of the scholars. Most of the scholars 
argued that the dramatically expansion of the number of PMSCs worldwide86 and their 
involvement in notorious human rights episodes87 raised questions regarding the regulation of 
                                                          
83 Ibid., p. 177. 
84 Ibid., p. 230. 
85 Ibid., p. 233. 
86 Deborah Avant, ‘The Emerging Market for Private Military Services and the Problems of Regulation’, in 
Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 63, p.181; 
87 Jose Luis Gomez Prado, ‘The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies 
(PMSC)’, (Global Research, 1 of July 2014), available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-privatization-of-war-
mercenaries-private-military-and-security-companies-pmsc/21826?print=1 (visited on May 2016). 
33 
 
PMScs, both at international and national level88. According to Singer, the private military and 
security industry seems ‘’less regulated that the chees market’’89.  
 
Singer concludes to that point by taking into account the most notorious human rights 
episodes that took place during the second war in Iraq. More particularly, in 2004 four 
employees of “Blackwater” were killed in Fallujah and detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
have been tortured by two USA-based PMSCs, CACI and Titan90. The ‘’Tabuga Report’’ - a 
published military investigation – has explicitly shown that the detainees in Abu Ghraib prison 
had been extensively sexually abused and humiliated by PMSCs’ employees91. It also 
illustrated that American soldiers along with private contractors were involved in ‘sadistic, 
blatant and wanton criminal abuses’ of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq92. However, whilst the 
                                                          
88 Alexander Kees, ‘Regulation of Private Military Companie [2011] 3 (1) Gottingen Journal of International Law 
199-216; Kevin A. O’ Brien, ‘What Should and Should Not be Regulated’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra 
note 63, p. 29. 
89 Peter W. Singer, The Private Military and Security Industry in Iraq: What We Learned and Where to Next 
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Policy Paper, 2004) 14. 
90 Blackwater is one of the most high-profile PMCs operating in Iraq, with around 1,000 employees as well as a 
fleet of helicopters in the country. 
91 The ‘Tabuga Report’ On Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade, Part One: Detainee Abuse 15, 
<http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.2> accessed on January 2016. See also, Katja 
Nieminen, ‘The Rules of Attribution and the Private Military Contractors at Abu Ghraib: Private Acts or Public 
Wrongs?’ (2004) XV Finnish Yearbook of International Law 289. 
92 Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Pratel 
(eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 405-477, at 416; See 
also Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, UN Doc A/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010, p. 20. 
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military officers were subjected to court-martials and were sentenced to prison, none of these 
PMSCs were prosecuted93, since the U.S. Higher Court of Appeals granted them immunity for 
working for American military forces94. The main reason for granting such immunity was that 
the USA’s Army was unsure whether they had any jurisdiction over them95. This matter 
revealed the legal vacuum under which PMSCs employees operate96 and raised ambiguities 
regarding the norms that govern their operations and the legitimacy of their activities97.  
 
Simoultaneously, the killing of 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians at Nisour square in Baghdad 
strengthened further questions regarding the private contractors’ responsibilities. In this case, 
five contractors have been charged with counts of voluntary and attempted manslaughters; they 
                                                          
93 Peter Spiegel, ‘’No Contractors Facing Abu Ghraib Charges’’, Financial Times, 9 August 2005. 
94 Ibrahim vs. Titan Corp 556 FSupp2d 1 (DDC 2007) (Ibrahim II), aff’d Saleh vs. Titan 580 F3d 1 14-16 (DC 
Cir 2009) (Saleh II). 
95 Peter W. Singer, Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go to War without 'Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency, (Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2007), p. 7; Fred Rosen, ‘Contract Warriors: How Mercenaries 
Changed History and the War on Terrorism’, (Alpha, New York, 2005), p. 222.  
96 Singer was the first who introduced the term of ‘legal vacuum’ with respect to PMSCs’ activities. Peter W. 
Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’ [2004] 42 
Columbia Journal of International Law, p. 521.  On the other hand, Lehnardt denotes that speaking for a legal 
vacuum is a kind of ignorance several States obligations which apply in complex environment whereas PMSCs 
operate. Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt, 
supra note 4, p. 42. 
97 See Mark W. Bina, ‘Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability after Abu Ghraib’ [2005] 38 John 
Marshall Law Review, p. 1237; Heather Carney, ‘Prosecuting the Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and Private 
Military Firms’ [2006] 74 George Washington Law Review, p. 317; Laura Dickinson, ‘Government for Hire: 
Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law’ [2005] 45 William and 
Mary Law Review, p. 135. 
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managed to escape from prosecution, as the District Court identified a violation of the right to 
fair trial, since statements given by the five Blackwater guards had been improperly used98. 
However upon appeal, the defendants petitioned the USA Supreme Court to hear their case. 
So, after seven years of delays, finally, Blackwater’s contractors were charged with convictions 
of first-degree murder and manslaughter, since the use of lethal force at that occasion was 
unnecessary99. However, the ‘’Memorandum: Additional Information on Blackwater U.S.A’’ 
denoted that Blackwater’s personnel have been involved in more than 195 incidents in Iraq 
from 2005 to 2007.100 Apart from the aforementioned incidents, PMSCs have been accused for 
attacking civilians in Colombia101 and even for buying and keeping women and girls in sexual 
slavery in Bosnia.102 
 
Under this framework of escaping accountability for their misconduct, the edited book 
of Chesterman and Lehnardt provides with an examination of the normative control of private 
                                                          
98 Timothy Williams, ‘Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped’, The New York Times, 2 January 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/02blackwater.html?_r=0 (visited on May 2016). 
99 ‘’Trial of Blackwater Guards Charged with Killing Iraqis to Open in US’’, 10 June 2014 available at 
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100 House of Representatives, Committee, on Oversight and Government Reform, Congress of the U.S.A., 
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101 Institute for Human Rights and Business, Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal 
Periodic Review – Session 16: Colombia, October 2012, 1 <http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/UPR/UPR-Colombia-2012-
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military and security market and an overview of the public control over PMSCs’ operations103. 
In the Section of norm (chapters 7 to 9), the contributors give particular emphasis on the status 
of PMSCs under international law104. In particular, Louise Doswald-Beck examines the status 
of PMSCs’ employees as combatants or civilians and under which circumstances they can 
could be consider as prisoners-of-the-war105.  Moreover, Lehnardt examines whether States 
incur responsibility for any violations may be committed by PMSCs and their employees106. 
More precisely, she illustrates the circumstances under which a PMSCs’ conduct is attributable 
to a State party to an armed conflict107. She founds her analysis on the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals, such as the ICJ and the ICTY. Further, from these aspects, their 
publication coveres also the issue of the domestic regulation of PMSCs’ activities. In particular, 
Caparini analyses the licensing system of USA and South Africa with respect to the export of 
military goods and security services108.  However, this book seems to be ‘anachronistic’ since 
it does not include the recent developments according to the regulation and monitoring of 
PMSCS’ operations and the activities of their employees.  
 
Furthermore, in Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice 
and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies (DCAF: Geneva, 2005), the same 
                                                          
103 Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 63. 
104 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Private Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law’, in Chesterman 
and Lehnardt, supra note 63, p. 115. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra 
note 63, p. 139.  
107 Ibid. 
108 Marina Caparini, ‘Domestic Regulation: Licensing Regimes for the Export of Military Goods and Services’, 
in Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 63, p. 158. 
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approach is followed. This means that they demonstrated the expansion of the use of the private 
military and security industry and they commented its nature. However, it is the first 
publication before the endorsement of the Montreux Document which emphasizes the 
deficiencies in the governance of Private Military and Security Companies109. They provide 
with the obligations of PMSCs at international level according to the prohibition of 
mercenaries, the law of neutrality and the law of use of force.  
 
Similar to Avant’s approach, they explore the regulation of PMSCs’ activities at 
national level based on the exports of security and arms110. However, it is the first published 
work which proposes several important options of regulations at international level, such as the 
ratification on behalf of States of all the relevant international instruments, and at national level, 
such as States have to adopt similar approach as the UK Green Paper (2002)111. 
 
It is worth mentioning that before 2008, the discussions around the regulation and the 
control of PMSCs’ activities and their obligations under international law were speculations. 
The adoption of the Montreux Document constitutes a revolution in the field of the PMSCs as 
it is the first international initiative that addresses directly obligations on States to regulate 
PMSCs’ activities. As a result, in the aftermath of the adoption of the Montreux Document and 
even the ICoC, the academia elaborated more on the issue of PMSCs’ regulation. To that 
extend, Cockayne’s paper ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, 
Negotiations, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document’ provides an overview of 
the deliberations prior the adoption of the final document and emphasises its significant 
                                                          
109 Schreier and Caparini, supra note 66, p. 103. 
110 Ibid., p. 105. 
111 Ibid., p. 116. 
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contribution to the field. He also argues whether the Montreux Documents is the primary basis 
for any further improvements regarding the accountability of PMSCs and their employees112. 
 
At the same time, Hoppe’s article on ‘Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private 
Military Companies’ reveals the existing regulatory gap within States try to reduce their 
international responsibility in case of violations committed by PMSCs. By considering the 
positive obligations of States under human rights law to prevent and protect human rights 
within their jurisdiction, he acknowledges that the regulatory gap could be minimized in the 
absence of an international framework on PMSCs113. He also argues that the ‘governmental 
functions’ of PMSCs could be attributed to State –in particular the hiring State- as that of 
‘persons forming part of its armed forces’114. So as, a State cannot evade international 
responsibility for the PMSCs’ actions115.  
 
The endorsement of the Montreux Document creates the hope that ‘the Montreux 
Document will form the basis for self-regulatory efforts by the PMSC industry’. As a result, the 
literature on PMSCs criticizes also the efforts of the private military and security industry to 
adopt regulatory mechanisms. To that extent, De Nevers in his article about the ‘The 
Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry’ assesses whether 
                                                          
112 James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiations, 
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document’ [2008] 13 (3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 401-
428. 
113 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies’ [2008] 19 (5) 
European Journal of International Law 989 – 1014. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., p. 1014. 
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the International Peace Operations Association and the British Association of Private Security 
Companies have adopted relevant mechanisms in order to monitor, control and sanction 
PMSCs that are members to  these associations116. However, he observes that these self-
regulatory initiatives are ineffective because they are the result of two different national 
approaches on PMSCs –the American and the British one. 
 
In any event, the lack of a decisive international efforts to establish effective, coherent 
and sufficient regulatory regimes for PMSCs’ activities, allows PMSCs and their employees to 
escape from prosecution117. According to Singer that happens because there is an existing legal 
vaccum in relation to PMSCs’ activities118.  However, Lehnardt denotes that the matter of 
accountability of PMSCs and their employees is a matter of enforcement law rather than the 
problem of applicable law119. As a result, by speaking for a legal vacuum is a kind of ignorance 
several States obligations which apply in complex environment whereas PMSCs operate120. 
For that reason, the edited book of Francioni and Rozitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human 
Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
constitutes a milestone in the area of regulation of PMSCs’ activities throughout other areas of 
international law. It explores the existing States obligations under human rights law and 
                                                          
116 Renee De Nevers, ‘The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry’ [2010] 
30 (2) Journal of Public Policy 219-240. 
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118 Ibid. 
119 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law’ [2008] 
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humanitarian law in relation to the regulation, monitoring and oversee PMSCs’ operations121. 
In particular, it examines the obligations of the home State122, the hiring State123 and the host 
State124 in ensuring the compliance of PMSCs’ activities with the fundamental principles of 
human rights law and humanitarian law.  
 
The most comprehensive approach regarding the regulation on PMSCs at international 
and national level is the research conducted by Bakker and Sossai (eds.) Multilevel Regulation 
of Private Military and Security Contractors: the Interplay between International, European 
and Domestic Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). This publication presents the interaction 
between international125 and European norms126 of monitoring PMSCs’ activities and the 
                                                          
121 Federico Lenzerini, and Francesco Francioni, ‘The Role of Human Rights in the Regulation of Private Military 
and Security Companies’, in Francioni and Rozitti, supra note 68, p. 55 - 79. 
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Military Contractors’, in Francioni and Rozitti, supra note 68, p. 93 – 110.  
123 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Positive Human Rights Obligations of the Hiring State in Connection with the Provision of 
‘Coercive Services’ by a Private Military or Security Company’, in Francioni and Rozitti, supra note 68, p. 111 – 
129. 
124 Christine Bakker, ‘Duties to Prevent, Investigate, and Redress Human Rights Violations by Private Military 
and Security Companies: The Role of the Host State’, in Francioni and Rozitti, supra note 68, p.   130 – 148. 
125 Nigel D. White, ‘Regulatory Initiatives at International Level’, in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), 
Multilevel Regulation of Private Military and Security Contractors: the Interplay between International, 
European and Domestic Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 11-30. 
126 Guido den Dekker, ‘The Regulatory Context of Private Military and Security Contractors at EU Level’, in 
Bakker and Sossai, supra note 125, p. 31 – 52; See also Marco Gestri, ‘The European Union and Private Military 
and Security Contractors: Existing Control and Legal Bases for Further Regulation’, in Bakker and Sossai, supra 
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domestic legislative mechanisms to hold accountable PMSCs’ employees for any possible 
misconduct may occurred127.  Even the editors and the contributors examine in detail most of 
the aspects according to the regulation of PMSCs, it remains less analysed the national 
accountability regimes that applied directly over PMSCs’ employees’ misconduct. For 
instance, in the cases of the USA128, the UK129, the South Africa130 and Germany131, the 
contributors do not mention the efforts that the abovementioned States did after the 
endorsement of the Montreux Document and the adoption of the ICoC by the private military 
and security industry. 
 
In the following years, particular attention is given at the status of the PMSCs under 
international law. As a result, the book of Cameron and Chetail, Privatizing War: Private 
Military and Security Companies under Public International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) provides a comprehensive and coherent analysis of the law that applies 
directly over the PMSCs’ operations during an armed conflict. They examine any possible 
limitations with regard to outsourcing to PMSCs functions relating to the use of force132. They 
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also examine how PMSCs are bound by international humanitarian law133 and how their 
activities are attributable to States. So as, in the event of any violation of humanitarian law, the 
responsibility of States incurs134. Overall, they demonstrate how the existing international legal 
obligations could have a primary role in the regulation of the industry135. 
 
The same approach is followed by Tonkin in State Control over Private Military and 
Security Companies in Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2013). However, she 
evaluates the international obligations of States within the context of the hiring State136, the 
home State137 and the host State138 and identifies under which circumstances the international 
responsibility of States is risen.   
 
Apart from the above-mentioned approaches on PMSCs’ activities, their status under 
international law and the responsibilities of PMSCs and their employees, Seiberth published 
the first most inclusive and comprehensive study in the field of the regulation of PMSCs. The 
book Private Military and Security Companies in International Law contributes to the growing 
debate and concern about the rise of private military and security and the difficulties in 
achieving an effective international regulation139.  
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In particular, she demonstrate the applicable international law to the use of PMSCs140 
and analyses under which cases an unlawful PMSCs’ activity is attributable to a State141 . 
Moreover, she observes that PMSCs’ employees have individual accountability for violations 
of international law142. Further, she provides an extensive analysis of the Montreux 
Document143 and the ICoC144. In addition, her book constitutes the first detailed publication on 
the functions of the ICoC Oversight mechanism145. However, this publication does not provide 
with the appropriate national measures that States adopted after the endorsement of the 
Montreux Document.  
 
Besides, Seiberth’s extensive analysis on the international initiatives of PMSCs, the 
scholars continue to have concerns regarding the matter of the regulation of PMSCs. To that 
extent, Richemond-Barak supports that while the international and national regulatory 
frameworks have not made a significant progress, the self-regulation of the private military and 
security industry is advanced continuously. As a result, her article ‘Can Self-Regulation Work? 
Lessons from the Private Security and Military Industry’ provides a normative assessment of 
self-regulation in the private security and military industry – and as such offers insights for 
other industries that are transnational in reach and under-regulated by domestic, regional, and 
international law146.  
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Moreover, she tends to comment on the normative 'softness' of self-regulation system 
and of its voluntary nature. She suggests that the adoption of an OECD-type model of 
governance for the private security and military industry could overpass any deficiencies with 
regard to the monitoring and sanctioning of PMSCs and the issue of corporate accountability.  
 
Deviating from the analysis of the regulation of PMSCs, Moyakine investigates the 
application of the doctrine of State responsibility to the employment of PMSCs in conflict areas 
affected by conflicts and in cases of grave breaches of international law may be committed by 
PMSCs and their personnel147.  
 
Similar to Seiberth, Moyakine examines in which circumstances an unlawful conduct 
of PMSCs and their employees may be attributed to States under international law148. She 
further analyses the application of positive obligations imposed by international humanitarian 
law and human rights law on States149. Moreover, she emphasizes that the States in question 
also bear international responsibility when they fail to comply with their positive duties of 
result and diligent conduct stemming from the fields of international humanitarian and human 
rights law. 
 
Taking into account the abovementioned analysis of the existing literature on the 
regulation of PMSCs, the current research tries to fill the existing gaps. In particular, this 
research proposes a new initiative on the regulation of PMSCs’ activities and their employees. 
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Chapter IV specifies the characteristics of an initiative like this, such as the inclusion of 
regulative options for both land-based and maritime-based operations and more precise 
obligations and responsibilities of States, International Organisations and PMSCs under human 
rights law and humanitarian law. Furthermore, a new international initiative has to be precise 
regarding the accountability  of  States, International Organisations and PMSCs by failing to 
fulfil their obligations under international law, and to specify criminal liability for PMSCs’ 
contractors in case of human rights infringements. Apart from that the establishment of an 
oversight body that supervises the effective implementation of its provisions is required.  
 
Moreover, the present thesis explores the international regulatory regimes that apply 
over PMSCs’ activities, more emphasis is given on States’ obligation to adopt national 
initiatives to monitor PMSCs’ activities and to enact proper legislative measures to prosecute 
their private contractors’ for human rights violations (Chapter V). Most notably, the second 
part of the chapter compares four different types of national regulatory regimes regarding 
PMSCs’ operations (USA, UK, South Africa and Germany). By analysing the different types 
of national legislative frameworks for holding private contractors accountable for their 
misconducts, it identifies that an international framework to punish private contractors for 
human rights violations could be play an important role in the creation of a national model with 
regard to the punishment of private contractors.  
 
Besides, the outcome of that part of the research stresses out a provisional national law 
which could apply directly over private contractors’ misconduct. To be more precise, it 
specifies that the adoption of a national legislative commitment which is addressed directly to 
PMSCs and their personnel is more than necessary.  Therefore, it suggests that the UK Private 
Security Industry Act is a distinguished example, but some additional changes are required. 
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More particular, that proposal has to set out specific requirements regarding the registration 
regime and licensing of PMSCs and their employees, outline explicit standards about the 
training and vetting of the private contractors according to human rights principles and 
humanitarian law standards and accountability for possible human rights violations in the event 
that these occur. Moreover, the establishment of an oversight mechanism is essential is order 
to supervise the registration procedures and examine human rights allegations against private 
contractors. Thus, that national model has to have extraterritorial application as well, to provide 
access to remedies for the victims irrespectively where the violations may be committed. 
 
Due to the non-binding nature of the existing international initiatives with regard to 
private contractors’ responsibilities, a lot of attention has been paid by the international 
community to the prevention of human rights abuses committed by PMSC and their employees. 
To that extent, this study demonstrates that the human rights law could play a vital role to the 
regulation of PMSCs and the responsibilities of private contractors. Thus, the Chapter VI of 
the research entitled as States Procedural Obligations Regarding Private Military and Security 
Companies’ Activities examines the States’ procedural obligations under international human 
rights treaty bodies in relation to violations of the right to life and prohibition of torture by 
private contractors.  
 
Following this approach, the current study concludes that the jurisprudence of the 
international human rights judiciary bodies, and particular the case-law precedent of the 
ECtHR, could apply over the activities of PMSCs, whilst focusing on the obligations of States 
to prevent and investigate human rights allegations committed by private contractors. To that 
extent, the human rights law has a significant and crucial role in the regulation of PMSCs and 
the prevention of the commission of human rights violations by private contractors.  
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Accordingly, human rights law seeks to impose duties not only on States, but also on 
individuals and business entities. Therefore, the research supports that both States and PMSCs 
have the obligation to adopt appropriate legislative measures in order to prevent the 
commission of human rights violations by PMSCs and vice versa. To that extend, it suggests 
that establishment of independent institutional bodies under which the government coordinates 
with and the PMSC industry will be sufficient in investigating and punishing violations of 
human rights by private contractors. 
 
Taking into account the significant role of the human rights law in the regulation of 
PMSCs’ activities and their employees, this research focuses also on the obligations to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress human rights violations of the hiring State, host State and home 
State under human rights law in the context of the Council of Europe. In particular, this study 
distributes to the academia with the unique opportunity to discuss –based on the case-law of 
the ECtHR the possibility to prosecute private contractors under the ECtHR. More accurately, 
it indicates the primary aims of the ECtHR in the harmonization of the national legal orders so 
as to create a common regulatory standards regarding to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms among Europe. As a result, the ECtHR has to have a more decisive and 
direct role to the regulation of PMSCs contractors and their prosecution for human rights 
abuses. Therefore, the Council of Europe has to put forward initiatives, such as the adoption of 
a new convention or a new additional protocol to the ECHR with regard to prevent human 
rights abuses by PMSCs contractors. Thus, the ECtHR will be the accountability mechanism 
in order not only to secure the preventive measures from human rights violations by 
contractors, but also to specify and clarify the legal framework under which the PMSCs 
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contractors can operate either within or outside of the Europe and to ensure that the actions of 
PMSCs do not contravene the norms of human rights law.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The primary focus of the current thesis is the analysis of the existing States’ obligations under 
human rights law with regards to the regulation of PMSCs. The aim of the research is to assess 
the role of the human rights law in regulating and monitoring the activities of PMSCs and 
holding accountable PMSCs’ employees for any possible human rights violation occurred. As 
a result, it evaluates whether the human rights law constitutes a vital area of law to improve 
oversight, control and accountability for PMSCs. The following chapter provides an overview 
of the research methodology and research design used in order to examine whether the 
obligations of States under human rights law apply over the conduct of PMSCs and their 
personnel and -to that extent- to hold private contractors accountable in the event of these 
violations.  
 
1. Research Methodology 
As research methodology is described the ‘science of studying how research is done 
scientifically’150. It includes all the appropriate and various steps that a researcher has to 
undertake to answer his/her primary research question151. Apart from the relevant research 
methods, the term of research methodology also includes the research philosophy of a study. 
In other words, the research methodology constitutes the main procedure of how to conduct a 
research. 
                                                          
150 Khushal Vibhute and Filipos Aynalem, Legal Research Methods (Justice and Legal System Research Institute, 
2009), p. 19. 
151  Ibid. 
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Kothari observed that ‘research methodology has many dimensions and research 
methods do constitute a part of the research methodology. The scope of research methodology 
is wider than that of research methods. Thus, when we talk of research methodology we not 
only talk of the research methods but also consider the logic behind the methods we use in the 
context of our research study and explain why we are using a particular method or technique 
and why we are not using others so that research results are capable of being evaluated either 
by the researcher himself or by others. Why a research study has been undertaken, how the 
research problem has been identified, in what way and why the hypothesis has been formulated, 
what data have been collected and what particular method has been adopted, why particular 
technique of analysing data has been used and a host of similar other questions are usually 
answered when we talk of research methodology concerning a research problem or study’152. 
 
However, it is very difficult for a legal researcher to explain the nature of his research 
to colleagues of other and various disciplines153. According to Becher, legal researchers are 
‘not really academic […] arcane, distant and alien: an appendage to the academic world … 
vociferous, untrustworthy, immoral, narrow and arrogant’154 and the outcomes of their 
research are usually dismissed as ‘[…] unexciting, uncreative, and comprising a series of 
intellectual puzzles scattered among large areas of description’155. 
                                                          
152 C R Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Delhi: New Age International Publishers, 
2004), p. 8. 
153 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’, in Andrew Knight and Las Ruddock (eds.), Advanced Research Methods 
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154 Tony Becher, ‘Towards a Definition of Disciplinary Cultures’ [1981] 6 (2) Studies in Higher Education, p. 
109. 
155 Ibid. 
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The main reason for the above negative perception for legal research is the lack of 
awareness regarding the nature and the contribution/dissemination of the legal research156. For 
instance, in 1987, the legal research has been described as a ‘failure to provide any significant 
explanation or jurisdiction of what academic lawyers do (as is normally demanded of the 
theoretical component of a discipline) and thus of what academic law is or might be’157.  
 
Up to then, the legal research is categorised158 as:  
 
1. Doctrinal research - ‘Research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules 
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas 
of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments’; 
 
2. Reform-oriented research – ‘Research which intensively evaluates the adequacy of 
existing rules and which recommends changes to any rules found wanting’; 
3. Theoretical research – ‘Research which fosters a more complete understanding of 
the conceptual bases of legal principles and of the combined effects of a range of rules and 
procedures that touch on a particular area of activity.’ 
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Despite the abovementioned distinction regarding the nature and the contribution of the 
legal research, Arthus has proposed a forth category of legal research. This category includes 
the ‘research designed to secure a deeper understanding of law as a social phenomenon, 
including research on the historical, philosophical, linguistic, economic, social or political 
implications of law’159. He named this new category as Fundamental Research.  
 
Arthus also provided with particular research taxonomy for legal scholars. He 
distinguished the legal research between pure (for academic purposes) and applied (for 
professional purposes) research. Simultaneously, he made a further distinction between the 
methodologies that used for legal researches. He made out that there is a doctrinal and 
interdisciplinary methodology for legal research; the first one is used for research in law and 
the letter one for research about law160.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
159 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and 
the Humanities Research Council of Canada (Information Division of the Social Sciences and Humanities 
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Following the matrix above, as doctrinal research method is defined the formulation of 
legal doctrines through the analysis of the legal rules161. To that extent, a doctrinal research is 
a study that analyses legal texts (statutes, acts and cases) –it is most known as research in law. 
Nevertheless sometimes for the purposes of a doctrinal analysis, the legal researcher has to 
make reference to some other external factors in order to find out relevant answers. This means 
that the researcher deviates from the traditional analysis of a legal rules and takes into account 
other external facts in order to interpret and explain it. 
 
 To conclude, the doctrinal research methodology is used for the present research. 
According to the doctrinal research analysis, the current research 1. Reviews and synthesizes 
the existing knowledge (Chapter II reviews the existing bibliography regarding the regulation 
of PMSCs’ activities and their personnel); 2. Investigates some existing situation and/or 
problem (Chapter IV and V explore the existing international and national frameworks in 
relation to the regulation of PMSCs’ activities and their personnel. These chapters also 
emphasize that the most important problem regarding the control and monitor of PMSCs is the 
                                                          
161 Brandley W. Wendel, ‘Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Analysis’ 
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90 Yale Law Journal, p. 1113. 
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absent of a coherent and binding international and national legal framework); 3. Provides 
solution to the problem (Chapter IV suggests that an international legal binding framework will 
provide an effective and sufficient answer to the regulation problems of PMSCs. Moreover, to 
achieve an effective regulation regarding the PMSCs, Chapter V demonstrates the need of the 
adoption of national mechanism to adjudicate human rights violations committed by PMSCs’ 
employees); 4. Explains the phenomenon and generates new knowledge (Chapter VI reviews 
the existing jurisprudence of international human rights judicial bodies in order to conclude 
that human rights judicial bodies could advocate human rights allegations against private 
contractors). 
 
Moreover, it is worth a mention that the current research is a result of a library-based 
work and the examination of the relevant case-law. So as, in order to explain the contribution 
of the Montreux Document and the ICoC to the regulation and monitoring of the PMSCs’ 
operation, I used a comparative research approach (Chapter IV). Besides the non-binding 
nature of these two legal rules drives me to examine all the relevant external facts in order to 
evaluate their enrichment.  
 
Apart from the analysis of the international legal framework that governs the activities 
of PMSCs, the comparative research approach is used in order to examine the national 
regulatory mechanisms for punishment and prosecution of PMSCs’ employees for human 
rights violations (Chapter V). To that extent, by comparing four different current legislative 
regimes relating to private contractors' prosecution for their wrongful acts, namely those of the 
USA, the UK, South Africa and Germany, I managed to assess which of them is more effective. 
Moreover, the examination and analysis of the recent national developments regarding the 
prosecution of private contractors helps me to understand whether States succeed or failed to 
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comply with the international standards set out in the Montreux Document and the ICoC. 
Consequently, in the context of the absence of an international prosecution model for human 
rights violations by PMSCs, this chapter suggests a national prosecution model which may 
encourage States to fulfill their obligations under human rights law by better regulation of 
PMSCs’ operations. 
 
Similar to the examination of the international non-binding legal rules and the national 
regulatory accountability regimes, the comparative research approach is used in order to 
explore the obligations of States under human rights law regarding the regulation and control 
of PMSCs’ activities and the accountability of PMSCs and their employees (Chapter VI). Since 
the international conventions of human rights are static legal document, the examination of the 
jurisprudence and other documentation of the human rights judicial bodies helps me to 
understand whether the human rights obligations apply in the case of PMSCs. This means that 
first, the general comments of the international human rights judicial bodies helped me to 
understand the scope and the interpretation of a particular human rights rule, and secondly, the 
relevant jurisprudence provided me with the possibility to assess the application of the human 
rights law in particular cases. 
 
Furthermore, a research carried out through case study, reports and other supplementary 
materials allows the understanding of complex issues162. For instance, examination of the 
General Comment 31 provides me with the perception that ‘individuals should be protected by 
the States not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts 
                                                          
162 Zaidah Zainal, ‘Case Study as a Research Method’ [2007] 9 Jurnal Kemanusiaan, p. 2; Winston Tellis, 
‘Introduction to Case Study’ [1997] 3 (2) The Qualitative Report, p. 4. 
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committed by private persons or entities’163. Similar the examination of the jurisprudence of 
human rights judicial bodies enriched me with the understanding that the human rights States’ 
obligations fully apply over the cases of PMSCs; such as the AComHPR denoted that States 
have to protect the rights of their individuals, to prevent any violation of their rights and to 
investigate those human rights allegations; regardless whether these violations are attributable 
to State agents or private parties164. 
 
Adopting the same approach, Chapter VI explores whether the ECtHR has jurisdiction 
to adjudicate PMSCs’ employees for human rights abuses. Initially, I demonstrate the 
obligations of States to prevent human rights abuses committed by PMSCs within their 
territories and distinguished them in accordance with the Montreux Document approach on 
host State, hiring State and home State. Furthermore, based on the case-law of the ECtHR, I 
examined in which cases the ECtHR mentioned the role of private entities in the protection of 
human rights, such as Lόpez Ostra v. Spain165, Taşkin and Others v. Turkey166 and Osmanoglu 
v. Turkey167. At this point, the comparative research approach assisted me to support my 
argument that the ECtHR could constitute a regional accountability mechanism for human 
rights violations committed by PMSCs.  
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1.1.Types of Research 
According to Kothari, a research is grouped into several types:  
(i) Descriptive and Analytical Research; Descriptive research presents the problem 
as it exists at present, while the analytical uses all the available information to 
comment and evaluate a problem. 
(ii) Applied and Fundamental Research; Applied research aims to find a solution 
for a problem immediately, however, the fundamental research tries to find out 
more information about a particular phenomenon.  
(iii) Quantitative and Qualitative Research; the research which is based upon the 
measurement of quantity is called quantitative and it tries to develop 
mathematical models and theories, however, qualitative research aims to  
investigate the reasons or motives behind a certain human behaviour. 
(iv) Conceptual and Empirical Research; Conceptual research is focused on new 
idea and/or theories, while empirical research based on observations168.  
 
The present study is grouped into descripted and analytical research. This happens 
because the present study analyses the problem of the ineffectiveness of international and 
national legal frameworks regarding the control and monitor of PMSCs’ activities, and also 
suggests some possible solutions based on the existing information. 
 
 
 
                                                          
168 Kothari, supra note 152, p. 2. 
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2. Research Philosophy 
A research philosophy is the way in which the researcher collects, analyses and uses the data 
about a particular matter. The term epistemology demonstrates which is true and the doxology 
which should be true. Based on that distinction, within the western tradition, two main research 
philosophies have been developed; the positivist and the interpretivist169.  
 
The present study is based on the positivist research philosophy. That happens because 
the positivist research philosophy supports that the researchers are independent of their 
research as they do not affect their participants during their research170 and so they can observe, 
describe and identify objectively171. 
 
2.1.Research Approach 
According to positivist research philosophy, the researcher is able make predictions 
based on previous work (Chapter II: Literature Review) in order to observe and explain further 
the inter-action and the inter-relation with the current research. The choice of the positivist 
philosophy usually drives to the adoption of a deductive approach172. On the other hand, the 
inductive research approach is usually associated with a phenomenology philosophy.  
 
                                                          
169 Robert Galliers (ed.), Information Systems Research: Issues, Methods and Practical Guidelines (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991), p. 144. 
170 Jonathan Wilson, Essentials of Business Research: A Guide to Doing Your Research Project (London, SAGE, 
2010), p. 10. 
171 David-Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 
1988) 
172 David Crowther and Geoffrey A. Lancaster, Research Methods: A Concise Introduction to Research in 
Management and Business Consultancy (Second Edition, Oxford: Elsevier, 2008) 
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A deductive approach requires the ‘developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on 
existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis’173. In other words, 
the deductive approach means that the researcher moves from the particular to the general. So 
as, he/she tests whether there is a particular link which applies in more general circumstances. 
 
On the other hand, inductive approach works on the other way; it means than the 
inductive approach ‘involves the search for pattern from observation and the development of 
explanations – theories – for those patterns through series of hypotheses’174.  
 
 
 
                                                          
173 Jonathan Wilson, Essentials of Business Research: A Guide to Doing Your Research Project (Los Angeles-
London-New Delhi, SAGE, 2010), p. 7. 
174 Harvey Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (5th 
Edition, Lanham-New York-Toronto-Plymouth, AltaMira Press, 2011), p. 7 
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However, for the purposes of the present research, the researcher adopts both deductive 
and inductive research approach175. That happens because he provides arguments, international 
frameworks and case-law regarding the obligations of States to protect human rights (general) 
in order to explain whether States have the obligation to prevent human rights abuses 
committed by PMSCs (specific).  
 
Most notably, the sexual abuse and inhuman treatment of detainees by PMSCs’ 
employees in Afghanistan and the shooting of 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians at Nisour square in 
Bagdad are used as case-study to demonstrate the involvement of PMSCs in human rights 
abuses. Both of the abovementioned incidents were received wide coverage in the media, 
literature and reports which criticized the effectiveness of the investigations on these grave 
breaches of human rights law, the lack of effective legal proceedings either nationals or 
internationals to punish the perpetrators of these crimes.  
 
Furthermore, this study explores the international non-binding regulative framework 
relating to the PMSCs’ operations. It assesses the contribution of the Montreux Document in 
imposing obligations on States to regulate, control and oversee the operations carrying out by 
PMSCs. At the same time, it examines the significance of the ICoC in imposing particular 
human rights obligations on PMSCs and their employees. However, considering the non-
binding nature of these initiatives, the current study focuses on the structural weaknesses of 
both the Montreux Document and the ICoC. In the context of the present thesis, such an 
analysis refers also to the interaction between the Montreux Document and the ICoC with 
recent developments in the field at national level.  
                                                          
175 Charner M. Perry, ‘Inductive vs. Deductive Method in Social Science Research’ [1927] 8 (1) The Southwestern 
Political and Social Science Quarterly, p. 66. 
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In order to examine further the issue of regulation of PMSCs’ operations and the 
accountability regime for any human rights violation may be committed by their employees, 
this research explores the existing national accountability frameworks for the prosecution of 
PMSCs’ employees. Therefore, there is a comparative element regarding the relationship 
between international law and domestic legal order for the purposes of the topic. So as, this 
research reviews four national accountability frameworks (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, South Africa and Germany) for the prosecution and punishment of PMSCs’ 
misconduct. The main reason for using these particular countries as case-study is that they have 
adopted different approaches towards the use of PMSCs and the outsourcing military and 
security services to private corporations. In particular, the United States are one of the major 
exporters of military and security services; the same as the United Kingdom. On the other hand, 
South Africa has a more strict national policy with respect to the outsourcing of military and 
security services and Germany based PMSCs’ operations on common regulatory regimes. 
Following the comparative analysis, the present research presents the particular features of 
national regulatory and accountability framework of PMSCs and their employees. 
 
At the same time, based on inductive approach, he accommodates arguments from 
specific observations; such as the UK Private Security Industry Act of 2001 in order to propose 
that all States have to adopt a similar national framework because currently it is the most 
effective and close to the international standards.   
 
2.2.Research Strategy 
The main key problem that a researcher has to deal with is what strategy he/she has to adopt in 
order to conduct his/her study. As a research strategy is defined ‘the general plan of how the 
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researcher will go about answering the research questions’176. So as, the research strategy 
provides the researcher with the overall direction of the research including the process by which 
the research is conducted177. Such examples of research strategies are the experiment, the case 
study, the survey, the action research, the grounded theory and the ethnography178. 
 
Saunders et al suggest that the research strategy should be selected by taking into 
account the research questions and objectives of the study, the existing literature on the topic 
be researched, the available resources, and the philosophical underpinnings of the researcher179. 
However, Robert Yin argues that a particular research strategy should be selected in according 
to the type of research question, the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural 
events, and the degree of focus on contemporary or historical events180. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
176 Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill, Research Methods for Business Students (5th ed., Harlow: 
Pearson Education, 2009), p. 600. 
177 Gayan Wedawatta, Bingunath Ingirige and Dilanthi Amaratunga, ‘Case Study as a Research Strategy: 
Investigating Extreme Weather Resilience of Construction SMEs in the UK’ [2011], p. 1. 
178 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, supra note 179, p. 141.  
179 Ibid. 
180 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: SAGE Publication, 2014). 
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Strategy Form of research question 
Requires  control 
over behavioural 
events 
Focuses on 
contemporary events 
Experiment How, Why Yes Yes 
Survey 
Who, What, Where, How many, 
How much No Yes 
Archival 
Who, What, Where, How  many, 
How much No Yes/No 
History How, Why No No 
Case Study How, Why No Yes 
Characteristics of Research Strategies (Retrieved from Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods (London: SAGE Publication, 2009). 
 
2.2.1. Justification for the Chosen Research Strategy 
Yin defines that a case study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident’181. Moreover, he argues that the case study research 
strategy is the appropriate one whereas the phenomenon and the context are not readily 
distinguish. The issue of the international and national regulation of PMSCs in order to prevent 
human rights violations and/or a context which adjudicates PMSCs for alleged human rights 
violations is a kind of a phenomenon like this. That happens because during an operation we 
can hardly distinguish PMSCS from the national armies.  
 
                                                          
181 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: SAGE Publication, 1984), p. 23. 
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Similarly, Dul and Hak argue that a case study is ‘a study in which (a) one case (single 
case study) or a small number of cases (comparative case study) in their real life context are 
selected and (b) scores obtained from these case are analysed in a qualitative manner’182. In 
other words, a case study is more often associated with contemporary challenges in which the 
regulation and the monitoring of the PMSCs falls within this scope.  
 
Taking into account the aforementioned definitions of the case study research strategy, 
at the present study the case study strategy is chosen in order to demonstrate the real and 
important problems around the context of the use of PMSCs. Adopting a case study research 
enabled the researcher the opportunity to be close to the research objects (regulation and control 
of the PMSCs’ activities), allowing the researcher the opportunity to gain in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon (international and national framework surrounded PMSCs 
and their employees activities).  
 
At the present study, two of the most notorious episodes of human rights violations are 
used in order to demonstrate the legal vacuum in which PMSCs their employees operate. The 
Abu Ghraib prison scandal (2003) and the Blackwater accident (2007) obviously illustrate that 
PMSCs operate within an elusive and unclear international framework. This is the reason that 
this study moves one step forward and examines, apart the international frameworks on 
PMSCs’ activities, the national ones. It uses as a case study the greatest four exporters and 
users of PMSCs, the USA, the UK, the South Africa and the Germany, in order to analyse the 
                                                          
182 Jan Dul and Tony Hak, Case Study Methodology in Business Research (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), p. 4. 
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context within the PMSCs operate and also whether there are relevant mechanism to adjudicate 
PMSCs and their employees for human rights violations. 
  
Apart from the case study research strategy, in the present research the comparative 
research strategy is also used.  That happens because a current study tends also to look for 
differences among its cases. This is the reason that the present study examines the four different 
types of national frameworks (Chapter V) in order to conclude which one is the more 
appropriate and suitable to regulate PMSCs activities and adjudicate their employees for human 
rights violations. So as, by adopting the comparative research strategy, the present research 
demonstrates also the insufficiencies of the current legal frameworks –international and 
nationals- in order to suggest that human rights law constitutes a new, secure and vital option 
for the regulation of  PMSCs activities. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
A NEW PATHWAY TOWARDS PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES’ 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
 
The current chapter demonstrates the obligations of States to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ 
activities with regard to the Montreux Document’s standards. Furthermore, it argues PMSCs’ 
obligations under the Montreux Document and ICoC regarding any potential improvements to 
oversee the activities of PMSC’s contractors and to establish accountability mechanisms for 
their harmful activities. Overall, it focuses on the emerge need of the adoption of a new 
coherent international regulatory regime which is going to demonstrate States’, international 
organisations’ and PMSCs’ international obligations and responsibilities for land-based and 
maritime-based PMSCs’ activities and to specify criminal liability for PMSCs’ contractors in 
case of human rights infringements. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the presence of new actors who carry out a range of tasks with regard to 
the use of force has increased. It the previous chapter, it is mentioned that PMSCs are requested 
by governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations or other 
corporations to provide land-based or maritime security and/or military services183. Their 
functions usually include the protection of personnel or military property, the training and 
                                                          
183 Elke Krahmann, Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence: A Case of Norm Change?, 
(Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2009). 
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advising of national security forces, the interrogation of suspects and even participation in 
hostilities.184 Accordingly, Singer185 distinguishes PMSCs into three different “sectors”: 1. 
military provider companies, which supply a State party to a conflict with direct, tactical and 
military assistance; 2. military consulting firms that advise and train members of the national 
armed forces; and, 3. military support companies that are responsible to provide logistic 
maintenance and other services to armed forces. For instance, in Iraq, the ‘civilian contractors’ 
had ranged from logistic supports to food preparation for the military forces. Further, PMSCs 
were are involved in training military personnel in former Yugoslavia, active in Afghanistan 
and constructed camps for displace people in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during 
Kosovo conflicts. 
 
The widespread use of outsourcing of governmental military and/or security functions 
to PSMCs has seen further growth very rapidly with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq186. 
To that extent, some questions have arisen concerning their responsibilities for any misconduct 
committed by them187. Most actually, the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has 
                                                          
184 Lindsey Cameron, ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status under International Humanitarian Law and Its 
Impact on Their Regulation’ [2006] 88 International Review of Red Cross, p. 573. 
185 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (New York, Cornell 
University Press, 2003).  
186 In 2010, the 54% of the United States Department of Defence’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan consisted 
of private contractors. Moshe Schawartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defence Contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: Background and Analysis (Congressional Research Service, 13 May 2011). 
187 For a further analysis of PMC’s activities in Iraq see Jordi Palou-Loverdos and Leticia Armendariz, The 
Privatization of Warfare, Violence and Private Military & Security Companies: A Factual Approach to Human 
Rights Abuses by PMSC in Iraq (Nova - Institute for Active Non-violence, 2011). 
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reported human rights violations perpetrated by PMSCs’ employees as ‘summary executions, 
acts of torture, cases of arbitrary detention, trafficking of persons and serious health damages 
caused by PMSC employee activities, as well as attempts against the right of self-
determination’188. 
 
In particular, in 2004 the killing of four employees of “Blackwater” in Fallujah and the 
torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq committed by two United States-based 
PMSCs, CACI and Titan189. These accidents revealed an existing legal vacuum under which 
PMSCs employees operate190 and raised ambiguities regarding the norms that govern PMSCs’ 
operations and the legitimacy of their activities191. Moreover, the killing of 17 unarmed Iraqi 
                                                          
(http://www.consciousbeingalliance.com/Informe_PMSC_Iraq_Nova.pdf); David A. Iseberg, Shadow Force: 
Private Military Contractors in Iraq, (New York: Praeger Security International, 2009). 
188 Jose Luis Gomez Prado, ‘The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies 
(PMSC)’ [2014] Global Research, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-privatization-of-war-
mercenaries-private-military-and-security-companies-pmsc/21826?print=1 (visited on May 2016). 
189 Blackwater is one of the most high-profile PMCs operating in Iraq, with around 1,000 employees as well as a 
fleet of helicopters in the country. 
190 Peter W. Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’ 
[2004] 42 Columbia Journal of International Law, p. 521.  On the other hand, Lehnardt denotes that speaking for 
a legal vacuum is a kind of ignorance several States obligations which apply in complex environment whereas 
PMSCs operate. Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’, in Simon Chesterman and 
Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to the Market: the Rise and Regulation for Private Military Companies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 42.  
191 See Mark W. Bina, ‘Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability after Abu Ghraib’ [2005] 38 John 
Marshall Law Review, p. 1237; Heather Carney, ‘Prosecuting the Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and Private 
Military Firms’ [2006] 74 George Washington Law Review, p. 317; Laura Dickinson, ‘Government for Hire: 
69 
 
civilians at Nisour square in Baghdad strengthened the questions of private contractors’ 
responsibilities. Five contractors have been charged with counts of voluntary and attempted 
manslaughters; yet they managed to escape from prosecution, as the District Court identified a 
violation of the right to fair trial, on the grounds that the given statements by the five 
Blackwater guards had been improperly used192. However upon appeal, the defendants 
petitioned the USA Supreme Court to hear their case. So, after seven years of delays, finally, 
Blackwater’s employees were charged with convictions of first-degree murder and 
manslaughter, since the use of lethal force at that occasion was unnecessary193. 
 
As States continue to transfer military and security functions to PMSCs during armed 
conflicts and/or stability operations, the discussions to establish a coherent legal framework to 
govern these operations are raised. This need has been highlighted by the UN Working Group 
on the Use of Mercenaries by arguing that ‘the lack of rules governing the activities carried 
out by PMSCs created a culture of impunity dangerous for the stability of the country’194. 
Moreover, in conjunction with the primary obligation of States to protect and respect human 
                                                          
Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law’ [2005] 45 William and 
Mary Law Review, p. 135. 
192 Timothy Williams, ‘Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped’, The New York Times, 2 January 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/02blackwater.html?_r=0 (visited on May 2016). 
193 Trial of Blackwater Guards Charged with Killing Iraqis to Open in US, (10 June 2014), available at 
http://www.voanews.com/content/trial-of-blackwater-guards-charged-with-killing-iraqis-to-open-in-
us/1934146.html (last visited on May 2016). 
194 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a 
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination - 
Addendum - Mission to Afghanistan, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25/Add.2, 2010. 
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rights within their territory and/or jurisdiction195, States have to execute overall and effective 
control over the activities of PMSCs and to ensure that their operations re fully complied with  
the principles of international humanitarian and human rights law. Therefore, the Montreux 
Document196 is the first international initiative that addresses direct obligations to States to 
regulate PMSCs’ activities and encourage them to establish national legislative frameworks to 
hold accountable PMSCs’ employees for any possible human rights abuses. 
 
Simultaneously, international law does not apply directly to private contractors. So it 
remains insufficient to hold them accountable for human rights abuses, besides they are acting 
under effective and official control of a State. It is also recognised that PMSCs have an 
obligation to respect human rights and to prevent any breaches197. In order to fill this gap, the 
private security industry throughout PSI associations has undertaken efforts to come up with 
issues of legitimacy of PMSCs’ activities, of regulation and monitoring their activities, and -in 
cases of human rights allegations- of effectiveness and accountability for PMSCs’ activities198. 
                                                          
195 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to 
the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 2004, at para. 10. 
196 The Montreux Document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, A/63/467–S/2008/636, 2008, 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/467 (last visited on May 2016). 
197 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 2011. 
198 Sorcha MacLeod, ‘The Role of International Regulatory Initiatives on Business and Human Rights for Holding 
Private Military and Security Contractors to Account’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalia Ronzitti (eds.), War by 
Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
p. 343. 
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Thus, the adoption of the ICoC199 constitutes the most recent and coherent international effort 
that imposes directly human rights obligations to PMSCs regarding the prevention of human 
rights abuses committed by their employees. Regardless the non-binding nature of both the 
aforementioned initiatives, this chapter outlines the obligations that these documents impose 
on States and PMSCs to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities. Moreover, it emphasizes the 
responsibility of States for any possible PMSCs’ misconduct. It also assesses States’ efforts to 
comply with the Montreux Document. In addition, it focuses on the importance of the 
international oversight mechanism as established by the ICoC. Overall it argues the emerging 
need of a binding international regime for the regulation of PMSCs’ activities.  
 
 
2. The Montreux Document: the First States’ International Effort to Regulate 
Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities 
 
After the incidents of human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib and Nisour square and more than 
three years of negotiations, some States have endorsed the first international document of a 
coherent and effective regulation for PMSCs which improves the accountability of business 
entities for violations of international law. The Montreux Document remains the most recent 
and the clearest collection of international legal norms regarding States’ obligations towards 
                                                          
199 The ICoC is a stakeholder initiative convened by the Swiss government. It aims to set principles and standards 
to private security industry based on international human rights and humanitarian law. This document adopted on 
9th of November 2010 by private companies and it is available at http://www.icoc-psp.org.  
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the PMSCs’ activities and contains also administrative practices for States to regulate and 
oversee PMSCs’ operations200. 
 
Cockyane201 summarized the significance of the Montreux Document in five main 
points: firstly, the Montreux Document constitutes the outcome of a long way negotiation by a 
diverse group of States with different interests; Secondly, this document repeats the existing 
obligation of States to protect human rights and to ensure respect for international humanitarian 
law towards PMSCs’ operations; Thirdly, it is the first international document that reminds to 
States that the obligation to regulate extraterritorial PMSCs’ activities derives by the existing 
treaty and customary law; Fourthly, the Montreux Document contains also a guide of ‘good 
practices’ regarding options to regulate PMSCs activities202; and finally, the Montreux 
Document constitutes the first international achievement which compromises two different 
approaches on PMSCs’ regulations; a States’ and an industry one.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
200 Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies in International Law 
(Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2014), p. 123; Nigel D. White, ‘Regulatory Initiatives at International 
Level’, in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Private Military and Security 
Contractors: the Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2012), p. 11. 
201 James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiations, 
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document’ [2008] 13 (3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 402. 
202 The Montreux Document, Preface, para. 5: ‘’ [...] that existing obligations and good practices may also be 
instructive for post-conflict situations and for other, comparable situations; [...]. 
73 
 
2.1. States’ Obligations to Regulate and Monitor the Activities of Private Military 
and Security Companies 
The Montreux Document expresses legal concerns regarding the monitoring of PMSCs’ 
activities203. It explicitly specifies the duties of the contracting States,204 territorial States,205 
home States 206 and all other States to regulate and monitor the activities that carried out by 
PMSCs and their personnel207; while PMSCs and their personnel do not escape from the 
obligation to comply their operations with the principles of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law. 
 
However, since the Montreux Document focuses on the use of PMSCs in conflict 
situations, it is clearly that it highlights the obligations of States as they derived by the common 
article 1 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions to ensure respect for international humanitarian 
                                                          
203 Expert Meeting on Private Military and Security Contractors: Status and State Responsibility for their Actions, 
University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, International Conference Centre, Geneva (2005), 
available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/expert-meetings/2005/2rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf (last 
visited on May 2015).  
204 As ‘’the contracting State’’ is defined the state which directly hires PMSCs. See the Montreux Document, 
Preface, para. 9 (c). 
205 The state on whose territory PMSCs operate is called ‘’territorial state’’. See the Montreux Document, Preface, 
para. 9 (d). 
206 According the Montreux Document, “Home States” are States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC 
is registered or incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one where it has its principal 
place of management, then the State where the PMSC has its principal place of management is the “Home State”. 
See the Montreux Document, Preface, para. 9 (e). 
207 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 132. 
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law.208 Therefore, all States have the primary obligation ‘not to encourage of assist […] 
violations of international humanitarian law’ by PMSCs activities and their employees209. To 
that extent the adoption of appropriate measures to prevent violations of international 
humanitarian law during PMSCs’ operations is more than necessary210. Under such general 
obligation, States have to restrict the outsourcing to functions which traditionally belonged to 
States; such as the supervision of prisoner-of-war camps and/or civilian places and the 
performing of certain actions in case of occupation211. In particular, contracting (hiring) States 
have the additional obligation to ensure that PMSCs and their personnel ‘are aware of their 
obligations’ during their operations under international humanitarian law, so they should be 
trained accordingly212. Besides, in conjunction with the establishment of selective213 and 
transparent procedures214 to contract of PMSCs, States assure that PMSCs fully comply with 
the obligations derived by international humanitarian law and human rights law215. Altogether 
States should have efficient national oversight mechanisms to monitor PMSCs’ contracts and 
                                                          
208 The common article 1 illustrates that ‘’the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for the present Convention in all circumstances’’. 
209 The Montreux Document, Part I: Pertinent International Legal Obligations Relating to Private Military and 
Security Companies, A para. 3 (b). Also in B para. 9 (b) and in C para. 14 (b). 
210 The Montreux Document emphasises that these measures are range from ‘’military regulations, administrative 
orders and other regulatory measures to administrative disciplinary or judicial sanctions’’. See The Montreux 
Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 3 (c). Also in B para. 9 (c) and in C para. 14 (c). 
211 Explanatory Comments to the Montreux Document, p. 32, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (last visited on May 2015). 
212 Explanatory Comments to the Montreux Document, supra note 214, p. 33.  
213 The Monteux Document, Part II: Good Practices Relating to Private Military and Security Companies, A para. 
2. 
214 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A para. 4. 
215 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A para. 5. 
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to ensure accountability for PMSCs’ employees in case of misconduct216. Consequently, the 
obligations of territorial States, the Montreux initiative imposes further obligations. It remains 
on its discretion to establish or not restrictions on PMSCs’ operations throughout national 
law217. Therefore in order to certify which of PMSCs respect international law principles, the 
territorial State should adopt a coherent authorization mechanism to provide licenses to PMSCs 
and their employees as well218. Moreover, the territorial State is responsible to clarify which 
function could be outsourced or not on its territory219. 
 
Apart from these obligations under the international humanitarian law, States have also 
the duty to undertake all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent any human rights 
violations by PMSCs and their employees, to protect their individuals by PMSCs’ harmful 
activities, to investigate effectively human rights allegations by private contractors and to 
prosecute them220, and - in case of a violation has been occurred – to provide reparations to 
victims221. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
216 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A paras. 19-23. 
217 Explanatory Comments to the Montreux Document, supra note 214, p. 33. 
218 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, B para. 25. 
219 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, B paras. 43-45. 
220 Additionally the Montreux Document affirms that States should enact specific legislative measures to hold 
private contractors’ accountable for grave breaches on international humanitarian law, irrespectively of their 
jurisdiction. Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 5. Also in B para.11 and in C para. 16. 
221 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 4. Also in B para.10 and in C para. 15. 
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2.2. Obligations Imposed on Private Military and Security Companies  
The Montreux Document also outlines PMSCs’ commitments. According to its provisions, 
PMSCs have to fully comply with the national laws that reflect international humanitarian law 
and human rights law standards222. Moreover, not only PMSCs but also their employees should 
act in accordance with the obligations and accountability provisions imposed by national 
frameworks223. In particular, they have to respect national criminal law provisions either of the 
home State or territorial’s one.224  
 
Regarding their status under international humanitarian law, PMSCs’ personnel ‘are 
obliged [...] to comply with the applicable international law’225. In spite that the majority view 
qualifies PMSCs’ employees as civilians, they are not allowed to participate directly to 
hostilities.226 Therefore, the Montreux Document illustrates further under which circumstances 
the private contractors lose their civilian immunity227. In particular, in situations where a PMSC 
contractor is part of the armed forces of a State-party to a non-international armed conflict - 
and effectively is qualified as a rebel soldier – the private contractor can be attacked under 
humanitarian law. Moreover, even though they are civilians, during international armed 
conflict private contractors are entailed to prisoner-of-war status, since they are acting as 
‘civilians accompanying the armed forces’228. Yet, when they are acting as State agents, private 
                                                          
222 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 22. 
223 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 23. 
224 Ibid. 
225 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 26 (a). 
226 Seiberth, supra note 203, at 106. 
227 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 26 (b).  
228 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 26 (c). 
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contractors are bound to respect human rights; and in case of any violations they are subjected 
to prosecution229. In order to ensure that private contractors are clearly distinguishable during 
their operations, the Montreux Document recommends that they have to carry clear and visible 
identification in accordance with safety requirements and moreover their means of transport 
should be clearly distinguishable as well230. 
 
Overall, the Montreux Document establishes also the superiors’ responsibility for 
crimes231 committed by private contractors, as a result of supervisor’s failure to exercise 
effective and adequate control over them. However, even there are different approaches 
regarding the establishment of superior’s responsibility; a contract cannot do it by itself. Yet in 
contrast, the Statute of ICC differs significantly in the determination of the superior 
responsibility232 that the one established by the ICRC Study on Customary International 
                                                          
229 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, E para. 26 (e). For instance, regarding the incidents of torture 
at Abu Ghraib prisons, the USA established settlements to provide accountability for those contractors and offer 
some measure of justice for the victims. See more Patrick Cockburn, ‘Iraqis win $5.8m from US firm in Abu 
Ghraib torture lawsuit’, (January 2013), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/iraqis-win-58m-from-us-firm-in-abu-ghraib-torture-lawsuit-8444907.html (last visited on May 2015). 
230 The Monteux Document remarks that: ‘’ [...] to require, if consistent with force protection requirements and 
safety of the assigned mission, that the personnel of the PMSC be personally identifiable whenever they are 
carrying out activities in discharge of their responsibilities under a contract. Identification should: a) be visible 
from a distance where mission and context allow, or consist of a non-transferable identification card that is shown 
upon demand; b) allow for a clear distinction between a PMSC’s personnel and the public authorities in the State 
where the PMSC operates. The same should apply to all means of transportation used by PMSCs [...]’’. See The 
Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A para. 16 and also B, para. 45. 
231 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, F para. 27. 
232 Article 28 of the Statute of ICC. 
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Law233. So the Montreux Document leaves certain loopholes with regard to the superior’s 
criminal responsibility. In cases where the applicable International Law is not applicable for 
PMSCS’ – for example British PMSCs and their employees are hired by the government of the 
U.S.A234. 
 
2.3. State Responsibility for Private Military and Security Companies’ Wrongful 
Acts 
The Montreux Document illustrates not only States’ obligations under Treaty and customary 
law to regulate and monitor PMSCs activities, but also designates in which cases a State cannot 
evade international responsibility for PMSCs’ employees’ wrongful acts. More specifically, it 
is highly important to hold a State responsible for wrongful acts committed by private 
contractors; these acts should be attributable to the State concern235.  
 
To that end the Montreux Document recalls the rules on State responsibility as 
contained in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(hereinafter as ‘Draft Articles’)236. Consequently, a PMSCs’ misconduct is attributable237 to a 
State in the following cases: the PMSC is incorporated into State’s national armed forces, 
PMSCs’ employees are acting under a command responsible to the States238, PMSCs are hired 
                                                          
233 Rule 153 sets out in the International Committee of Red Cross Study on Customary International Law (2009). 
234 Cockyane, supra note 204, p. 411. 
235 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 7. 
236 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, vol. II (2001) (Part Two). 
237 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 7 (a). Also Article 4 of Draft Articles.  
238 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 7 (b) and Article 4 of Draft Articles. 
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to exercise inherent governmental functions239, and PMSCs are acting on the instructions of 
the State under direct effective control240. In the aforementioned cases and when an incident of 
a violation occurred by PMSCs employees, the State should provide reparation to victims241. 
In this degree, Ruggie242 explained further the notion of providing reparation to victims of such 
violations. He denotes that States have to enact ‘independent, non-discriminatory and fair’ 
mechanisms to provide ‘legitimate, accessible, predictable equitable, rights-compatible and 
transparent’ remedy to individuals harmed from PMSCs’ activities.   
 
However, the Montreux Document did not manage to close the loopholes regarding the 
State responsibility for PMSCs’ misconducts. That happened because it follows the narrow 
interpretation with regard to which acts are attributable to a State as it establishes by the Draft 
Articles. To that extent when a State contracts out a PMSC to operate on an occupied territory, 
the State does not engage international responsibility because the overall, direct and effective 
control by the contracting State is missing243.  
 
2.4. Achievements of States to Reach the Montreux Principles 
Since the endorsement of the Montreux initiative by stakeholders and international 
organizations, States engaged with the efforts to achieve an effective and coherent regulatory 
                                                          
239 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 7 (c). See also Articles 5 and 7 of Draft Articles. 
240 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, A para. 7 (d) and Article 8 of Draft Articles. 
241 The Montreux Document, Part I, supra note 212, para. 8. 
242 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations  and Other 
Business Enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 2008, para. 92. 
243 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 85. 
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framework to oversee PMSCs’ activities. While Cockyane244 argues that the Montreux 
Document tries to ‘provide a set of generally respected standards on which other regulatory 
initiatives could be built’, it is worth to highlight the measures that States have already 
undertook in order to comply with the good practices suggested by the Montreux Document. 
 
The report on ‘’Progress and Opportunities: Five Years On’’ of the Montreux 
Document245 highlighted that endorsing States have to face with crucial challenges on 
regulation of PMSCs at national level. For instance, States should articulate which functions 
can or cannot be performed by PMSCs. To that extent, States tried to delineate domains of 
authorized PMSCs activities. For instance, the USA Office of Management and Budget 
Circular indicates which functions could be carried out by PMSC. These functions include 
‘guard services, convoy protection services, pass and identification services, plant protection 
services or the operation of prison or detention facilities’246. At the same time, the USA has 
narrowed the scope of using PMSCs by stating that these civilian contractors are not authorized 
to exercise governmental functions by taking part into hostilities247. 
                                                          
244 Cockyane, supra note 204, p. 427. 
245 Benjamin S. Buckland and Annie Burdzy, Progress and Opportunities: Five Years On: Challenges and 
Recommendations for the Montreux Document Endorsing States (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2013).  
246 White House - Office of Management and Budget, Circular A- 76 (Revised), Performance of Commercial 
Activities, Washington, 2003, Attachment A.B.1 (c) (4), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction/ (last visited on May 2016). 
247 National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 832, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr5658ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr5658ih.pdf (last visited on May 2016). 
Accordingly the U.S. Congress emphasised that inherently governmental functions should not be delegated to 
someone who is not into the military chain of command. Ibid. 
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Some States –on the other hand- adopted a more restrictive policy regarding the hiring 
of PMSCs. One significant example to that end is the South Africa which completely bans the 
participation of its nationals in an armed conflict of a foreign State248. Moving forward from 
this restrictive approach, the British example stands far different; as the UK regulates PMSCs 
regarding the activities that they export249. 
 
Another important step to regulate effectively PMSCs’ activities and to prevent 
possible violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law is to ensure that 
PMSCs and their contractors (including subcontractors as well) respect the principles of 
international law. Thus, States have to improve oversight mechanisms and to exercise adequate 
control over the relationship between States and PMSCs. Therefore, the development of a 
licensing, contracting and authorization system for PMSCs is required250. This system seems 
to be more than necessary in order to prevent any violation of their contractual activity and also 
                                                          
248 Republic of South Africa, Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country 
of Armed Conflict Act, 2006, Government Gazette, Vol. 509, No. 30477, Section 3, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/mercenaries/wg/law/southafrica2.pdf (last visited on May 2016). 
249 Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003 No. 
2764, Department of Industry and Trade, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2764/contents/made (last visited on May 2016). 
250 As the Report ‘‘Progress and Opportunities: Five Years On’’ emphasises that all States have to adopt these 
procedures. ‘Home States, where PMSCs are headquartered or based, should consider establishing a system 
issuing operating licenses for the provision of military and security services abroad. For territorial States, the 
Montreux Document urges States to require that PMSCs obtain authorisation to provide military and security 
services in their sovereign territory. Contracting States should develop systematic procedures that grant contracts 
to companies’. Buckland and Burdzy, supra note 248, p. 25. 
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to avoid impunity in cases of misconduct251. For example, in the UK, an independent body 
named as the Security Industry Authority, which is responsible for licensing PMSCs, has been 
established. At the same time, the British Secretary of State retains control of licensing and 
registration when it relates to the export of goods, transfer of technology and provisional 
technical assistance252. 
 
Moreover, South Africa has a more detailed approach regarding the functions and the 
procedures of this oversight body. According to the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 
56 ‘[...] the Council (for the Authority) must appoint a suitable qualified and experienced 
person as the director of the Authority, as well as three deputy directors, on such conditions 
and terms as may be determined by the Council […]’253. The Act goes further in order to clarify 
procedures to ensure accountability for this institution; it highlights that: ‘[...] the Council is 
accountable to the Minister for the performance of its functions and must: (b) as soon as may 
be reasonably practicable [...] supply the Minister with a copy of (i) the annual report on the 
activities of the Authority and the Council’254 and moreover that ‘[...] the Committee must 
maintain a register of any— (a) authorisation issued by the Committee [...]’ and ‘[...] must 
                                                          
251 Marina Caparini, ‘Domestic Regulation: Licensing Regimes for the Export of Military Goods and Services’, 
in Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 193, p. 138. 
252 Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003 No. 
2764, supra note 252. 
253 Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation Act (No. 56 of 2001), Section 14, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica3.pdf. (last visited on May 2016). 
254 Ibid., section 10. 
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submit quarterly reports to the National Executive and Parliament with regard to the register 
[...]’255. 
 
The establishment of these procedures could be enhanced by the evaluation of past 
PMSCs’ conducts and their employees’ past conduct as well. To that extent in order to select 
a PMSC and/or approve its authorisation, States should examine whether that PMSC has been 
involved in any serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law 
during its previous operations; and if so, whether they provided adequate remedies to victims 
or not.  
 
Nevertheless these potential good practices256, Seiberth257 observes that ‘the idea of a 
poor reputation being bad for business only applies to small PMSCs’258. As an example she 
mentions the case of DynCorp International. Despite several accusations against DynCorp of 
providing Afghan police with drugs and child prostitutes, the USA Department of Defence 
renewed its contract in 2010 for training police forces in Afghanistan259. These examples 
indicates that the past conduct of the PMSC, even good or bad one, still does not affect at all 
States decisions to contract to them governmental functions.  
 
                                                          
255 Republic of South Africa, Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country 
of Armed Conflict Act, supra note 251, Section 8. 
256 The Monteux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A. para. 6, B. para. 32, C. para. 60. 
257 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 143. 
258 Susan Crabtree, ‘U.S. Needs To Improve Safeguards To Avoid Rehiring 'Bad Actor' Defense Contractors’, 
(2011), available at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/u-s-needs-to-improve-safeguards-to-avoid-rehiring-bad-
actor-defense-contractors (last visited on May 2016). 
259 David Isenberg, ‘DynCorp Still Training Afghan military of Interior, 2011’, The PMSC Observer (2011).  
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Also, a State is responsible to gather information regarding the criminal records of 
PMSCs’ employees. With this respect South Africa constitutes a unique example, as it asks for 
detailed reports from PMSCs, including personal details of the employees, registers reflecting 
the hours of work of PMSCs’ personnel, records regarding the places where PMSCs’ 
employees have been or are utilised, the nature of the operation, whether the PMSCs’ personnel 
are carried any firearm or other weapon, and also certified documents that indicate the level of 
security training of such security officers and officials260. 
   
3. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers 
Two years after the endorsement of the Montreux Document, fifty-eight private security 
companies signed the final version of the ICoC under the auspices of the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law261. The significance of this effort 
is that it is an industry driven process, representatives from PMSCs, industry associations, such 
as ISOA, members of civil society – as Human Rights First and ICRC, and governments, such 
the USA, the UK, Afghanistan and Switzerland, have been involved262. 
                                                          
260 Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation Act, supra note 256, Section 34. Buckland and 
Burdzy, supra note 248, p. 31. 
261 Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs 2 (Switzerland, November 2011), available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/Fact_Sheet_ICoC_November_2011.pdf (last visited on May 2016). 
262 Despite that the ICoC is built upon the Montreux Document’s foundation and constitutes its follow-up process, 
there is no uniform use regarding the terminology. For instance, the draftsmen of the ICoC instead of using the 
term of PMSCs, they use the term of Private Security Providers. The main reason is to disclaim any negative 
connection with the mercenaries and/or even with any PMSCs’ involvement in human rights abuses. For all the 
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This process has been completed in two main stages. The first one was the drafting of 
the core commitments, which contains the principles and standards that PMSCs and their 
employees should respect during their operations under the international humanitarian law and 
human rights law. The second one was the improvement of accountability of PMSCs by 
establishing also an external independent oversight mechanism263. This mechanism constitutes 
‘a founding instrument for a broader initiative to create better governance, compliance and 
accountability’264 and the ‘first step in a process towards full compliance’265 with the ICoC’s 
principles and standards. To that end, in 2012 stakeholders and private security providers 
agreed on the establishment of an oversight mechanism by adopting the Articles of the 
Association (ICoC’s Association)266. 
 
According to its preamble, the ICoC constitutes the follow-up process of the Montreux 
Document, in order to extend its principles to private security industry267. In doing so, PMSCs 
have to support the rule of law; to protect, prevent and respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and to protect the interests of their clients. The main goal of this initiative is to ensure 
that signatory PMSCs fully comply with ICoC’s standards and principles during their 
                                                          
services which are closer to military operations, they used the term of Private Peace and Stability Operations 
Companies. See Seiberth, supra note 1203, p. 163. 
263 ICoC, Section A, paras. 7 (a) and (b). 
264 ICoC, Section A, para. 7. 
265 ICoC, Section A, para. 8.  
266The Articles of the Association are available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf (last visited on May 2016). 
267 ICoC, Section A, para. 3. 
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operations268. Even if the Montreux Document gives particular emphasis to the regulation of 
PMSCs and their obligations during armed conflicts, the applicability of the ICoC is extended 
to both armed and unarmed PMSCs’ services. In contrast, the ICoC does not enlist PMSCs’ 
services as the Montreux Document does269, but it uses the term of ‘any other activity for which 
the personnel of the companies are requires to carry or operate a weapon in the performance 
of their duties’270. 
 
Unlike the recommendations set out by the Montreux Document, it couldn’t manage to 
specify PMSCs’ activities during a maritime operation. However, the ICoC leaves the option 
to extend its applicability on the training of external forces, maritime security services and all 
the operations related to detainees and other protected persons271. Therefore, the expansive 
application of the ICoC could be seen as complementary to the narrow one of the Montreux 
Document. Particularly, the ICoC embodies three types of commitments; firstly it specifies 
general commitments for PMSCs and their personnel, secondly it states specific policy 
commitments to respect human rights and thirdly governance commitments to monitor and 
oversee the policy ones.  
 
3.1. Private Military and Security Companies’ Duties under the Provisions of the 
ICoC 
                                                          
268 ICoC, Section B, para. 13. 
269 For instance, the Montreux Document illustrates that the PMSCs’ services include armed guarding, the 
protection of person and military objects, the maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention 
and advice of or training of local forces and security personnel. See the Montreux Document, Preface, para. 9.  
270 ICoC, Section B. 
271 ICoC, para. 7. 
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3.1.1. General Commitments with Regard to Private Military and Security Companies 
By signing the ICoC, a PMSC has to exercise due diligence obligation and to act in accordance 
with the international humanitarian law, human rights law principles and national law272. This 
obligation should be also restated into the contractual agreements between the State and the 
PMSC273 and between the PMSC and their personnel. For example, PMSCs should ensure that 
the rights and the freedoms of their employees are fully respected, such as the freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and the prevention of arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with privacy or deprivation of property274. 
 
Since PMSCs act in accordance with the law – both in terms of international and 
national laws - they should restrain from signing contracts with governments which act in 
contrast with the resolutions of the UN Security Council275. Respecting international law’s 
principles, PMSCs should ensure that their contractors (and subcontractors) are not involved 
in the commission of any serious breach of human rights law and international humanitarian 
law276. In this category of breaches, the ICoC includes war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
torture, the crime of genocide, forced labour, sexual exploitation and human trafficking, 
hostage-taking, illicit drug or/and weapons trafficking, child abuse and arbitrary executions277. 
With that way, PMSCs assure that their activities are fully complied with international law 
                                                          
272 ICoC, Section E, para. 21.  
273 ICoC, Section E, para. 19. 
274 ICoC, Section E, para. 21. 
275 ICoC, Section E, para. 22. 
276 These restrictions are imposed under any circumstances. Even there is a superior command or a threat against 
international peace and security, PMSCs and their contractors should restrain from these acts. See ICoC, Section 
E, para. 23.    
277 ICoC, Section E, para. 22. 
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standards278.On the other hand, in the case suspicion of grave breach of international law of 
any PMSCs and their employees should address it directly to Competent National Authorities 
of the country where the violation occurred; and then they should inform properly the country 
of origin of the victim/victims and of the criminal279. 
 
3.1.2. Specific Commitments for Private military and Security Companies’ Conduct 
Followinw the aforementioned general commitments, the ICoC contains a non-exhaustive 
catalogue of PMSC’s obligations regarding the prevention of human rights abuses280. To that 
end the document calls all signatory PMSCs and their personnel to ‘treat all persons humanely 
and with respect for their dignity and privacy’281.  
 
 
3.1.2.1. Rules for the use of force and firearms by private contractors 
                                                          
278 ICoC, Section E, para. 26. 
279 ICoC, Section E, para. 25. 
280 Despite the fact that the ICoC reiterates significant human rights commitments for the companies and their 
personnel, an important category of rights which has been violated by their operations is missing. To this matter, 
the ICoC does not include any clear obligation for PMSCs to restrain from violations of people’s right to culture 
and its exercise. Allegations for these violations have been reported, the ICoC did not mention it at all, except 
from an unspecific reference under the phrase of ‘’ [...] Signatory Companies also recognize the importance of 
respecting the various cultures encountered in their work [...]’’. See ICoC, Section A, para. 4. For violations of 
the right to culture by PMSCs and business entities see Jeninifer L. Heil, ‘African Private Security Companies 
and the Alien Tort Claims Act: Could Multinational Oil and Mining Companies be Liable?’ [2002] 2 (2) 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, p. 291. 
281 ICoC, Section F, para. 28. 
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PMSCs usually operate in high-risk security environment, therefore it was impossible for ICoC 
to introduce a total prohibition of the use of force. Recognising the same problem, the 
draftsmen of the Montreux Document urged States to adopt regulations regarding the use of 
force and firearms by private contractors282.  Thus, the ICoC affirms that in case of using force 
and firearms, it should be done in accordance with the applicable law and proportionate to the 
threat283. 
 
Moreover, like the Montreux Document does, the ICoC clearly repeats that ‘using 
firearms against persons’ should be happen only in case of ‘self-defence of defence of others 
against imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a 
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life’284. Despite this general approach 
regarding the use of force, the ICoC goes one step further as follows; whenever private 
contractors are officially incorporated within national armed forces, and so they are ‘authorised 
to assist in the exercise of a State’s law enforcement authority’285 –act as a State agent – PMSCs 
have to assure that activities of their contractors are compliant – as a minimum – with the 
standards set out by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials (1990)286. 
 
                                                          
282 The Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A. 10, 12, 18 for recommendations to contracting States. 
See also The Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, B. 37, 43 for suggestions to territorial States and for 
home States see The Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, C. 63. 
283 ICoC, Section F, para. 30. 
284 ICoC, Section F, para. 31. 
285 ICoC, Section F, para. 32. 
286 Ibid. 
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At that point, the ICoC tries to fill the gap that the Monteux Document failed to do so. 
To be more precise, ‘Good Practices’ of the Montreux Document avoid to clarify which is the 
legislative framework that governs contractors while they are using force or firearms287. On the 
other hand, the draftsmen of the ICoC were enough bold to specify that the use of force and 
firearms by private contractors, in case of exercising governmental functions, is governed by 
the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. In 
spite of that fact, the ICoC signifies that whenever PMSCs’ contractors -as State agents- 
carrying firearms and getting involved in any misconduct, they should be treated as State 
officials and their actions are attributable the State288. In all other cases, the use of force should 
be limited by circumstances of self-defence289.  
 
3.1.2.2 Human rights’ commitments for Private Military and Security Companies  and 
their personnel 
In several cases, performing governmental functions, PMSCs and their employees have been 
implicated in incidents violating inherent human rights; ranging from the abuse of prisoners290, 
                                                          
287 At that point it is worthy to notice that the draftsmen of the Montreux Document used vague references with 
regard to the use of force and firearms. For instance, they describe the legislative framework of use of force as 
‘’firearms conventions’’ (The Montreux Document, Part II), ‘’rules on the use of force and firearms (The 
Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A. 10 (a), B. 43 (a) and C. 63 (a)) and ‘’policies on use of force and 
firearms’’ (The Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A. 12 (a), B. 37 (a)). 
288 See Article 5 of Draft Articles. 
289 Seiberth, supra note 1203, p. 174. 
290 George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence 
Brigade (2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf 
(last visited on May 2014). 
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to shooting at unarmed civilians291. Thus it was far clear that the ICoC points out PMSCs’ 
obligations with regard to detention services. To that extent, the ICoC specifies under which 
circumstances a PMSC could provide detention services. Firstly, the PMSCs should be 
contracted out by a State to guard, transport or question detainees; and secondly if only PMSCs’ 
personnel have received adequate training according to human rights law and international 
humanitarian law to do so292. In conjunction with PMSCs’ obligations providing with detention 
services, the ICoC illustrates their obligation to restrain from acts of apprehending persons293. 
Only in cases of self-defence or defend others against any threat of violence, or in cases of any 
possible attack or crime occur against another private contractors or against their clients or 
property which they protect, the ICoC permits the holding and/or taking any persons. 
 
Either providing detention services or apprehending persons, PMSCs and their 
employees should not get involved in any serious violations of the prohibition of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment294. Moreover, the ICoC reiterates the existing 
general obligation under human rights law to prohibit any form of torture under any 
circumstances295. Any incident of prohibition of torture should be reported directly to the 
                                                          
291 See David Johnston and John M. Broder, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis without Cause, (November 2007) 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
(last visited on May 2015). 
292 ICoC, Section F, para. 33. 
293 ICoC, Section F, para. 34. 
294 ICoC, Section F, para. 33 and para.35. This obligation derives by the general commitment to treat all 
individuals humanely. See as above ICoC, Section F, para. 28. 
295 ICoC, Section F, para. 36. And article 2 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations Treaty Series , vol. 1465, p. 85, (New York, 
December 1984). 
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competent authority whereas the violation took place, and to the country of nationality of the 
victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator296. 
 
Attempting to prevent any reoccurrence of PMSCs’ involvement in sexual 
exploitation297 and human trafficking, the ICoC requires that PMSCs and their personnel 
should avoid to engaging in such misconduct298. Therefore PMSCs have to prevent any form 
of sexual exploitation and any gender-based violence or crimes, such as rape and sexual 
harassment either within the PMSC or externally299. Regarding also the prohibition of any form 
of human trafficking, the ICoC adopts a similar terminology as the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children300 does. Thus, 
PMSCs should prevent the recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of 
a person for (1) a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the 
person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2) labour or 
services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery’301. At the same time, PMSCs are engaged with 
the obligation to not use slavery and/or forced or compulsory labour either internally or 
                                                          
296 ICoC, Section F, para. 37. 
297 Jamie Wilson and Kevin Maguire, American Firm in Bosnia Sex Trade Row Poised to Win MoD Contract, 
(November 2009). 
298 ICoC, Section F, para. 33. 
299 ICoC, Section F, para. 38. 
300 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations Treaty 
Series, vol. 2237, 319, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000). 
301 ICoC, Section F, para. 39. 
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externally,302 and also they have to restrain from any forced child labour and trafficking of 
children303. 
 
Additionally, taking into account the safety of civilians, the ICoC reiterates that PMSCs 
should have specific identification and registration of vehicles and materials in order to be 
clearly distinguishable304. That principle is a restatement for the Montreux Document as well, 
in order to emphasize their questioning status under international humanitarian law.    
 
3.1.3. Commitments regarding the management and governance of the Private 
Military and Security Companies 
In order to fulfil their obligations set out by the ICoC, PMSCs are required not only to 
incorporate ICoC’s principles and standards within their internal policies,305 but also they have 
to establish specific internal procedures in order to prevent any misconduct. Therefore, the 
ICoC demonstrates important guidelines which must be followed to achieve a sufficient and 
coherent internal management framework. These guidelines are ranged from the selection of 
private contractors and subcontractors,306 the standards of their contracts,307 their training 
according to the human rights law and humanitarian law principles308, the use of weapons and 
                                                          
302 ICoC, Section F, para. 40. 
303 ICoC, Section F, para. 41. 
304 ICoC, Section F, para. 43. 
305 ICoC, Section G, para. 44. 
306 ICoC, Section G, para. 45 - 51. 
307 ICoC, Section G, para. 52 – 54. 
308 ICoC, Section G, para. 55. 
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being trained on them,309 the management of material of war,310 the reporting scheme of 
wrongful acts,311 the working environment,312 the harassment313 and finally, complaint 
procedures314. Similarly to the Montreux Document,315 the ICoC highly emphasizes the 
considerations of private contractors’ records before hiring them.  
 
3.1.3.1. The oversight mechanism of the International Code of Conduct 
Apart for the abovementioned commitments with regard to the PMSCs’ responsibility to 
respect human rights of individuals and their employees and the establishment of internal 
policies on management and governance private contractors’ training and activities, the ICoC 
suggests the creation of an external independent oversight mechanism,316 which further 
promotes and oversees the implementation of its principles and standards317.   Besides in 2011, 
the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework 
which recognises that the responsibility to respect human rights and to prevent their abuses is 
                                                          
309 ICoC, Section G, para. 56 - 59. 
310 ICoC, Section G, para. 60 – 62. 
311 ICoC, Section G, para. 63. 
312 ICoC, Section G, para. 64. 
313 ICoC, Section G, para. 65. 
314 ICoC, Section G, para. 66 – 69. 
315 The Montreux Document, Part II, supra note 216, A.6. 
316 The draftsmen of the ICoC appointed a steering committee to prepare a Draft Charter of an International 
Governance and Oversight Mechanism. Until 2012, this Draft Charter was being opened for public consultations, 
further discussion and possible suggestions. Finally, in 2013 the final Articles of the Association were adopted 
and the ICoC’s Association inaugurated on September 2013.  
317 ICoC’s Association, Article 2, para. 2.2. 
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extended to all kind of business entities as well318. That happens because their activities have 
impact on internationally recognised human rights. So PMSCs bound - as States do - by the 
obligation to respect them319. 
 
In doing so, the ICoC’s Association seeks the establishment of different mechanisms, 
such as certification, auditing, monitoring and reporting. To that extent, the ICoC’s Association 
ensures the effective implementation of the ICoC’s standards. More precisely, these 
mechanisms are assessed and ruled by three main bodies:  the General Assembly, the Board of 
Directors and the Secretariat with and the Executive Director320. Moreover, the ICoC’s 
Association suggests also the establishment of another body, which provides information and 
gives advices regarding the national and international policies’ compliance with the Montreux 
Document’s principles and good practices: the Advisory Forum of the Montreux Document 
Participants321. 
 
The establishment of a certification procedure confirms whether a PMSC has already 
internal policy to fulfil ICoC’s requirements or not322. Simultaneously the reporting, 
monitoring and assessing performance review PMSCs’ operations and informs for any possible 
violation of the ICoC.323 Thus, the Board of Directors could advice PMSCs to address ‘specific 
                                                          
318 U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 15, Section II, para. 11. 
319 Ibid., para. 12. 
320 ICoC’s Association, Article 5. 
321 ICoC’s Association, Article 10. 
322 ICoC’s Association, Article 11. 
323 ICoC’s Association, Article 12. 
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compliance concerns’324. In case of failing to comply with ICoC’s standards and principles, 
the ICoC’s Association imposes two main types of sanctions; as the termination of PMSC’s 
membership and/or suspension325. 
 
More significantly, the ICoC’s Association sets out a complaints procedure through an 
international independent body326.  This procedure raises the opportunity to everyone, mostly 
the victims, to bring a complaint against PMSCs for alleged violations of ICoC’s principles. In 
such cases, the ICoC’s Association has to act directly, as most of the judicial bodies do so, to 
carry out prompt and impartial investigation due the allegation and - in case of violation - to 
offer effective remedies to prevent any reoccurrence327. However, the ICoC’s Association does 
not include any further provisions regarding the remedies for PMSCs’ harmful activities. To 
that extent, the creation of independent body which provide remedies to victims seems 
incomplete. Yet, it encourages States and/or PMSCs to enact grievance mechanisms which 
could be responsible to provide effective remedies to victims.   
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The increasing importance of PMSCs in international stability operations enhanced several 
efforts to address their duties and responsibilities towards the protection of human rights and 
                                                          
324 ICoC’s Association, Article 12, para. 12.2.6. 
325 A kind of sanctions can be found in other self-regulatory regimes as well, such as in ISOA Code of Conduct, 
para. 14.2: ‘’[...]14.2. The enforcement of the ISOA Code of Conduct is guided by the ISOA Enforcement 
Mechanism, the complaint system available to the public at-large. Signatories who fail to uphold any provision 
contained in this Code may be subject to dismissal from ISOA [...]’’, available at http://www.stability-
operations.org/?page=Code (last visited on May 2016). 
326 ICoC’s Association, Article 13. See also ICoC, Section F, paras. 66 et seq.  
327 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 202. 
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fundamental freedoms328. PMSCs and other business entities frequently escape from their 
accountability for human rights abuses. Therefore, the evolution of the Montreux Document 
based on the imposed obligations on States to regulate and monitor PMSCs and their 
personnel’s activities in conflict environments. It is the first international initiative in its kind 
which drafted by the significant contribution of States, non-governmental organizations and 
the private security and military industry. But only States can officially endorse it329. Even 
though the Montreux Document compiles with existing obligations under international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, its importance lies also upon the recommendations –
‘’Good Practices’’- which are suggested to States. By implementing those proposals, States 
could really achieve a high level of oversight and accountability framework for PMSCs’ 
conduct.  
 
Besides its contribution, the Montreux Document reveals some weakness which 
frustrates a completed approach towards the regulation of PMSCs. Firstly; the Montreux 
Document is referring only to regulative options with regard to land-based PMSCs’ operations. 
Thus, it leaves maritime security operations outside of its scope. Secondly, the Montreux 
Document particularly emphasises issues of State responsibility by attributing PMSCs’ 
misconduct to States – in a case-by-case basis. However the initiators of the document avoided 
to addressing issues of responsibility of international organisations whenever they hire PMSCs 
                                                          
328 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
329 To date fifty States have already signed the Montreux Document. Even though only seventeen States finalised 
the Monteux Document, its universal value was increased by the presence of the ICRC during the drafting process 
and the cooperation which has been developed between States – the most affected by PMSCs’ operations 
(Afghanistan, Sierra Leone) and the biggest users of PMSCs (USA and the UK).   
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to carry out their operations330.  Besides, they could pointed out some suggestions – as a 
minimum – regarding the responsibility of international organisations for PMSCs’ wrongful 
acts occurring under their authority and control. Thirdly, since the Montreux Document focuses 
more on the monitoring of PMSCs in conflict environments, and to that extent the States; 
obligations under international humanitarian law, it leaves aside the exercise of due diligence 
obligation in conjunction with the extraterritorial application of human rights331. Fourthly, 
apart from the issues of State responsibility, the Monteux Document does not specify issues of 
corporate responsibility by failing to fulfil the Monteux Document’s principles and standards. 
That omission could be justified by the reluctance of States at the time of drafting the document. 
Both States and PMSCs were enough hesitant to conclude on such prominent topic. Hence, it 
took three years waiting for the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights332 to recognise directly the duty to respect the human rights during PMSCs; operations. 
Fifthly, the main weakness of the Montreux Document could be found in the absence of 
mechanism which ensures the compliance of national PMSCs’ policies with the 
recommendations set out by the Montreux Document. 
 
Having identified the aforementioned missing points of the Montreux Document, the 
ICoC came to fill these grey zones of regulation from an industry-driven perspective. The main 
                                                          
330 Oldrich Bures, ‘Private Military Companies: A Second Peacekeeping Option?’ [2005] 12 (4) International 
Peacekeeping, p. 533. 
331 Olivier De Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving Human Rights Accountability of 
Transnational Corporations, (December 2006), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extraterritorial-
jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf (last visited on May 2016). 
332 U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 200. 
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scope of the ICoC is the creation of an oversight system according to which PMSCs are going 
to act with its commitments. Its non-binding nature does not affect a lot its implementations 
since it constitutes a kind of bylaw for the signatory PMSCs. However, its effective 
implementation depends exclusively on the structure of the mechanisms which would be 
adopted by PMSCs333.   
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the independent oversight mechanism hides some 
of deficiencies which PMSCs have to overpass through the ICoC’s incorporation within their 
internal policies. In particular, due to the complexities of the environments the ICoC’s 
Association does not specify which is the examination process for a complaint to be admissible 
or not and  then  to proceed with further impartial investigation throughout PMSCs’ harmful 
activities. Moreover, another crucial weakness’ point for the ICoC is that it does not include 
any provision on remedies for PMSCs harmful activities. With respect to remedies procedure, 
the ICoC’s Association indicates then after the examination of the complaint, the ICoC’s 
Association to which mechanism the victim/victims should be addressed to have access to 
effective remedies334.  
 
To surmount the aforementioned weaknesses the ultimate solution is the adoption of an 
international legally binding document to ensure the application of minimum standards for 
                                                          
333 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 225. 
334 ICoC’s Association, Article 13.2.2. 
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regulations and monitoring PMSCs’ operations335. As Gómez del Prado336 argues a binding 
initiative has some important advantages. Firstly, it has a broad applicability irrespectively the 
nature of the PMSC’s operation. It applies on land-based or maritime- based operations during 
wartime or peacetime as well. Secondly, apart from the states, it imposes obligations to regulate 
and monitor PMSCs’ operations to international organisations, such as NATO337. Thirdly, it 
creates an international monitoring body to oversee states’ efforts to comply with its provisions, 
and also it establishes a complaint procedure – inter-sate and individual petition procedures.  
 
Nevertheless, most of the Western States stand against on this initiative, as they strongly 
support that the only thing is missing is not the absence of a binding regulatory framework 
regarding the PMSCs activities, but the delayed adoption of the already existing international 
mechanisms and the lack of support to new self-regulatory mechanisms, such as the Montreux 
Document and the ICoC, which have not yet been fully implemented. Moreover, the adoption 
of a binding legal document shields another important danger. White338 indicates that the 
                                                          
335 Benjamin Perrin, ‘Searching for Accountability: the Draft U.N. International Convention on the Regulation, 
Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies’ [2009] 47 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 299. Moreover, Percy argues that ‘the international regulation has the capacity to protect 
States with weak judicial systems from potential problems caused by PMSCs; it can prevent PMSCs from moving 
abroad to avoid regulations; it can ensure that contracts between non—State actors and PMSCs adhere to 
minimum standards’. See Sarah Percy, Regulating Private Security Industry (Adelphi Paper, 2006). 
336 Jose Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘A U.N. Convention to Regulate PMSCs?’ [2012] 31 (3) Criminal Justice Ethics, 
p. 262. 
337 David A. Isenberg, The Many PMC Faces of NATO, (November 2012), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/the-many-pmc-faces-of-nato_b_2200697.html (last visited on 
May 2016). 
338 White, supra note 203, p. 31. 
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adoption of an international binding document ‘will attract a different clientele of States’ than 
the non-binding initiatives did. That is, States, who are high connected with the PMSC industry, 
might be strongly opposed to a binding regulatory framework, and those who are completely 
opposed to PMSCs’ activities as a modern form of mercenary would support it more. 
Moreover, even a non-binding document as ICoC is hardly implemented. To date, only the UK, 
Switzerland and Australia have already endorsed ICoC and they asked for membership339. 
 
In conclusion, since the adoption of a binding document seems to be a longstanding and 
difficult  process, -for instance - it took five years for the Human Rights Council to conclude 
on the final document of the Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and 
Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies (hereinafter as ‘the Draft 
Convention’)340 after of almost ten year of international negotiations regarding the regulation, 
monitoring and accountability of PMSCs and their employees, States and PMSCs are enough 
ready to come up with a new challenge - the drafting of a new international initiative like the 
Montreux Document -  with more broad approach. Moreover, the Montreux process inspired 
other international organisations to suggest measures to States to adopt coherent and sufficient 
regulatory frameworks regarding PMSCs’ activities. In particular, to fully support the 
implementation of the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, the OECD adopted 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011)341 and also, the CoE approved the Declaration 
                                                          
339 See footnote 869 in Seibeth, supra note 203, p. 159. 
340 This process is still undergoing. For the draft of a possible Convention on PMSCs see Report of the Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right 
of Peoples to Self-determination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25, 2010, Annex, p. 19.  
341 For the full document of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises see at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf (last visited on May 2015). 
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of the Committee of Ministers on the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights 
(2014)342. That new initiative has to include regulative options for both land-based and 
maritime-based operations. Secondly a document like this has to illustrate obligations and 
responsibilities of States, International Organisations and PMSCs under human rights law and 
humanitarian law. Moreover, it has to be precise regarding the accountability  of  States, 
International Organisations and PMSCs by failing to fulfil their obligations under international 
law, and to specify criminal liability for PMSCs’ contractors in case of human rights 
infringements. Overall an international initiative like that has also to establish an oversight 
body which supervise the effective implementation of its provisions. Such marks out the new 
pathway towards an enforceable international code. 
 
5. Summary 
Following the analysis of the international legal framework on the regulation of PMSCs, the 
present study focuses also on the examination of national regulatory mechanisms for 
punishment and prosecution of PMSCs’ employees for human rights violations. So as, the next 
chapter examines the national regulatory regimes of the greatest exporters of PMSCs pertaining 
to PMSCs’ operations (USA, UK, South Africa and Germany). Moreover, it explores the 
existing national legislative framework, under which private contractors may be held 
accountable for their misconducts. Further, it considers that the absence of an international 
framework to punish private contractors for human rights violations allows for non-compliance 
with human rights law. 
                                                          
342 See CoE, Committee of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 16/04/2014, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2185745&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=ED
B021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 (last visited on May 2015). 
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CHAPTER V: 
NATIONAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS TO 
PROSECUTE PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES’ EMPLOYEES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
 
By carrying out several security tasks that traditionally belonged to States343, PMSCs have 
purportedly been involved in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
                                                          
343 In the last two decades, States relied on business entities to perform military and security services, which prior 
to that, had been performed by national armed forces. This practice has initially begun during the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and now on the use of private entities is widespread, covering for example anti-piracy operations in 
the Horn of Africa and combatting drug trafficking in Latin America. See Kateri Carmola, Private Security 
Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law and Ethics (London: Routledge, 2010); Deborah V. Avant, The Market of 
Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also United 
Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as Means of Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples 
to Self-determination, ‘Why We Need an International Convention on Private Military and Security Companies’ 
(17 May 2011) U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/CRP.1, para. 1. See also Tanya Cook, 'Dogs of War or Tomorrow's 
Peacekeepers? The Role of Mercenaries in the Future Management of Conflict' [2002] 5(1) Culture Mandala, 
Article 1. Bassiouni argued that the proliferation of non-state actors in conflicts and post-conflicts environment 
emerged the concept of the ‘new culture of wars’. Cherif M. Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of 
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflicts by Non-State Actors’ [2008] 98 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 711, 717. To that extent, that ‘’new culture of war’’ is based on a general enthusiasm of States to 
outsource their functions and also on a growing reluctance by them to intervene in conflicts which are not of their 
particular strategic interests. See Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to the Market: 
The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1.  
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during their operations344. Several States, such as the USA, the UK, South Africa, Iraq and 
Afghanistan have already experienced violations of human rights law by private contractors. 
The most notorious examples have allegedly taken place in Iraq. In particular, in 2004, Titan 
Corporation and CACI – two American PMSCs latterly, they contracted out to provide 
interpretation and interrogation services at Abu Ghraib prison – were accused of being involved 
with torturing of Iraqi detainees345. A military investigation, which resulted in the publication 
                                                          
344 See Swisspeace, The Impact of PMSCs on the Local Population in Post – Conflict Countries: A Comparative 
Study for Afghanistan and Angola (Bern, 2007); Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Privatization of War and Security in 
Afghanistan: Future or Dead End?’ [2007] 2(1) Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 30, 31. See also José 
Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘Impact in Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities’, U.N. 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, page 2, 
<http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Impact%20in%20Human%20Rights%20of%20Private%20Milit
ary%20and%20Security%20Companies%27%20Activities.pdf> accessed on May 2016. Moreover, Perrin 
denotes that the widespread involvement of PMSCs in modern warfare and other insurgencies harmed more 
civilians than the ‘traditional armed conflicts’ do. See Benjamin Perrin (ed.), Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, 
Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations and the Law (UBC Press, 2012), p. 2. 
345 The incidents of Abu Ghraib constitute the cornerstone for a longstanding political and legal discussion within 
the U.S.A. relating to the human rights obligations during military and security operations. See Shadi Mokhtari, 
After Abu Ghraib: Exploring Human Rights in America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). Accordingly several legal scholars started to focus on issues of attribution of PMSCS’ misconduct 
to States in order to bear international responsibility. See Robert McCorquodale and Renelope Simons, 
‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of 
International Human Rights Law’ [2007] 70(4)The Modern Law Review 598; Joshua L. Pratel, The Torture 
Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 383; Michelle Brown, ‘Setting 
the Conditions for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad’ [2005] 57(3) American Quarterly 973; Jordan Paust, 
‘Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib: Will Prosecution and Cashiering of a Few Soldiers Comply with the 
International Law?’ (May 10, 2004) Jurist, < http://www.jurist.org/forum/paust1.php> accessed on May 2016; 
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of a report titled ‘’Tabuga Report’’, explicitly indicates the extensive sexual abuse and 
humiliating treatment of detainees by private contractors346.  
  
Notwithstanding these allegations, the US State Department hired Blackwater to guard 
the US diplomatic mission in Iraq.  A few years later, in 2007 Blackwater’s private contractors 
were involved in shooting innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square in Iraq while they were 
escorting US vehicles to the Green Zone347. As result, 17 people were killed and 24 were 
wounded, among them women and children348. According to the ‘’Memorandum: Additional 
Information on Blackwater U.S.A’’ Blackwater’s personnel have been involved in more than 
195 incidents in Iraq from 2005 to 2007349. Apart from the aforementioned incidents, PMSCs 
                                                          
‘Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal – Fast Facts’ (CNN Library, 7 November 2014) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/> accessed on May 2016. 
346 The ‘Tabuga Report’ On Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade, Part One: Detainee Abuse 15, 
<http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.2> accessed on May 2016. See also, Katja 
Nieminen, ‘The Rules of Attribution and the Private Military Contractors at Abu Ghraib: Private Acts or Public 
Wrongs?’ [2004] XV Finnish Yearbook of International Law 289. 
347 The International Zone known as ’the Green Zone’ was a guarded area of closed-off streets in central Baghdad 
whereas the US governments officials were living and working.  
348 James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, ‘From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths’ (The New York 
Times, 3 October, 2007) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 > accessed on 
May 2016. 
349 House of Representatives, Committee, on Oversight and Government Reform, Congress of the U.S.A., 
‘Memorandum: Additional Information on Blackwater U.S.A’, 01/10/2007, 6. 
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have also been accused of attacking civilians in Colombia350 and even of buying and keeping 
women and girls in sexual slavery in Bosnia351. 
 
Despite the national reports, such as the ‘’Memorandum: Additional Information on 
Blackwater U.S.A’’, and the media constitute a proven record of the involvement of private 
contractors in human rights abuses, they also highlight that in most cases none of them had 
been prosecuted352. The absence of a coherent and binding international legal framework to 
regulate PMSCs and oversee private contractors’ activities353, together with the lack of national 
regulatory and advocacy frameworks, which have jurisdiction related to PMSCs' misconduct, 
means that private contractors have managed to escape from prosecution for human rights 
                                                          
350 Institute for Human Rights and Business, Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal 
Periodic Review – Session 16: Colombia, October 2012, 1 <http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/UPR/UPR-Colombia-2012-
FINAL.pdf> accessed on May 2016. 
351 Robert Capps, ‘Outside the Law’, (Salon, 26 June 2010) <http://www.salon.com/2002/06/26/bosnia_4/> 
accessed on May 2016.  
352 Peter W. Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law’ 
(2003/4) Columbia JTC 521; Antoine Perret, ‘Privatization without Regulation: The Human Rights Risks of 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in Mexico [2013] 6:1 Mexican Law Review 163. 
353 Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi argued that the multinational character of (PMSCs) operations and the ‘amorphous 
structure’ of those companies make them immune from the control of States. Therefore, it requires to be regulated 
at international level. See Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, ‘Liability for Multinational Corporations 
under International Law: An Introduction’ in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability for 
Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2000) 3.  
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violations354. As a result, private military and security industry remains ‘less regulated than the 
cheese market’355 and/or ‘the toy industry’356. 
 
In an attempt to fill the regulatory and accountability gap regarding the PMSCs and 
their employees, the international community has launched some significant initiatives in an 
attempt to encourage States to implement regulatory frameworks with regard to PMSCs357. The 
Montreux Document358 forms the first international document that emphasizes States’ 
obligations both to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities and to enact proper legislative 
measures to punish perpetrators for violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law359. More specifically, the Montreux Document provides that States have the ultimate 
                                                          
354 Emily Kelly, ‘Holding Blackwater Accountable: Private Security Contractors and the Protections of the Use 
Immunity’ [2013] 35(3) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 17. See also Vice-President’s 
of the International Red Cross Committee statement Christine Beerli, ‘Private Military/Security Companies: Rules 
should be Implemented, Keynote Address by Chrisine Beerli, Montreux +5 Conference’ (Montreux, Switzerland, 
11-13 December 2013) < https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/12-11-privatization-of-
war-montreux-plus-5-beerli.htm>. 
355 Peter W. Singer, The Private Military and Security Industry in Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to 
Next (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Force, Policy Paper, 2004) 14. 
356 See the abstract of José Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘A U.N. Convention on PMSCs?’ [2012] 31 (3) Criminal Justice 
Ethics 262. One of the primary reasons that this market continues to be unregulated is the transnational character 
of PMSCs’ activities. See Avant, supra note 346, p. 144. 
357 Janos Kalman, ‘The International Regulation or Private Security Providers: A Brief Analysis in ‘Janos Kalman 
(ed.), Legal Studies on the Contemporary Hungarian Legal System (Universitas – Gyor Ltd, 2014), p. 148. 
358 The Montreux Document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/63/467–S/2008/636) 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/467> accessed on May 2016. 
359 See The Montreux Document, Part I: Pertinent International Legal Obligations Relating to Private Military and 
Security Companies, supra note 361, A. 5, B. 11, C. 16 and D. 20. Cockayne analyses more the contribution of 
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obligation to establish relevant judicial mechanisms to prosecute persons for ‘committing, or 
ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, 
Additional Protocol I’. It requires also States to be bound by the obligation to ‘search for 
persons alleged to have committed’ those acts ‘regardless of their nationality, before their own 
courts’360.  
 
Therefore, States have to enact relevant laws to prosecute private contractors, as 
perpetrators for human rights abuses, regardless of the place where violations have been 
committed.  Moreover, the Montreux Document underlines that the lack of national laws with 
extraterritorial effect and the immunity provided to private contractors enjoy under the status-
of-forces agreements361, could lead to impunity362. That is exactly what happened with the 
punishment of private contractors in Iraq. In both cases of Abu Ghraib and Nisour Square, 
private contractors enjoyed immunity from Iraqi courts in case of misconduct363. This is 
                                                          
the Montreux Document in improving the standards of accountability for private contractors’ misconduct. See 
James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses 
and Promise of the Montreux Document’ [2008] 13(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p. 401. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Status-of –Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are agreements between the host State and a State stationing military 
force within the territory of that State. SOFAs are also included along with other types of military agreements, as 
a comprehensive security agreement. See also Chunk R. Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It 
and How It Been Utilized? (CRS Report for Congress, 15 March 2012). 
362 See Explanatory Comments to the Montreux Document, 40 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf> accessed on May 2016. 
363 According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order No 17, the agreement that was signed between 
the Iraqi government and the U.S.A. Department of Defence regarding the use of private contractors in military 
operations states ‘’Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms 
and conditions of their Contracts […]’’. See National Legislative Bodies/National Authorities, Iraq: Coalition 
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because USA Courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes committed by private 
contractors on the Iraqi territory364. Yet the problem remains, since the USA does not have 
proper legislative enforcement over private contractors' misconduct365. Irrespective of the 
                                                          
Provisional Authority Order No. 17 of 2004 (Revised), Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, 
Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, 27 June 2004 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997ada3.html> 
accessed on May 2016. Nonetheless after the killing of the Iraqi unarmed civilians in 2007, the Iraqi government 
approved this agreement by ending private contractors’ immunities. By contrast, in Libya the U.S.A. managed to 
achieve immunities for all PMSCs’ employees. See also Christopher. M. Kovach, ‘Cowboys in the Middle East: 
Private Security Companies and the Imperfect Reach of the United States Criminal Justice System’ [2010] IX(2) 
The Quarterly Journal, p. 17. The United Nations Resolution 1970 (2011) on Libya states that  the Security Council 
‘’decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly 
waived by the State’’. See UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, 26/02/2011), para. 6. 
364 It is worth to be noticed that States usually adopt specific legislative procedures in order to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over their nationals. Thus, their citizens are excluded from the possibility of surrender to the 
jurisdiction of another State. Micaela Frulli, ‘Immunity for Private Contractors: Legal Hurdles or Political Snags?’ 
in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and 
Private Contractors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 460. 
365 For an overview of the U.S. policy see at Marco Roscini, ‘The Efforts to Limit the International Criminal 
Court’s Jurisdiction Over Nationals of Non-Party States: A Comparative Study’ [2006] 5 The Law and the Practice 
of International Courts and Tribunals, p. 495. Giulia Pinzauti, ‘The Blackwater Scandal: Legal Black Hole or 
Unwillingness to Prosecute Private Military Contractors?’ [2007] 17 Italian Yearbook of International Law, p. 
125. See also Reema Shah, 'Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to Enforce the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Military Companies’ [2014] 13 The Yale Law Journal, p. 2561. Moreover, L. S. Ebner 
described in detailed difficulties regarding the prosecution of private contractors under the USA federal laws. He 
concluded that it is unfortunate for the U.S.A. to 'get stuck by non-establishing liability suits for those who are 
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significant contribution of the Montreux Document in the field of regulating PMSCs’ activities, 
its non-binding nature and its limited application (since it applies only during armed conflicts) 
makes it unable to fill in the accountability gap for human rights abuses by private 
contractors366. For instance, the UN Working Group on Mercenaries critisized the contribution 
of the Montreux Document. In particular, in its 2009 report the UN Working Group which 
recognized that the Montreux Document failed to ‘address the regulatory gap in the 
responsibility of States with respect to the conduct of PMSCs and their employees’367. 
 
Yet, recognizing the significance of the Montreux Document, the Human Rights 
Council welcomed the addition of a legally binding document with regard to PMSCs and their 
employees. The final document – titled the U.N. Draft Convention368 - constitutes the first 
effort to create States' obligations for using PMSCs, their licensing and authorization of 
PMSCs' activities as well as addressing accountability issues for PMSCs for human rights 
violations. Since it is still an ongoing process, the UN Draft Convention makes the intentions 
                                                          
''holding the bag'' of the American military operations. See Lawrence S. Ebner, 'Defending Battlefield Contractors: 
An Ongoing Jurisprudential War' [2013] Appellate Advocacy for the Defence, 32. 
366 Nigel D. White, ‘Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level’ in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), 
Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, European and 
Domestic Norms (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 12. 
367 ‘Report of the UN Working Group (2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/10/14, para. 44. 
368 This process is still undergoing. For the draft of a possible Convention on PMSCs see Report of the Working 
Group (2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25, Annex 19. See also Benjamin Perrin, ‘Searching for Accountability: The 
Draft UN International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight, and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Companies’ [2009] 47 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p. 299. 
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of States towards the regulation and control of PMSCs' operations369. Therefore, it is a result 
of the aforementioned initiatives, it places an onus is placed on States to take decisive 
legislative measures to regulate PMSCs’ activities and hold private contractors accountable for 
human rights violations. According to Schneiker370, there are two main reasons, which indicate 
the emerged need of such regulation. First, States remain responsible for violations committed 
by PMSCs by outsourcing certain security activities to them371. Secondly, even though the 
national regimes are less effective than an international one372, as they are easier to be enforced. 
Caparini373 therefore highlights that there is a general need to clarify under whose jurisdiction 
PMSCs' employees operate and who holds the competence over their activities. For example, 
if a Colombian contractor working for a Belgian PMSC commits grave violations of human 
rights law, whose jurisdiction will prosecute him/her and under which laws should he/she be 
tried? 
                                                          
369 Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, ’Private Military and Security Companies and the UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries’ [2008] 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p. 429. 
370 Andrea Schneiker, ‘National Regulatory Regimes for PMSCs and their Activities: Benefits and Shortcomings’ 
in Thomas Jager and Gerarld Kummuel (eds.), Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, 
Pitfalls and Prospects (Verblag Fur Sozialwissenchaften 2007). 
371 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military 
and Security Companies (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper – No 6, 
2005) 117. 
372 The possible ineffectiveness of national regulations derived from the transnational nature of PMSCs' 
operations. As Singer argues, in most cases, PMSCs are registered in one country, they operate within the territory 
of another one and they hire contractors from a third State. See Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of 
Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2003). 
373 Marina Caparini, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: the U.S.A. Approach’ in Andrew 
Alexandra, Deane –Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private, Military Companies: Ethics, Politics and 
Civil-Military Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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Due to lack of international binding regulations, the need for the establishment of 
accountability mechanisms regarding violations of human rights law has never seen higher, in 
order to establish effective prosecution for private contractors. This chapter focuses on the 
existing national accountability regimes that apply over private contractors. First, it compares 
four different legislative regimes relating to private contractors' prosecution for their wrongful 
acts, namely the greatest exporters of PMSCs (the USA, the UK, South Africa and Germany) 
and assesses their effectiveness based on their contribution to the prosecution of private 
contractors for their misconduct. Consequently, thereafter, in the context of the absence of an 
international prosecution model for human rights violations by PMSCs, this chapter suggests 
a national prosecution model which encourages States to fulfill their obligations under human 
rights law by better regulation of PMSCs’ operations. 
 
2. Current National Legislative Pathways to Prosecute Private Contractors for 
Human Rights Breaches  
Since the international community’s failure to enact decisive measures to control PMSCs' 
activities and establish an international accountability body to hold private contractors 
responsible for serious human rights violations, States have postponed the adoption of effective 
national legislative mechanisms to govern PMSCs and for their employees374. From PMSCs’ 
perspective, the enforcement of national regulation in relation to PMSCs’ activities also 
promotes the safety and wellbeing of private contractors during their activities. For instance, 
following the killing of four Blackwater’s employees in Fallujah in 2004, their families 
                                                          
374 Ibid. 
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investigated legal proceedings against Blackwater, claiming that the company sent the four 
employees into Iraq’s hostilities without the adequate equipment and training375. 
 
Overall, the lack of a coherent governance framework serves only to enhance the 
perception that PMSCs enjoy legal impunity in conflict zones376. In 2005, four military veterans 
were hired by Custer Battles and later were accused of using brutal tactics against unarmed 
Iraqi civilians, including children. This case against Custer Battles was eventually dismissed, 
as there was no evidence, this reinforced that perception377. The lack of accountability and 
oversight mechanisms has been further amplified by the Amnesty International in 2006; where 
it was pointed out that at least twenty incidents of abusing and humiliating civilians were 
forwarded by the US Department of Defense and the CIA to the Department of Justice for 
                                                          
375  See Jeremy Scahill, ‘Blood Is Thicker Than Blackwater’, (The Nation, 8 May 2006) 
<http://www.thenation.com/article/blood-thicker-blackwater> accessed on May 2016. To that extent, according 
to a 2008 survey, 20 per cent of armed forces members support the view that PMSCs contractors do not respect 
international law principles and 40 per cent of the US State Department’s officials and staff believes that PMSCs 
personnel actually violate international law during their operations. See Ulrich Petersohn, ‘The Other Side of the 
Coin: Private Security Companies and Counterinsurgency Operations’ [2011] 34 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
p. 793.  
376 Peter W. Singer, Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Countersurgency, (Policy Paper, Washington DC: The Brookings Institute 2007) 12. 
377 Dana Hedgpeth, ‘Judge Clears Contractor of Fraud in Iraq’, (The Washington Post, 9 Friday 2007) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020801871.html> accessed on 
May 2016. 
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prosecution. Yet only one PMSCs contractor was indicted378, two were dismissed and 
seventeen cases remain open379. 
 
2.1. The United States of America 
the USA is one of the major exporters of private military and security services to many unstable 
environments380, so as it is the best choice to examine the national regulations aimed at 
prosecuting private contractors for human rights abuses. In order to ensure that private 
contractors were accountable for their actions, the U.S. government has adopted some 
administrative arrangements as a mean of control. In 2000, the Congress passed the MEJA381. 
The MEJA is the only U.S. legal instrument that applies to any American contractor living 
and/or operating abroad382. Initially, the MEJA only applied to those civilians who were either 
employed by, or accompanied security operation authorised by the U.S. Department of 
Defence. Most notably, in the case of the U.S.A. v. Gatlin, the U.S. Court of Appeal of the 
                                                          
378 This contractor was prosecuted and jailed for assaulting an Afghan detainee during interrogation who later died 
from his injuries. See U.S.A. vs. David Passaro, U.S.A. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, 
Western Division, Case No.: 5:04-CR-211-(BO)-1 [2004]. See also John Hendren and Mark Mazzetti, ‘U.S. 
Charges Contractor over Beating of Afghan Detainee’ (Los Angeles Times, 18 June 2004) 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/18/world/fg-cia18> accessed on May 2016. 
379 See Amnesty International, Outsourcing Facilitating Human Rights Violations (Annual Report, 2006). 
380 Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz and Kennon H. Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: 
Background, Legal Status and Other Issues (CRS Report for Congress, 25 August 2007) 2. 
381 The U.S.A. Congress passed the MEJA, concerned “the lack of U.S.A. criminal jurisdiction [over potential 
crimes] committed by civilians, including military dependents and contractors accompanying U.S.A. armed forces 
overseas”. See Reid v. Convert, 354 U.S.A. 1 [1957], U.S.A. Supreme Court [82]. 
382 US Department of Defense, Instruction Number 5525.11, 3 March3, 2005 < 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/552511p.pdf>. 
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second Circuit argued that there was no jurisdiction relating to the crimes committed abroad 
by U.S. nationals383. However, the subsequent 2004 amendment to MEJA was added with an 
aim of including all private contractors under its jurisdiction384. In particular it provides 
jurisdiction over private contractors who ‘are employed by or accompanying armed forces 
outside the USA’385, which includes private contractors and sub-contractors not only under the 
U.S. Department of Defence, but also under ‘other federal agencies and/or provisional 
authorities’386. 
 
For example, in the Blackwater’s scandal was used lethal force, in 2008 five 
Blackwater’s employees were indicted under MEJA for their misconduct387. At the first 
instance, the defendants claimed that the court had no jurisdiction to preside over the case, 
since they were hired by the U.S. Department of State and not by the U.S. Department of 
Defence388. The DC of Columbia dropped the case. However, in 2011 the DC Circuit Court of 
                                                          
383 U.S.A. v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Glenn R. Schmidt,’ The Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: the Continuing Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying 
the Armed Forces Abroad-Problem Solved?’ (2000) 1 Army Law 1. 
384 18 U.S.C., paras 3261-67. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid. However, under the term of ‘’other federal agencies and/or provisional authorities’’, MEJA provides 
coverage only to those who have a function under the mission of the U.S.A. Department of Defense’’.  
387 However, Tara Lee at her article on DePaul Rule of Law Journal in 2009 strongly supported that even MEJA 
is considered as the most appropriate jurisdictional mechanism for advocating crimes committed by private 
contractors, there are still other more appropriate legislative pathways. She came to that conclusion by observing 
that throughout MEJA war crimes are tried out as they are merely street crimes. See Tara Lee, MEJA for Street 
Crimes, NOT for War Crimes’ [2009] DePaul Rule of Law Journal, p. 1. 
388 ‘’These private security contractors were not engaged in employment supporting the DoD mission overseas 
and, therefore, are not subject to Federal criminal prosecution under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act’’. 
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Appeals overruled this decision and the U.S. Supreme Court instigated the proceedings against 
the defendants389. Eventually, successful prosecutions under MEJA occurred. In particular, 
private contractors faced convictions under MEJA for child pornography390, sexual 
harassment391 and assaults392.  
 
In addition to the MEJA, accountability issues concerning private contractors are 
governed under the War Crimes Act of 1996393. This Act criminalises any crime committed by 
or against a member of the U.S. armed forces394. However, to date no one has been prosecuted 
under this Act. At the same time, the UCMJ395 can also apply to the misconducts by U.S. 
civilians ‘supporting the U.S. national armed forces in declared war and contingency 
operations’.396 However, none of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions have involved private 
contractors; despite the fact that their misconduct took place during hostilities397. In particular, 
US Supreme Court in the case of U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles did not speak directly of ‘the 
issue of court-martial jurisdiction over contractor employees or to the issue of jurisdiction 
                                                          
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction: 
United States of America v. Slough et al, 677 FSupp2d 112, DDC [2009]. 
389 ibid. 
390 U.S.A. Department of Justice, U.S.A. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Military Contractor 
Sentenced for Possession of Child Pornography in Baghdad [May 25, 2007]. 
391 U.S.A. v. Green, No 5:06 – CR- 19 R 2008 WL 4000873 [WB KY August 26 2008]. 
392 U.S.A. v. Maldorado, 215 Fed Approx. 938 2007 WL 27662 [11th Cir. January 31 2007]. 
393 18 U.S.C., para. 2441 (2006). 
394 Ibid.  
395 U.S.A. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47. 
396 Art. 2 para 802 (a) (10). 
397 For instance the case of Kinsello vs. Singleton, 361 U.S.A. 234 [1960].  
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during active military hostilities as contemplated by [the] UCMJ […] which provides for court-
martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force […] during 
time of war’398. Even though the UCMJ states that the national courts should have jurisdiction 
relating to PMSCs’ misconducts, in the case of U.S.A. v. Averette399, the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces argued that the court had no jurisdiction to decide this case, since the war in 
Vietnam was not declared by the Congress400. On the other hand, Stigall401 states that ‘any 
person who commits a crime and accompanying the national armed forces, falls within the 
national courts’ jurisdiction either as U.S. citizen or a third-State national’. To override these 
difficulties, in 2007 the UCMJ was revised to allow military jurisdiction ‘in time of declared 
war and contingency operations’402 over ‘persons serving with or accompanying the armed 
forces in the field’403. However, the prosecution of civilians under the UCMJ is constitutionally 
                                                          
398 United States ex rel. v. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 [1955]; Jesse A Ouellette. ""In The Field" A Legal 
Analysis of Military Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Armed Forces During a 
Contingency Operation for Offenses Committed Outside of an Area of Actual Fighting’’ [2014] 4:2 National 
Security Law, p. 21. See also Steven Paul Cullen, ‘Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter and Address 
Criminal Acts Committed by Contractor Employees Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas’ [2009] 38 Public 
Contract Law Journal, p. 509. 
399 See U.S.A. v. Averette et al., 19 C.M.A. 363 [1970]. 
400 Ibid, [365].  
401 Dan E. Stigall, ‘An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the UCMJ over Civilians and the Implications 
of International Human Rights Law’ [2009] 17 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 70. 
402 John Warner, National Deference Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pud L No 109-364 120 Stat 2083 
(2006). 
403 To that end, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England issued a directive to senior officers in the 
Pentagon, reminding them that all the contractors who are hired under the U.S.A. Department of Defense are 
subject to the UCMJ and encouraging them to begin legal proceedings against those that have violated the U.S.A. 
military law. 
118 
 
barred. In Reid v. Covert case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
the prosecution of civilians by court-martials, as it lacks trial by jury404. Only one reported case 
can be cited in support of a successful use of the UCMJ to hold private contractors accountable 
for human rights violations405. 
 
Finally, under the ATCA, a civil claim can be brought by an alien against PMSCs whose 
employees commit human rights abuses for monetary compensation406. In particular, in 2007 
                                                          
404 Reid v. Covert 354 U.S.A. 1 39-41 [1957]. Also, the UCMJ’s jurisdiction is limited only to individuals 
possessing an official military status (Solorio v. United States 483 U.S. 435 450-51 [1987]). The uses of military 
courts to try civilians raised serious human rights concern. The U.N. Human rights Committed stressed out that 
the trial of civilians by military courts should be exceptional and occur only under conditions that genuinely afford 
full due process. See Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before 
Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial’ (2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32. See also Evelyne Schmid, ‘A Few 
Comments on a Comment: the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 of the 
ICCPR and  the Question of Civilians Tried by Military Courts’ [2010] 14(7) International Journal of Human 
Right, p. 1058. 
405 In June 2008, Alaa Mahammad Ali, a Canadian-Iraqi translator, became the first contractor convicted through 
a UCMJ prosecution. See ‘First Contractor Convicted under U.S. Military Law in Iraq’ (Reuters, 24 June 2008) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/24/us-iraq-contractor-idUSL243864420080624 accessed on May 2016. 
406 For an overview of the jurisprudence of the Alien Tort Claims Act see Beth Stephens, ‘Corporate 
Accountability: International Human Rights Litigation Against Corporations in U.S. Courts’ in Menno T. 
Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability for Multinational Corporations under International Law (The 
Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 209. 
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a complaint was filed with the USA District Court for the District Court of Columbia against 
Blackwater on behalf of an injured survivor and the families of some of the victims407. 
 
2.2. The United Kingdom 
The UK is also another home State for some of the largest PMSCs, such as the Group 4 Securior 
and Aegis. As a result, the UK’s approach towards governing PMSCs is to follow a two-fold 
policy regarding the regulation of their operations408 and for PMSCs409, the industry's 
initiatives410. 
 
Where human rights violations occur by private contractors, the UK government has a 
wide range of legislation which can apply on them411. First, the Foreign Enlistment Act of 
                                                          
407 Estate of Himoud Atban et al v. Blackwater USA et al., U.S.A. District Court for the District Court of Columbia, 
No. 1:2007cv01831 - Document 37 [2009]. <http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-
columbia/dcdce/1:2007cv01831/127734/37/> accessed on May 2016. 
408 Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies in International Law 
(Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2014), p. 246. 
409 Alexandra Bohm, Kerry Senior and Adam White, ‘The United Kingdom’ in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai 
(eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, European 
and Domestic Norms (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
410 Regarding the self-regulation approach for PMSCs’ activities see Engeni Moyakine, The Privatized Art of War: 
Private Military and Security Companies and State Responsibility for their Unlawful Conduct in Conflict Areas 
(Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2015), p. 132. See also Renee de Nevers, ‘(Self) Regulating War?: 
Voluntary Regulation and the Private Security Industry’ [2009] 18 Security Studies, p. 479.  
411 In any case, Michael Byers emphasizes that the British courts constitute the most desirable pathway to litigate 
abuses against private corporations. That is based on the deepen knowledge of the British judges for public 
international law. In particular, he highlights the decision of Trendex Trading Corp. vs. Central Bank of Nigeria 
–back in 1977- according to which the judges accepted the importance of customary international law as an 
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1870412 remains the only legal pathway that directly applies to the activities of PMSCs’ and 
their employees, even when they operate abroad; but, no prosecution has ever been brought 
successfully under this Act, due to the difficulty of gathering information regarding non-State 
actors’ operations abroad. Since most of the British PMSCs operate abroad, including Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there is a requirement that the jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities de 
extended413. As emphasized in the case of Bici v. Ministry of Defense414, the High Court found 
that a soldier who violated the duty to prevent an injury to the public by deliberately firing at 
them, liability against them arises. However, the extension of the jurisdiction over military 
operations is often refused first, on grounds that they are ‘forces of the Crown’ –it could be 
said that PMSCs’ are acting on behalf of the Queen; and secondly, based on a broader 
implementation of the Human Rights Act of 1998415. 
 
 
The Human Rights Act stipulates that the State has to secure that everyone within its 
jurisdiction enjoys the rights and freedoms defined in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Moreover, Lord Justice Rix explored the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to 
the extraterritorial activities of the armed forces in R (Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of 
                                                          
inherent art of the British law. See Michael Byers, ‘English Courts and Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad: 
A Preliminary Assessment’, in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability for Multinational 
Corporations under International Law (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 3.   
412 See Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 Chapter 90 33 and 34, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/33-
34/90/contents accessed on May 2016. 
413 Bohm, Senior and White, supra note 412, p.  312. 
414 Bici v. Ministry of Defence (2004) EWHC 786. See also Mulcany vs. Ministry of Defence (1996) QB 732 and 
Bell and Others v. Ministry of Defence (2003) EWHC 1134. 
415 See Human Rights Act 1998, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents accessed on May 2016. 
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State of Defense416. He highlighted that the Article 1417 of the ECHR – therefore, the Human 
Rights Act applies not only on a territorial basis, but also in cases where the State exercises 
effective control over the operation418. Therefore, it follows that the Human Rights Act can 
apply to British-controlled detention facilities abroad. Accordingly, an individual who has been 
subjected to human rights abuses by private contractors would be able to bring its case before 
the British courts, but only if the PMSC’ misconduct is attributable to Britain419. 
 
Another way of holding private contractors liable for human rights violations when 
operating as a PMSC is to exercise jurisdiction through the ICC Act of 2001420. To date, only 
one soldier has been tried by a court-martial for abusing prisoners in Iraq in this way421. 
However, the application of the ICC Act is restricted since PMSCs do not typically operate in 
war zones and moreover, they are not engaged in offensive military actions. Furthermore, the 
activities of PMSCs within Britain’s territory are directly regulated and monitored by the 
                                                          
416 R (Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State of Defense, Case No: CO/2242/2004, 14 December 2004, EWHC 
2911. 
417 The Article 1 stipulates the obligations of State Parties to respect human rights. In particular, it indicates that '' 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention''. 
418 R (Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State of Defense, op. cit., paras. 248, 249, 265 and much better 270.  
419 Kerry Alexander and Nigel White, The Regulatory Context of Private Military and Security Services in the 
United Kingdom (PRIV-WAR National Reports Series, United Kingdom National Report, 2009), p.  26. 
420 See International Criminal Court Act 2001 Chapter 17, 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17/contents> accessed on May 2016. 
421 See R. v. Corporal Payne (2007) unreported. See ‘’UK Soldier Jailed Over Iraq Abuse’’, BBC News, 30 April 
2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6609237.stm (last accessed on May 2016). 
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PSIA422. The main goal of the PSIA is to protect citizens from the negligent and harmful 
practices of private security companies. However, in recent years, the PSIA has tried to hold 
PMSCs accountable423 by stipulating that a private contractor ‘shall be guilty of that offence 
and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly’424. This illustrates that ‘where 
an offence […] is committed by a body corporate and is proved to have been committed with 
the consent […] of […] a direction, manager, secretary or other similar officers of the body 
corporate [..] he [..]’425 is criminally liable.  
 
Despite the establishment of contractors' accountability, the Private Security 
Authority426 does not have competence to examine such allegations. The Authority is only 
responsible for granting or refusing to grant licenses to PMSCs' employees and supervising the 
self-regulation administrative functions contented in the Act427. Apart from the existing 
legislative context, the UK has initiated negotiations for the adoption of a regulatory regime 
regarding the PMSCs’ activities. In 2002, the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
                                                          
422 See Private Security Industry Act 2001 Chapter 12, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/12/contents (last accessed on May 2016). 
423 HC 922 (2001-02), Ninth Report of the House of Common Defence Committee: Private Military Companies 
(London: HMSO, 2002). 
424 See Private Security Industry Act 2001 Chapter 12, Supplemental Section 23. 
425 See Private Security Industry Act 2001 Chapter 12, Explanatory Notes, Commentary, Part II, Door Supervisors, 
etc for Public Houses, Clubs and Comparable Venues, Section 23.  
426 The Private Security Authority is the monitoring body of the Private Security Industry Act 2001. Its primary 
responsibility is to oversee the effective implementation of the PSIA 2001 and to carry out the functions related 
to licensing. See Private Security Industry Act 2001 Chapter 12, Supplemental Section 1. 
427 See Private Security Industry Act 2001 Chapter 12, Supplemental Section 1. 
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launched the ‘’Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’’428, which outlined how 
an appropriate framework for the regulation of PMSCs' activities could be achieved. This so 
called Green Paper, – provides ‘options for the control of private military companies which 
operate out of the UK, its dependencies and the British Islands’429. Not only did the Green 
Paper stress the lack of clear lines of accountability430, but also private security industry 
welcomed any proper regulation from the UK government, provided self-regulation was an 
integral part of the process431. Yet, the BARSC claims that they are working towards the 
harmonization of industry standards through voluntary codes of conduct, but it is a weak 
obstacle to prevent abuse. 
 
2.3. South Africa 
South African Republic is addressing the growth of PMSCs and the challenges posed by the 
use of mercenaries in the African continent, as it has the most effective legal regime regarding 
the regulation of PMSCs' activities. This is not a surprising fact since that country used to be a 
major exporter of PMSCs in the post-apartheid era.432 After their first democratic elections in 
1994, the South African Constitution is the primary source of law that applies to the private 
military and security services433. The willingness of the new government was to give direct and 
                                                          
428 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation (2001-02) HC 577. 
429 Ibid, para. 1. 
430 Ibid, para. 34. 
431 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Miliband Urged to Regulate Private Military’, (The Guardian, 18 February 2008), 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/18/military.foreignpolicy1> accessed on May 2016. 
432 Caroline Holmquist, Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation (SIPRI Policy Paper No9, 2005), 
p. 50. 
433 According to the Annual Report of the Working Group on Mercenaries, the South Africa is the only anglo-
speaking African State, which had specific legislation regarding the export of military and security services. See 
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decisive response to the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone in 1995434, led to 
the adoption of the FMAA of 1998 435. The FMAA sets out a restrictive structure with regard 
to the engagement of any national with the training and/or financing of any military and 
security assistance abroad436. In addition to the establishment of an authorization and 
registration regime of PMSCs and their employees, the FMAA contains provisions for the 
prosecution of private contractors when a violation of FMAA provisions occurs437. In Rouget 
v. S., the involvement of a former French soldier who was convicted for recruiting mercenaries 
in South Africa to participate in the civil war in Ivory Coast438. Furthermore, in Zimbabwe case 
a former British officer was found guilty of trying to supply weapons in order to overthrow the 
                                                          
Annual Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Rights of Peoples to Self-determination (A/HRC/24/45, 01/07/2013) para. 23.  
434 Khareen Pech, ‘Executive Outcomes – A corporate conquest’ in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), Peace, 
Profit and Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 1999), p.  86. 
435 South Africa Government Gazette Vol. 395, No. 18912, 20/05/1998. See also Raenette Taljaard, 
‘Implementing South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act’ in Alan Bryden and Marina 
Caparini (eds.), Private Actors and Security Governance, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the 
Armed Forces: Geneva, 2006). 
436 Andre Stemmet, ‘The South Africa Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act’ [2000] 145(5) RUSI 
Journal, p. 37. 
437 Faustin Z. Ntoubandi, ‘South Africa: the Regulatory Context of Private Military and Security Services’ in 
Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors: The 
Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
438 Rouget v. S. (2006) JOL 15962 (T) Case No. A 2850/3 (20/05/2005). 
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government of Equatorial Guinea, including South Africans, although only two of them were 
fined because of the lack of evidence439.  
 
Despite the limited cases that have been brought before the national courts under the 
FMAA, in order to comprehensively implement the FMAA, several concerns need to be 
addressed. First, relates to the gathering of information and evidence to secure the convictions, 
whilst the second to the problematic extraterritorially enforcement of certain FMAA’s 
provisions. In order to overcome these shortcomings, the government replaced the FMAA with 
the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act of 2006 (hereinafter as ‘the Mercenary Act’) 440. The Mercenary Act 
applies to any South African citizen or permanent resident, any incorporated, or registered 
company, or any foreign citizen, who contravenes the provisions of the Mercenary Act within 
the borders of the South Africa441. Therefore, a citizen who recruits or trains mercenaries within 
or outside of the territory of the Republic falls under the scope of the Mercenary Act. A foreign 
citizen would come within the jurisdiction of the Mercenary Act, if the recruitment, training or 
financing takes place within the borders of the South Africa. 
 
Even so, the Mercenary Act 2006 leaves certain loopholes regarding the prosecution of 
foreigners even if where they operate within the territory of the State or extraterritorially, under 
the domestic courts, the ICC Act could provide a possible pathway for punishing private 
                                                          
439 Case No 12967/2004 Kaunda and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2004 (5) SA 
191 (T), and Case No CCT 23/04 Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4) SA (CC). 
440 South Africa Government Gazette Vol. 509, No. 30477, 16/11/2007, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica2.pdf> accessed on May 2016.  
441 Sections 11 (a) – (d) and 2 (a) – (b). 
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contractors who have committed any misconduct442. This legislative context applies to any 
person accused of commissioning of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes within 
the territory of the South Africa and under certain circumstances, beyond its borders. 
 
2.4. Germany 
Despite some similarities in historical backgrounds, European domestic approaches towards 
regulating PMSCs’ activities differ. According to one scholar, Bazatu443 finds four different 
approaches to domestic regulation of PMSCs’ operations and classifies then as follows: First, 
some States lack altogether a national framework, as in the case of Cyprus. Secondly, some 
countries adopt a more decentralized approach, for instance Switzerland and Italy. Others, 
including Ireland and the U.K., adopt a more specific approach regarding PMSCs’ operations 
within their territory. Finally, States such as Germany and Austria have a more permissive 
approach based on the application of general commercial regulatory rules over PMSCs’ 
conduct.  In addition, the fact that compliance with human rights law and humanitarian law is 
one of the top priorities within the EU policies444. This is evidenced by the EU endorsement of 
                                                          
442 South Africa Government Gazette Vol. 445, No. 23642, 18/07/2002, Implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act 2002, <http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/iotrsoticca2002699.pdf> 
accessed on May 2016. 
443 Anne - Maria Buzatu, European Practices of Regulation of PMSCs and Recommendations for Regulation of 
PMSCs through International Legal Instruments (Geneva: the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2008), p. 17 
<http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/dcaf_buzatu_european-practices.pdf> 
accessed on May 2016. 
444 Concerning the use of PMSCs, the EU hires private security guards to protect EU offices, civilians and police 
missions. See Elke Krahmann, ‘The United States, PMSCs and the State Monopoly on Violence: Leading the 
Way Towards Norm Change’ [2013] 44 (1) Security Dialogue, p. 62.  
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the Montreux Document. Through its attempt the EU has yet to harmonize the domestic 
regulations in relation to PMSCs’ operations445. 
 
An example of a permissive approach is Germany. It is a home State for several PMSCs 
offering protection to persons, buildings and cash-in-transit operations, but there is no explicit 
domestic regulation to monitor and control such activities. Despite Germany's opens support 
to the effective application of the Montreux Document, it has a restrictive view with regard to 
the outsourcing of military and security functions abroad446. However, when an allegation 
against a private contractor is made regarding human rights violations, German criminal law 
fully applies to the private contractors’ misconduct447. In cases, where these companies operate 
within the territory of a third State, the application of the German criminal law requires that a 
link exists to the official German Armed Forces448 before the law can be applied. For instance, 
                                                          
445 The EU endorsed the Montreux Document on July 2012 <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-
policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-
states.html> accessed on May 2016. 
446 Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 249. In particular, core military and security activities can be outsourced to PMSCs 
only if they are related to internal security and not to external. See Answer by the German Government to 
Parliament, Bundenstag printed paper 15/5824, preliminary remarks, Answer No. 1a, 
<http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/15/058/1505824.pdf> access on May 2016. 
447 The German Government did not approve the application of court-martial jurisdiction over PMSCs’ employees. 
Bundestag printed paper 15/5824, preliminary remark, Answer No. 12, 
<http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/15/058/1505824.pdf> accessed on May 2016. More particular, the German 
government argued that PMSCs’ employees could not claim the status of combatant and so they cannot be tried 
under the German military law.  
448 Ralf Evertz, ‘Germany’ in Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Military and 
Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms (Oxford/Portland, 
Hart Publishing, 2012), p.  228. 
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Germany has enacted agreements with regard to the promotion criminal prosecution and co-
operation on criminal matters for offences committed by PMSCs within the territory of a third 
State. As an example, the Law on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters covers 
any co-operation for the extradition of execution and non-German court decisions449. 
 
Apart from that, the German Criminal Code is entirely applicable to PMSCs’ 
employees. For instance, in 2010, the German Federal Government observed that employees of 
private security companies […] are bound by international humanitarian law and can be 
prosecuted by domestic courts or the International Criminal Court if they have committed war 
crimes  in  armed conflicts’450. Taking into account the principle of personality for the private 
contractor, it is easy for him/her to be prosecuted by having German nationality for offences 
committed abroad based on his/her German nationality451. Additionally, the Federal High 
Court of Justice highlighted that in case of a PMSCs’ misconduct, State has the ultimate 
responsibility for grave breaches of international law committed by private contractors452. 
                                                          
449 See Law on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (IRG) of December 23, 1982. See more on 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Requesting Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
from G8 Countries: A step-by-step guide (E/CN.15/2011/CRP.6, 12 April 2011), p. 16. 
450 Germany, Lower House Federal Parliament (Bundestag). Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor 
Interpellation by Members Inge Hoger, Jan Aken, Christine Buchholz, further Members and the Parliamentary 
Group Die linked, BT-Drs, 17/4012, 1 November 2010, 9. 
451 Ralf Evert, Regulation of Private Military, Security and Surveillance Services in Germany (PRIV-WAR Report 
Germany, National Reports Series 16/09, 2009), p. 12. 
452 The issue of State responsibility rises only if the PMSCs’ mission has been authorised by a governmental 
authority. See Evertz, supra note106, p. 229. 
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Thus, in the case of Former Yugoslavia453, the Federal High Court of Justice claimed that in 
the absence of connection between a private act and the German official authority, the States 
could evade international responsibility454. Thus, in order to hold Germany responsible for 
violations committed by PMSCs, the nexus between them should be proved455. 
 
Therefore, in summary, the discussion above shows that in terms of regulatory schemes, 
the following approaches are drafted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
453 The case was concerned the destruction of a bridge by an aerial attack during the NATO operation in Kosovo 
(KFOR) in 1999. 
454 Germany, Federal high Court of Justice, 35 Citizens of the Former Yugoslavia v. Germany. Appeal Judgment, 
2 November 2006, Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts, No 887. See also Antonio Cassesse 
and Guido Acquaviva (eds.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p.  738. 
455 Ibid, paras. 20 -23. 
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National Regulatory Approaches regarding PMSCs’ regulation 
 United States of 
America 
United Kingdom South Africa Germany 
National 
Regulatory 
Framework over 
PMSCs’ Activities 
Yes No Yes No 
Adjudicating 
Pathways to 
Prosecute Private 
Contractors in Case 
of Misconduct 
Yes No Yes Yes 
National Laws with 
Extraterritorial 
Application over 
Private Contractors’ 
Misconduct 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Support for the 
Montreux 
Document 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PMSCs endorsed 
the ICoC 
64 208 22 13 
Self-Regulation 
system 
Yes Yes No No 
Support for the U.N 
Draft Convention 
on PMSCs 
No No Yes No 
 These figures are taken by the ICoC website http://www.icoc-psp.org/. Last update on September 2013. (last 
accessed on May 2016). 
 
Overall, the above table highlights that the absence of a coherent and binding 
international regulatory scheme relating with the PMSCs’ activities makes States to deviate 
from their obligation to establish relevant mechanism to monitor and control PMSCs’ activities. 
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3. The Absent International Model for the Prosecution of Human Rights 
Violations by PMSCs 
The extensive involvement of PMSCs in unstable environments gives rise to some of the most 
notorious human rights abuses, such as the shooting at Nisour Square456 and the Abu Ghraib 
scandal457. These incidents revealed the lack of transparent mechanisms regarding PMSCs’ 
activities and more distantly the absence of mechanisms to hold private contractors accountable 
for such violations458. Consequently, individual States are inspired to work towards the 
establishment of national and international accountability mechanisms to punish perpetrators 
and to provide victims with effective remedies. However, the aforementioned analysis of 
national mechanisms demonstrates that States avoid the adoption of a coherent accountability 
framework for PMSCs’ misconduct. In 2008, the USA failed to control effectively PMSCs’ 
activities, and the Department of Justice was unable and/or unwilling to hold them criminally 
liable for acts of excessive violence or abuse by private contractors459. This shows that the 
                                                          
456 Charles Tiefer, ‘No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and After’, 
[2009] 88(3) Oregon Law Review, p. 745. 
457 Joel Brinkley and James Glanz, ‘The Struggle for Iraq: Civilian Employees; Contract Workers Implicated in 
February Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on the Job’ (New York Times, 4 May 2004) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/04/world/struggle-for-iraq-civilian-employees-contract-workers-implicated-
february-army.html> accessed on May 2016. 
458 See Dawn L. Rothe and Jeffrey I. Ross, ‘Private Military Contractors, Crimes and the Terrain of 
Unaccountability’ [2010] 27(4) Justice Quarterly, p.593; see also Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as 
Means of Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Why We Need an International 
Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/CRP.1, 17 May 2011) para. 
2. 
459 Eric De Brabandere argued that in the most cases the unwillingness of the local government to protect human 
rights and/or their inability to ensure that protection effectively could give impunity to PMSCs and their 
employees for their misconduct. See Eric De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights Obligations ad Transnational 
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adoption of a clear national legal framework to govern PMSCs’ conduct remains 
problematic460, yet it is required for States to establish a comprehensive regime to monitor 
PMSCs’ activities by registration and licensing these companies and regulating the variety 
types of functions that they can perform461. Moreover the UN Working Group on Mercenaries 
emphasized that States must also be able to prosecute where violations of human rights law 
and/or international humanitarian law occur, in order to ensure accountability462. 
 
Despite these efforts, there is still a need to hold private contractors accountable for 
their misconduct; the transnational nature of PMSCs’ activities helps them to avoid national 
regulation and the jurisdiction of national courts. Therefore the enactment of a coherent 
international legally binding framework for PMSCs which could supplement the national 
regimes is needed, such as the UN Draft Convention. However, to date the international efforts 
seem to have failed for three main reasons. First, their voluntary nature means that all current 
international initiatives that address PMSCs directly, such as the Montreux Document, do not 
have a binding nature. Secondly, they lack an oversight and enforcement mechanism in order 
to secure accountability for private contractors for human rights violations. Thirdly, they do 
not establish a judiciary body that could examine complaints concerning human rights 
violations by private contractors. A case in point is the Montreux Document. It is the most 
                                                          
Corporations: The Limits of Direct Corporate Responsibility’ [2010] 4(1) Human Rights and International Legal 
Discourse, p. 72. 
460 Jon D. Michaels, ‘Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic ad Strategic Problems with 
Privatizing War’ [2002] 82 Washington University Law Quarterly, p. 1001. 
461 See United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as Means of Impending the Exercise of the 
Right of Peoples to Self-determination, ‘Why We Need an International Convention on Private Military and 
Security Companies’ (17 May 2011) U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/CRP.1, para. 6.  
462 Ibid. 
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popular and detailed restatement of well-established States’ obligations under international 
humanitarian law and human rights law regarding PMSCs’ activities and their personnel. Even 
though it is not a legally binding document, it encourages States to establish national 
monitoring and supervision bodies to regulate PMSCs’ activities instead of an international 
one. However, it continues to hold the status of soft law463. Additionally the Montreux 
Document has limited application in application to PMSCs' activities, since according to its 
title; it applies only in situations of armed conflicts464. 
 
Despite its limited effect, the Montreux Document has led to the development of the 
ICoC 465. Its great significance relates to the need to achieve higher standards for PMSCs from 
an industry perspective. Since it is a non-governmental initiative, the ICoC does not address 
human rights issues of accountability of PMSCs and their employees for human rights 
allegations. Accordingly, the voluntary nature of this document means that it cannot meet the 
goal of ensuring that all PMSCs are addressed.  
 
The aforementioned international initiatives have not been implemented; the Human 
Rights Council proposed that only an international legally binding instrument would ensure 
that States adopt minimum standards to regulate PMSCs' activities. To that extent, Gomez del 
Prado suggested that a this binding document will relate to cover all the types of PMSCs' 
functions and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, the registration and authorization 
                                                          
463 White, supra note 24, p. 11. 
464 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related 
to Operations off Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflicts. 
465 See Seiberth, supra note 66, p. 161; Fred Schreier, ‘Obligations of Private Military and Security Companies 
under International Humanitarian Law’ in Perrin, supra note 2, p. 193; White, supra note 369, p. 12. 
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regime to monitor PMSCs' operations, the ensuring of accountability when it is necessary and 
the provision of remedies for the victims466. The UN Draft Convention on PMSCs constitutes 
the first international effort which envisages an international system of oversight and 
monitoring for PMSCs' activities - named Committee on the Regulation, Oversight and 
Monitoring of PMSCs (hereinafter as ‘the Committee on PMSCs’).  
 
The Committee on PMSCs is required to collect periodical reports on the legislative, 
judicial and administrative and other measures that States must adopt to implement sufficiently 
the Convention on PMSCs467. Moreover, in case of ‘grave and/or systematic’ violations of 
human rights, the Committee on PMSCs has to launch in loco investigations468. To that end, 
the UN Draft Convention establishes a twofold complaint mechanism, namely the Inter-State 
Complaint Mechanism and the Individual and Group Petition Procedure469. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
In the absence of a coherent and binding international framework regarding the regulation of 
PMSCs’ activities and an accountability mechanism for the punishment of private contractors 
for human rights violations, States are required to develop domestic regulations to comply with 
                                                          
466 Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, 'A. U.N. Convention to PMSCs?' [2012] 13 (3) Criminal Justice Ethics, p. 262. 
467 Art. 33 of the UN Draft Convention. 
468 Art. 36 of the UN Draft Convention. 
469 Art. 37 of the UN Draft Convention. 
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the international standards470. In Seiberth471 view, one of the main aims of the Montreux 
Document was to raise awareness with regard to legal challenges posed by PMSCs and to make 
some non-exclusive recommendations on how domestic legal regimes could sufficiently 
respond to these challenges.  
 
Despite the fact that, the Montreux Document provides common guidelines for all 
States, that is contracting, territorial and home States, in order to achieve an efficient national 
regulatory regime for PMSCs’ operations and a sufficient accountability mechanism for private 
contractors’ misconduct, States implemented these recommendations differently. For instance, 
following the endorsement of the Montreux Document, the USA opted for the revision of the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Defense Department Instructions and 
Combatant Commander Orders472.  Moreover, in order to increase the operational standards for 
PMSCs’ functions, the USA enacted the Public Law 111-383 (2011) 473. According to Section 
                                                          
470 In particular the Montreux Document emphasised that ‘[…] to provide for […] appropriate administrative and 
other monitoring mechanisms to ensure the proper execution of the contract and the accountability of contracted 
PMSCs and their personnel for their improper and unlawful conduct […]’. See the Montreux Document, Part II, 
Good Practice No. 21. 
471 See Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 256. 
472 See presentation of Christopher Mayer, ‘Implementation of the  Montreux Commitments: Comparative 
Perspectives’’ for Webinar Recordings-Montreux: Fives Years On: Assessing the Current Status of the 
Development and Implementation of International Standards for the Private Security Industry’ (recorded on 29 th 
of April 2013), <http://ihrib.org/webinar-recordings-montreux-fives-years-on-assessing-current-status-
development-implementation-international-standards-private-military-security-industry/> accessed on May 
2016. 
473 This Act is enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives named as ‘’Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011’’, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ383/pdf/PLAW-
111publ383.pdf> accessed on May 2016. 
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833 of this Act, the USA adopted high standards and strict certification criteria for private 
security contractors474. For example, this Act incorporates the principles of the Montreux 
Document into its framework. In particular, contractors must ensure training and awareness on 
human rights law, such as the prohibition of torture, the protection of relevant culture and 
religion475, and also contractors must establish, implement, and maintain procedures to ensure 
respect for human rights476. In contrast, some States are unwilling to enact separate and 
additional legislative measures to implement the principles of the Montreux Document. One 
such example is South Africa. Even if South Africa endorsed the Montreux Document and fully 
supported the dissemination of the Montreux Document’s standards477, it prefers to wait until 
the negotiations for the adoption of a binding international convention come to an end. The 
main reason for this approach is that South Africa believes that the adoption of an international 
binding norm in a form of the U. N. Draft Convention on PMSCs would be more direct and 
effective than the non-binding normative provisions of the Montreux Document478. Moreover, 
                                                          
474 Section 833 of the Act has the title of Standards and Certification for Private Security Contractors.  
475 U.S. Department of Defense, Procedures Guidance and Information § 225.7401. 
476 ASIS International, Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations-Requirements 
with Guidance, ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 (Mar. 5, 2012), para. 9.5 <http:// 
www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/Item_1997-PSC_1_STD.PDF> accessed on May 2016. 
477 See South Africa Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Strategic Plan 2010 – 2013, 21, 
<http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/strategic%20plan%202010-2013/strategic%20plan%202010-2013.pdf> 
accessed on May 2016. 
478 See presentation of Dr. Sabelo Gumedze, ‘’Implementation of the  Montreux Commitments: Comparative 
Perspectives’’ for Webinar Recordings-Montreux: Fives Years On: Assessing the Current Status of the 
Development and Implementation of International Standards for the Private Security Industry (recorded on 29 th 
of April 2013), <http://ihrib.org/webinar-recordings-montreux-fives-years-on-assessing-current-status-
development-implementation-international-standards-private-military-security-industry/> accessed on May 
2016. 
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the endorsement of the ICoC by the South African PMSCs is akin to the implementation of the 
Montreux Document’s standards479. The same approach has been adopted concurrently by 
some European States, such as Germany480. Despite the fact that European Union has joined 
the Montreux Document in 2012 and recognized the high significance of the international 
principles that are contained therein, Germany considers that there is no reason to enact 
additional legislative measures to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities481. In addition to the 
aforementioned comparative analysis, Germany holds one of the most effective mechanisms 
to establish criminal sanctions on private contractors for their misconduct. 
 
As a parallel process to the Montreux Document, the United Nations ‘’Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’’ Framework482 highlights that States have the primary role in preventing and 
addressing human rights violations committed within their territory and/or jurisdiction.483 
Thus, States have to undertake all appropriate policies, regulations and adjudication measures 
to prevent human rights abuses, which may be committed by third parties –including those 
committed by PMSCs. While some States are moving in the right direction as described 
previously, they fail to enforce their existing laws over PMSCs’ activities and their employees’ 
                                                          
479 Ibid. 
480 See Seiberth, supra note 203, p. 249. 
481 See Evertz, supra note 451, p. 231. 
482 Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of all human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights (A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008) <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-
and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf> accessed on May 2016.  
483 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf> accessed on May 2016.  
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misconduct – as was the case with legal action against Blackwater. This failure is caused mostly 
by the inconsistency between the departments that have the overall and direct control of 
PMSCs’ operations. For instance, the U.S.A. International Traffic in Arms Regulations is 
responsible for the Arms Export Control Act during a PMSC operation and not for the 
supervision whether the private contractors’ behaviour is in accordance with the human rights 
standards484.  
 
Moreover, as part of their inherent international duty to protect human rights, States 
have to enact those specific and direct national regulatory measures in order to ensure that in 
case of any possible violation that may occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction by 
PMSCs, the victims should have access to effective remedy485. In cases of the PMSCs-related 
human rights claims, todate there are limited non-judicial mechanisms that provide remedy to 
those affected by PMSCs operations.  More specifically, some States that have signed the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises486 – including the UK, established National 
Contact Points as a non-judicial grievance mechanism.  Therefore, States must adopt a national 
legislative framework, which will directly address to PMSCs and their personnel. In this regard, 
the UK Private Security Industry Act is a prime example, but some additional changes are 
                                                          
484 For a comprehensive analysis on the  U.S.A. regulatory regime of PMSCs see Marina Caparini, ‘Domestic 
Regulation: Licensing Regimes for the Export of Military Goods and Services’ in Simon Chesterman, Chia 
Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to the Market: the Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 158. 
485 Human Rights Council, Implementing the United Nations ‘’Protect, Respect and Remedy’’ Framework, 
(United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2011) 25 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf> accessed on May 2016. 
486 For the text and commentary on OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises see 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ accessed on May 2016. 
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required. So that, such an example of a national initiative has to set out specific requirements 
regarding the registration regime and licensing of PMSCs and their employees, outline explicit 
standards about the training and vetting of the private contractors according to human rights 
principles and humanitarian law standards and also accountability for possible human rights 
violations in the event that these occur. Moreover, the establishment of an oversight mechanism 
under this initiative is essential in order to supervise the registration procedures and examine 
human rights allegations against private contractors. Consequently, such a model has to have 
extraterritorial application in order to provide access to remedies for the victims irrespective of 
where the violations may have been committed.  
 
1. Summary 
This chapter examined the national mechanisms regarding the punishment and prosecution of 
PMSCs’ employees for human rights violations. It concludes that as part of the States’ inherent 
international duty to protect human rights, they have to enact proper, specific and direct 
national regulatory measures in order to ensure that in case of any possible violation that may 
occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction by PMSCs, the victims should have access to 
effective remedy. However, in the absence of such measures, a State has still the responsibility 
to protect its individuals from any human rights violations committed by PMSCs. 
 
This approach is coming through another area of law; the human rights law.  That is the 
reason that the next chapter focuses on the application of human rights law on the regulation 
of the activities of PMSCs. It emphasizes the obligations of States under human rights law to 
regulate and control PMSCs’ activities. It examines further whether the ECtHR has the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate PMSCs’ employees for human rights abuses. Moreover, it focuses on 
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the contribution of the ECtHR in the harmonization of the national legal orders towards the 
establishment of a common accountability regime for abuses committed by PMSCs. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON 
THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND 
SECURITY COMPANIES’ ACTIVITIES 
 
This chapter is focused on the application of human rights law over the activities of PMSCs. It 
is divided into two parts. The first part of this chapter examines the obligations of States under 
human rights law to regulate and control PMSCs’ activities. Considering that PMSCs are 
operating in unstable environments, this chapter assesses the States’ procedural obligations 
under human rights law with respect to allegations of the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture. Moreover, it demonstrates the efforts of States to fulfil their obligations under human 
rights law regarding the regulation of PMSCs’ and their employees’ activities. Above all, this 
chapter advocates whether human rights law has a significant role in the regulation of PMSCs 
and the prevention of the commission of human rights violations by PMSCs and their 
employees. Following this analysis, the second part of the present chapter uses as a case study 
the ECtHR. In particular, it explores whether the ECtHR has the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
PMSCs’ employees for human rights abuses. Further, it focuses on the contribution of the 
ECtHR – and the other regional human rights judicial boobies- in the harmonization of the 
national legal orders towards the establishment of a common accountability regime for abuses 
committed by PMSCs. 
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PART A: STATES’ PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECYURITY COMPANIES’ ACTIVITIES 
 
1. Introduction  
Over the past few decades the international community has several concerns about the 
responsibilities of private businesses for human rights violations487. PMSCs488 and their 
employees/private contractors489 have been accused of involving in numerous episodes of 
human rights violations during their operations490. The most notorious examples have allegedly 
                                                          
487 See also Jose Luis Gómez del Prado, Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ 
Activities (2009) U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. Retrieved from 
http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Impact%20in%20Human%20Rights%20of%20Private%20Militar
y%20and%20Security%20Companies%27%20Activities.pdf. 
488 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (the Montreux Document) defines 
the PMSCs as ‘private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they 
describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of 
persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; 
prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel’. See The Montreux 
Document: Preface, point 9(a), G.A. Res. A/63/467–S/2008/636 (2008). Retrieved from 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-document-
4_en.pdf.   
489 Similarly, the Montreux Document demonstrates that ‘PMSCs’ employees/private contractors are persons 
employed by, through direct hire or under a contract with, a PMSC, including its employees and managers’. See 
Ibid. 
490 See Swisspeace, The Impact of PMSCs on the Local Population in Post – Conflict Countries: A Comparative 
Study for Afghanistan and Angola (Bern, 2007); Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Privatization of War and Security in 
Afghanistan: Future or Dead End?’ [2007] 2 (1) Economics of Peace and Security Journal, p. 30. Moreover, Perrin 
denotes that the widespread involvement of PMSCs in modern warfare and other insurgencies harmed more 
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taken place in Iraq. In 2004, Titan Corporation and CACI – two American PMSCs latterly, 
they contracted out to provide interpretation and interrogation services at Abu Ghraib prison – 
were accused of being involved in torturing of Iraqi detainees491. Few years later, private 
                                                          
civilians than the ‘traditional armed conflicts’ do. See Benjamin Perrin (ed.), Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, 
Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations and the Law (UBC Press, 2012), p. 2. See also Human Rights 
First, A New Way to Hold Abusers Accountable: American Ideals, Universal Values (Annual Report, 2013). 
Retrieved from http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/annualreport/HRF-2013-Annual-Report.pdf. 
491 The incidents of Abu Ghraib constitute the cornerstone for a longstanding political and legal discussion within 
the U.S.A. relating to the human rights obligations during military and security operations. See Shadi Mokhtari, 
After Abu Ghraib: Exploring Human Rights in America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). Accordingly several legal scholars started to Robert McCorquodale and Renelope Simons, 
‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of 
International Human Rights Law’ [2007] 70(4) The Modern Law Review 598; Joshua L. Pratel, The Torture 
Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 383; Michelle Brown, 
‘Setting the Conditions for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad’ [2005] 57(3) American Quarterly, p. 973; 
Jordan Paust, ‘Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib: Will Prosecution and Cashiering of a Few Soldiers Comply 
with the International Law?’ (May 10, 2004) Jurist, < http://www.jurist.org/forum/paust1.php> accessed on May 
2016; See also Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal – Fast Facts. (2014) CNN Library. Retrieved from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/. A military investigation, 
which resulted in the publication of a report titled ‘’Tabuga Report’’, explicitly indicated the extensive sexual 
abuse and humiliating treatment of detainees by private contractors. See The ‘Tabuga Report’ On Treatment of 
Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part One: Detainee 
Abuse 15. Retrieved from http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.2. See also, Katja 
Nieminen, ‘The Rules of Attribution and the Private Military Contractors at Abu Ghraib: Private Acts or Public 
Wrongs?’ [2004] XV Finnish Yearbook of International Law, p. 289. 
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contractors of Blackwater were involved in shooting innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square. 
As a result, 17 people were killed and 24 were wounded, among them women and children492.  
 
Despite the fact that there seems to be a proven record of involvement of private 
contractors in human rights abuses, none of them had been prosecuted493. Usually, the absence 
of a coherent and binding international legal framework for the regulation of PMSCs and 
monitoring private contractors’ activities494 -as it is mentioned in Chapter V- helps PMSCs’ 
employees to escape from prosecution for human rights violations495. Hence, private military 
                                                          
492 James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, ‘From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths’ (The New York 
Times, 3 October, 2007) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 > accessed on 
May 2016. 
493 Peter W. Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law’ 
[2003/4] Columbia JTC, p. 521. 
494 Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi argued that the multinational character of (PMSCs) operations and the ‘amorphous 
structure’ of those companies make them immune from the control of States. Therefore, it requires to be regulated 
at international level. See Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, ‘Liability for Multinational Corporations 
under International Law: An Introduction’ in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability for 
Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2000), p. 3.  
495 Emily Kelly, ‘Holding Blackwater Accountable: Private Security Contractors and the Protections of the Use 
Immunity’ [2013] 35 (3) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, p. 17. See also Vice-
President’s of the International Red Cross Committee statement Christine Beerli, ‘Private Military/Security 
Companies: Rules should be Implemented, Keynote Address by Chrisine Beerli, Montreux +5 Conference’ 
(Montreux, Switzerland, 11-13 December 2013) < 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/12-11-privatization-of-war-montreux-plus-5-
beerli.htm>. 
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and security industry seems ‘less regulated than the cheese market’496 and/or ‘the toy 
industry’497.  
 
In the aftermath of those accidents, the international community elaborated more 
towards the establishment of an international framework to regulate PMSCs’ activities and 
advocate human rights allegations. The Montreux Document498 constitutes a unique effort to 
encourage States to comply with the international humanitarian law and human rights law with 
respect to PMSCs. However, the Montreux Document has limited application –only during 
land-based military and security operations- and also it recognizes that its provisions do not 
affect States’ existing obligations under customary international law or under any other 
international agreement to which States are parties499.  
 
                                                          
496 Peter W. Singer, The Private Military and Security Industry in Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to 
Next (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Force, Policy Paper, 2004), p. 14. 
497 See the abstract of Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, 'A. U.N. Convention to PMSCs?' [2012] 13 (3) Criminal Justice 
Ethics, p. 262; Sarah Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 41. One of 
the primary reasons that this market continues to be unregulated is the transnational character of PMSCs’ 
activities. See also Deborah V. Avant, The Market of Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 144;  
498 The Montreux Document. G.A. Res. A/63/467–S/2008/636 (2008). Retrieved from 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-document-
4_en.pdf.  
499 See Preface, Part I, para. 3 of the Montreux Document. See also Nigel D. White, Advanced Introduction to 
International Conflict and Security Law (Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, 2014), p. 53; Daphné Richemond-Barak, 
‘Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law’ [2011] 22 European Journal of International Law, 
p. 1027. 
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At the same time, the private security industry adopted self-regulatory frameworks 
regarding the responsibilities of PMSCs and their employees during their operations. The most 
significant and recent example is the ICoC500. It is mentioned in the previous chapter that this 
self-regulation code of conduct enlists human rights standards for PMSCs and their employees; 
and it also engages with operational guidelines concerning the governance, management and 
internal policies of PMSCs in order to improve oversight and accountability for their 
employees’ misconduct501. Yet, the non-binding nature of both documents makes them more a 
kind of suggestions for PMSCs rather than a binding and coherent international framework.   
 
Notwithstanding the absence of a coherent regulatory framework for PMSCs’ activities 
and of an accountability scheme for their misconduct, States have already bound by human 
rights law to regulate PMSCs’ activities, and to adopt special measures in order to adjudicate 
PMSCs for human rights violations. Namely, the application of human rights law to PMSCs’ 
operations is further interpreted by international and regional human rights bodies. For 
instance, the HRC expressed that States parties to the ICCPR502 have the primary obligation 
‘to ensure [the rights recognised by the Covenant] to all individuals in their territory and 
                                                          
500 The ICOC document adopted on 9 November 2010 by private companies. Retrieved from http://www.icoc-
psp.org. For an overview see Fact Sheet International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
(ICoC). (2011). Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/COC/Fact%20Sheet%20ICoC_March%202011.pdf.  
501 See Working towards an International PMSC Code of Conduct Report from the National and International 
Standard-Setters workshop organized by DCAF in partnership with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs. 
(2009). (Working Report III) Geneva: Switzerland. Retrieved from http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Working-Towards-
an-International-PMSC-Code-of-Conduct.  
502 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 Dec. 1966) U.N.T.S. 171, entered into 
force 26 Mar. 1976. 
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subject to their jurisdiction’503. However, this obligation does not concern only violations 
committed by State’s agents, but also from violations they may have committed by private 
entities504.  
 
To that end, the main question is how human rights law imposes obligations on States 
to regulate PMSCs’ activities and prevent human rights violations committed by them. In other 
words, whether the human rights law provides with States the obligation to prevent human 
rights abuses committed by PMSCs. Therefore, the present chapter examines human rights 
obligations to regulate PMSCs’ activities. Considering that PMSCs are operating in unstable 
environments and that PMSC are used in detention centres and in protecting military objects, 
this chapter assesses the States’ procedural obligations under human rights law with particular 
emphasis to allegations of the right to life and the prohibition of torture. Moreover, it 
demonstrates the efforts of the USA, UK, South Africa and Germany to fulfil their obligations 
under human rights law regarding the regulation of PMSCs and the activities of their 
employees. Above all, this chapter advocates whether human rights law has to play a significant 
role in the regulation of PMSCs and the prevention of the commission of human rights 
violations by PMSCs and their employees.  
 
2. Human Rights Obligations to Regulate Private Military and Security 
Companies’ Activities  
                                                          
503 See HRC, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 3. 
504 Ibid, para. 8. 
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International human rights law requires that States have the primary responsibility to prevent 
and address human rights abuses within their territory or jurisdiction by PMSCs505. The impact 
of PMSCs’ activities on the enjoyment and exercise of human rights506 and the emerging need 
for the prevention and punishment for violations of human rights law illustrate the need of 
                                                          
505 This obligation has been firstly highlighted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction 
Case. The ICJ noticed that the obligation to respect human rights is ‘in concern of all States’ because every 
commission of a human rights violation does not affect only a single State, but the international community as a 
whole. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1970 (Feb. 5), para. 33. Besides the International Law Commission (ILC) recognised in 
cases of a State tortures its citizens that ‘if a State is responsible for torturing its own citizens, no single State 
suffers any direct harm. Apart from the individual or individuals directly concerned, any harm attributed to 
anyone else is purely notional, that is, constructed on the basis of the assumption that such action violates some 
values or interests of “all”, or in the vocabulary of the Barcelona Traction case, the “international community 
as a whole”’ International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13/04/2006, para. 393. 
506 See Jose Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘The Role of Private Military and Security Companies in Modern Warfare – 
Impacts on Human Rights’ [2012] The Brown Journal of World Affairs, available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51834-the-role-of-private-military-and-security-companies-in-modern-
warfare-impacts-on-human-rights.html; Jose Luis Gómez del Prado, ‘Impact on Human Rights of Private Military 
and Security Companies’ Activities’ [2008] Global Research available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/impact-
on-human-rights-of-private-military-and-security-companies-activities/10523. See also Ieva Kalnina and Ugis 
Zeltins, ‘The Impact of the EU Human Rights System on Operations of Private Military and Security Companies’ 
in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.) War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and 
Private Contractors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 80. 
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further regulation of PMSCs507. Along with the human rights treaties, States have the obligation 
to ‘ensure’ that all rights guaranteed by the treaties are respected ‘for all individuals in their 
territory and subject to their jurisdiction’508.  
 
Therefore, human rights law could play such an important and decisive role towards 
the regulation of PMSCs’ activities and adjudication of private contractors for human rights 
violations. That happens because, human rights rules are designated as jus cogens509. This has 
occurred by invoking the peremptory character of human rights obligations such as the 
prohibition of slavery, torture, and genocide. Even the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States characterized a high number of human rights norms as 
having attained peremptory status510.  
 
As jus cogens, human rights law imposes erga omnes obligations on States with respect 
to the protection and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Erga omnes 
obligations are determined as obligations that States have towards the international community 
as a whole. The concept of erga omnes obligations is supported by the South West Africa 
                                                          
507 Eugenio Cusumano, ‘Policy Prospects for Regulating Private Military and Security Companies’, in Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.) War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private 
Contractors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 16.  
508 See HRC, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 3. 
509 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ [2008] 19:3 European Journal of International 
Law, p. 491. 
510Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), para. 702. 
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cases511 and the Barcelona Traction512. However, it should be noted that the South West Africa 
cases dealt inter alia with human rights violations and not only with international crimes and 
that the Barcelona Traction case is concerned as an issue of civil law. 
 
At the same time, human righst law also provides legal limitations on the activities of 
PMSCs and their employees. These legal boundaries are important since PMSCs may use lethal 
force during their operations, such as support during an armed conflict, interrogation and 
detention of prisoners, guarding persons or instalments. Since, PMSCs employees are usually 
working in endangered areas with a high level of institutional instability, they are in need to 
safeguard their lives during PMSCs operations513. So as, human rights law could be considered 
as a protective framework for themselves. 
 
To be more precise, one of the most important human rights treaty bodies, in General 
Comment 31, the HRC highlighted that ‘individuals should be protected by the States not just 
against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private 
persons or entities’514. Thus, in order to create an effective protective framework for 
individuals from human rights abuses by PMSCs’ employees , States have the obligation to 
‘take appropriate measures […] to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by 
                                                          
511 South West African Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), (Preliminary Objections), 1963 
ICJ REP. 319 (Dec. 21). 
512 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1970 (Feb. 5). 
513 See Francesco Francioni, ‘The Role of the Home State in Ensuring Compliance with Human Rights by Private 
Military Contractors’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 54. 
514 See HRC, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 8. 
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such acts by private persons or entities […] and to provide effective remedies in the event of 
breach […]’515.  
 
Accordingly, the absence of a binding and coherent international regulatory framework 
with a consistent oversight mechanism with regards to PMSCs raised the question whether 
human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, create duties and responsibilities directly to PMSCs 
and their employees516. In addition to this, States are frequently reluctant to accept 
responsibility for PMSCs’ operations; most of the times – such as at Abu Grhaib incident – 
States emphasize the civilian status of the private contractors and the lack of ‘effective 
control’517 over the activities of PMSCs. However, Buzatu argues that the activities of PMSCs 
should be regulated and monitored by the domestic criminal system of the State in which a 
PMSC is operating518. Nonetheless in unstable areas, the territorial government is unable to 
                                                          
515 Ibid. 
516 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also United 
Nations, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations, 2012), p. 77. 
517 The test of ‘effective control’ was set by the ICJ for the attribution to a State actions of non-State actors when 
the State has effective control of the operations. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ, 1986, para. 109.  
518 Anna-Marie Buzatu, European Practices of Regulation of PMSCs and Recommendations for Regulation of 
PMSCs through International Legal Instruments (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, 2008), p. 27. 
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fulfil the aforementioned obligation; and this fact creates a de facto gap within human rights 
protection519.  
 
Furthermore, it is very important to highlight that human rights law sets aside the 
national boundaries for the regulation of PMSCs and could apply over their activities 
irrespective of the territory whereas PMSCs’ operations taking place. Yet, Art. 2 of the ICCPR 
argues that States  
 
‘undertake to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the […] Covenant’520. 
 
It means that States parties are required to protect and respect ‘the rights of anyone 
within the power or effective control of the State’, even if they are not living within the territory 
of that State521. This principle is extremely important in matter of PMSCs’ operations, because 
it applies to everyone with respect to ‘those within the power or effective control of the forces 
of a State acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained’522. Therefore, the approach of the HRC ensures that the 
                                                          
519 See Hannah Tonkin, State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 123. 
520 Art. 2, para. 1 of the ICCPR. 
521 See HRC, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 10. 
522 Ibid. Even in cases that ‘States are not per se responsible for human rights abuses by private actors’, they 
remain responsible for their activities when these are attributable directly to them or when States fail to take 
appropriate measures to prevent them and/or investigate such violations. See United Nations Human Rights 
Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
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provisions of the ICCPR are adapted into different contexts regardless where the human rights 
violations are committed; such as in occupied territories523 or during peacekeeping 
operations524. 
 
3. States’ Obligations to Prevent Human Rights Abuses Committed by 
Private military and Security Companies 
It is aforesaid that international human rights law imposes obligations on States to safeguard 
the rights of their individuals within their territories and to prevent human rights violations may 
be committed by States and/or private agents. In this regard, States have the obligation to take 
appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, punish and provide effective remedies for 
misconduct by PMSCs and their employees. As the UN Working Group the Use of Mercenaries 
denoted that if a State decides to outsource certain inherently governmental functions525, such 
                                                          
and Remedy’ Framework (2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf3. 
523 See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the 
HRC: Cyprus, UN CCPR/C/79/Add.39, 03/08/1994, para. 3. 
524 The HRC stressed out ‘that the Covenant automatically applies when it exercises power or effective control 
over a person outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operation’. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the HRC: Belgium, UN CCPR/CO/81/BEL, 21/08/2004, para 6. 
525 Simon Chesterman, ‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of 
Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions [2008] 19 (5) European Journal of International Law, p. 1055. 
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as the monopoly of use of force, the obligation to prevent and investigate human rights abuses 
committed by private entities remains526.  
 
To this degree, regardless the territorial application of human rights treaties527, States 
are obliged to exercise ‘due diligence obligations’ to adopt proper legislative measures to 
prevent, investigate, punish and/or redress any harm caused by the activities of private 
persons/entities528. In case that the violated rights are core rights, such as the right to life and 
the prohibition of torture, States cannot derogate from the obligation to protect them529. 
Therefore, a State cannot deviate from its procedural obligations under human rights law for 
violations committed by private entities. Similarly, the HRC noticed that ‘the contracting out 
to the private commercial sector of core State activities which involve the use of force and the 
                                                          
526 Report of the U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, G.A. A/HRC/15/25 (2010), p. 11. 
Furthermore, according to Lenzerini and Francioni, the State should stand in-between criminals and victims as a 
shield in order to prevent violations of fundamental human rights, even during the activities of PMSCs. See 
Federico Lenzerini, and Francesco Francioni, ‘The Role of Human Rights in the Regulation of Private Military 
and Security Companies’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 60.   
527 As it is stated above, States parties to the ICCPR have the primary obligation ‘to respect and to ensure the 
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. 
This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the 
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’. See HRC, 
General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 10. 
528 See ibid, para. 8. 
529 See Robert McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ [2004] 17 (3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law, p. 477. 
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detention of persons does not absolve a State party of its obligations under the Covenant’530. 
Thus, a State has to ensure that PMSCs’ activities are compatible with the standards set out by 
the ICCPR and to provide effective remedies for victims in case of violations committed by 
‘persons acting in an official capacity’531. 
 
Further, the procedural obligations of States towards the activities of PMSCs have been 
developed throughout the jurisprudence of regional human rights judicial bodies. The ECtHR 
interpreted that in the event of failing to adopt appropriate measures to protect the rights of its 
citizens by third parties, a State holds international responsibility532. Apart from human rights 
violations, a State should take reasonable and appropriate measures to investigate these 
allegations533 and punish perpetrators, even they are private actors534. In particular, in Osman, 
the ECtHR considered that: 
 
                                                          
530 See HRC, Cabal and Pasini v. Australia (Communication No 1020/2002).  2003, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001, para.7.2. 
531 According to the Art. 2, para. 3 (a) of  the ICCPR, the term of a ‘person acting in an official capacity’, the 
ICCPR does not include only official forces, such as members of the national army, but also PMSCs employees 
hired by  the State to exercise governmental functions. 
532 See Osman v. the United Kingdom App no 87/1997/871/1083 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998).  
533 In Varnava and Others, the ECtHR held that the State violated the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) by failing to ‘’conduct an effective investigation into the fate of the nine men who disappeared in life-
threatening circumstances’’. See Varnava and Others v. Turkey Apps nos 
16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 (ECtHR, 18 
September 2009), para. 194. 
534 See Osmanoglu v. Turkey App no 48804/99 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008). 
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‘the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a 
third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk’535.  
 
Similarly, the IACtHR affirmed that the responsibility of a State is triggered by failing 
to exercise its ‘due diligence’ obligations with regard to private entities. In particular, in Pueblo 
Bello Massacre, the IACtHR found that a State is responsible by failing to adopt sufficient 
preventive measures to protect victims by the activities of a paramilitary group536. It is worthy 
a mention that from its very first case, the IACtHR recognized that the failure to adopt 
reasonable and adequate measures to prevent and investigate human rights violations by third 
parties constitutes a decisive element of State responsibility537.  
 
Furthermore, the significance of the procedural obligations of States in relation to 
violations committed by PMSCs has been highlighted by the AComHPR. The AComHPR 
                                                          
535 See Osman v. the United Kingdom supra note 44, para. 116.  
536 ‘[…] This Court considers that Colombia did not adopt sufficient prevention measures to avoid a paramilitary 
group of approximately 60 men from entering the municipality of Pueblo Bello at a time of day when the 
circulation of vehicles was restricted and then leaving this zone, after having detained at least the 43 alleged 
victims in the instant case, who were subsequently assassinated or disappeared […]’. See Pueblo Bello Massacre 
case (2006) IACtHR, Series C, No. 140, para. 138.  
537 ‘[…] An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for 
example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can 
lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention […]’. I/A Court H.R., Velasquez 
Rodriguez case (1988) IACtHR, Series C, No. 4, para. 172. 
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highlighted that States have the primary obligation to protect the rights of their individuals, to 
prevent any violation of their rights and to investigate those human rights allegations; 
regardless whether these violations are attributable to State agents or private parties538. 
Notably, the AComHPR in Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights recognized that a State should exercise its ‘due diligence’ 
obligations to ensure that all the rights that granted by the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights539 are protected ‘against political, economic and social interferences’540. 
 
3.A. Right to Life 
3.A.1. Procedural Obligations of States to Ensure the Protection of the Right to Life 
The activities of PMSCs usually have impact on the enjoyment of the most human rights541. 
Those rights, including rights of individual or rights with collective character, are contemplated 
                                                          
538 Particularly, the AComHPR states that ‘[…] the Government has failed to intervene to prevent the 
assassination and killing of specific individuals. Even where it cannot be proved that violations were committed 
by government agents, the government had a responsibility to secure the safety and the liberty of its citizens, and 
to conduct investigations into murders […]’. Decision Regarding Communication No. 74/92 (Commission 
Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés v. Chad) (AComHPR, 11 October 1995), para. 22. 
539 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (known as Banjul Charter) adopted June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 
540 ‘[…] the State is obliged to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of effective 
remedies. This obligation requires the State to take measures to protect beneficiaries of the protected rights 
against political, economic and social interferences […]’. See Decision Regarding Communication No. 155/96 
(Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria), Case No. 
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (AComHPR, 27 October 2001), para. 46. 
541 Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, The Role of Human Rights in the Regulation of Private Military 
and Security Companies: General Report: Universal and Regional Systems: Latin America, Africa and Asia (EUI: 
Working Paper, 2009), p. 4.  
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and protected by international and regional legal instruments. Human rights treaty bodies 
developed human rights obligations imposed on a State; as a primary responsibility is to respect 
the rights of individuals. Additionally, a State has to promote the enjoyment of human rights 
by preventing any possible violation by third parties. A State should also protect and/or fulfil 
human rights within its territory. That means that a State should enact proper legislative 
measures in order to ‘create a necessary and conductive environment within which the relevant 
rights can be fully realised’542. 
 
This chapter examines first the States’ procedural obligations towards the rights to life. 
The right to life as ‘the supreme right’543 is ‘essential in making the enjoyment of all other 
rights possible’544. As a result, the protection of the right to life should be guaranteed under 
any circumstances and no derogation is possible ‘even in time of public emergency’545. Its 
protection entails a broad range of obligations. For instance, States are required not only to 
abstain from unlawful killings and/or arbitrary deprivation of life, but also they must undertake 
                                                          
542 Human Rights, Civil and Political: The Human Rights Committee, Fact Sheet No 15 (Rev. 1) 6. The same 
four-layer construction of States’ human rights obligation has been emphasized by the AComHPR as well. In 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights communication, the 
AcomHPR argues that States have to ‘resect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the enjoyment of human rights of all 
individuals with their territory. See Decision Regarding Communication No. 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria), Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 
(AComHPR, 27 October 2001), para. 45-47. 
543 Art. 6.1 of the ICCPR. 
544 See Lenzerini and Francioni, supra note 38, p. 61. 
545 See HRC, General Comment 6: Article 6: The Right to Life, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6, 27/05/2008, 
para. 1. 
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positive measures to protect the individuals within their jurisdiction546; and even to prevent any 
threaten against their lives.   
 
This obligation should be examined in conjunction with the erga omnes obligations 
under Art. 2 of the ICCPR547. In particular, Art. 2 of the ICCPR stipulates that States parties to 
the Covenant should undertake appropriate measures in order to ‘to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant’548. Thus, all of the rights that are guaranteed by the Covenant should be 
protected by proper laws549; and also States parties are required to establish procedures for 
providing effective remedies in cases of human rights violations550. Correspondently States 
                                                          
546 See HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 10. 
547 The term erga omnes for the obligations derived by Art. 2 of the ICCPR is used in accordance with the General 
Comment 24 in which HRC argued that: ‘[a] State could not make a reservation to Art. 2, paragraph 3, of the 
Covenant, indicating that it intends to provide no remedies for human rights violations. Guarantees such as these 
are an integral part of the structure of the Covenant and underpin its efficacy’. See HRC, General Comment 24, 
Issues relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols 
thereto, or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 
11/11/1994, para. 11. 
548 Art. 2, para 1 of the ICCPR. 
549 In paragraph 2 of the Art. 2, the ICCPR sets out that ‘[..] each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take the necessary steps […] to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant […]’. 
550 These remedies should be provided by the State under whose territory the violation occurred. See also Art. 2, 
para 3 (a) indicates that States parties in order ‘[…]To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity […]’. 
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have procedural obligations regarding the prevention of violations of the right to life. So, States 
have the responsibility to proceed with an effective and sufficient investigation when a 
violation might be committed either by State agents or private actors551. In particular, the HRC 
in the General Comment 31 argues that:  
 
‘[However] the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be 
fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant 
rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would 
impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between 
private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant 
rights as required by art. 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a 
result of States Parties' permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private 
persons or entities’552. 
 
Simultaneously, in William Eduardo Delgrado Paez, the HRC held that ‘[it] cannot be 
the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under 
their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States are 
under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect [them]’553. It 
means that States have the obligation to guarantee the enjoyment of the right to life for everyone 
                                                          
551 See HRC, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 8. 
552 Ibid. 
553 See HRC, William Eduardo Delgrado Paez v. Colombia (Communication No. 195/1985). 1990, U.N. 
CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985, para. 5.5. 
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within State’s jurisdiction; and to ensure that the activities from state and private agents do not 
violate it. 
 
The additional obligation of a State is to undertake ‘legislative, judicial, administrative, 
educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations’554  and it 
includes the obligation to provide the victims with effective remedies. Thus, every time that a 
State is engaged with allegations of the right to life, the obligation to provide effective remedies 
arises. Therefore, in order to protect the right to life and to prevent any possible violation of 
this right, States should enact administrative laws and enforce proper criminal law provisions 
and to punish the perpetrators555.  
 
On the other hand, in cases of serious human rights allegations, the HRC held that 
‘purely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot be deemed to constitute adequate and 
effective remedies within the meaning of Art. 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, in the event of 
particularly serious violations of human rights, especially when violation of the right to life is 
alleged’556. The obligation to enact proper legislation is interpreted as the creation of an 
administrative structure in order to investigate independently human rights violations by taking 
                                                          
554 See HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 7. 
555 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Positive Human Rights Obligations of the Hiring State in Connection with the Provision of 
‘Coercive Services’ by a Private Military or Security Company’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti 
(eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 118. 
556 See HRC, José Vicente and Amado Villafañe Chaparro, Luís Napoleón Torres Crespo, Angel María Torres 
Arroyo and Antonio Hugues Chaparro Torres v. Colombia (Communication No. 612/1995) . 1994, U.N. 
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, para. 8.3. 
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into account the special vulnerabilities of persons. If a failure of this obligation occurs, then 
this is ‘a separate breach of the Covenant’557. 
  
3.A.2. Obligation to Investigate and Prosecute and Punish Private Contractors for 
Violations of the Right to Life 
 
States have also to enact administrative mechanisms in order to investigate allegations of the 
right to life and a failure like that constitutes a violation of their obligations under human rights 
law, and in particular under the ICCPR. The General Comment 6 argues that ‘States should 
establish effective facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly cases of missing and 
disappeared persons in circumstances which may involve a violation of the right to life’558. 
Simultaneously, States have also the obligation to prosecute and criminally punish the 
perpetrators of such violations and moreover to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar violation. 
In Mr. S. Jegatheeswara Sarma, the HRC held that ‘the State party is also under an obligation 
to expedite the current criminal proceedings […]. The State party is also under an obligation 
to prevent similar violations in the future’559.  
 
Observations regarding the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the private 
contractors for violating the right to life have been developed by regional human rights treaty 
                                                          
557 See HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 18. 
558 See HRC, General Comment 6: Article 6: The Right to Life, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6, 27/05/2008, 
para. 4. 
559 See HRC, Mr. S. Jegatheeswara Sarma v. Sri Lanka (Communication No. 950/2000). U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, 2003, para. 11. 
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bodies as well. According to the ECtHR, the duty to investigate is implied in the ECHR and 
the obligation to protect the right to life ‘[…] read in conjunction with the State’s general duty 
under Art. 1 of the Convention [...] (which) requires by implication that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use 
of force by, inter alia, agents of the State’560. Therefore, the ECtHR initially established a 
narrow meaning for the obligation to investigate an unlawful deprivation of life resulting from 
the use of force, inter alia, by State agents561. 
 
Similarly, the McCann emphasized that the duty to investigate is no longer implied but 
an established obligation. In fact, the ECtHR frequently demonstrates within its jurisprudence 
the procedural aspect of the right to life,562 and finds that this obligation has been violated563. 
The main purpose of the investigation is to ensure that the right to life is protected effectively 
                                                          
560 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom App no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995), para. 161. This 
reasoning is identical to the one adopted by the HRC with regard to the duty to investigate under the ICCPR in its 
General Comment No. 20. HRC emphasised that the ‘[…] Art. 7 should be read in conjunction with article 2, 
paragraph 3, of the Covenant [...]. Complaints must be investigated promptly and impartially by competent 
authorities so as to make the remedy effective [...]’. See HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7: Prohibition of 
Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 
(1994), para. 30. See also HRC, Joaquín David Herrera Rubio et al. v. Colombia (Communication no. 161/1983) 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 192 (1990), para. 10.5.  It is also similar to the approach taken by the IACtHR in the 
case of Godínez Cruz case (1989) IACtHR, Series C, No. 5, para 175. 
561 Kaya v. Turkey App no 22535/93 (ECtHR, 28 March 2000), para 105. 
562 Some cases that cases dealing with the duty to investigate for allegations of the right to life are Kurt v. Turkey 
App no 24276/94 (ECtHR, 25 May 1998); Ergi v. Turkey App no 23818/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998); Ertak v. 
Turkey App no 20764/92 (ECtHR, 9 May 2000); Timurtas v. Turkey App no 23531/94 (ECtHR, 13 June 2000). 
563 Tanrıkulu v. Turkey App no 23763/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999), para. 110. 
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by domestic laws and to ensure the accountability of the perpetrators564. Trying to articulate 
the meaning of the ‘effective investigation’565, the ECtHR established specific rules while 
referring to an investigative action. As a result, an investigation should include eye-witness 
testimonies566 and forensic evidences567 and autopsies by specialized pathologists, whereas 
appropriate568. By deviating from the principles that were determined as required for an 
effective investigation or lacking of a specific investigative step, a violation of the duty to 
investigate may be occurred569. 
 
                                                          
564 Bazorkina v. Russia App no 69481/01 (ECtHR, 27 July 2006), para. 117. 
565 The notion of the ‘effective investigation’ is described by the ECtHR as ‘[…] it may generally be regarded as 
necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those 
implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical 
independence [...]. The investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a 
determination of whether the force used in such cases was or as not justified [...] and to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible [...]. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to 
secure the evidence concerning the incident [...]. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is 
implicit […] there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny [...] to secure accountability in practice as well 
as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the 
next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure [...]’. See Jordan v. United Kingdom, Appl no 24746/94 
(ECtHR, 4 May 2001), paras. 106-109 (emphasis added). 
566 McKerr v. the United Kingdom App no 28883/95 (ECtHR, 4 May 2001), para. 126. 
567 Kaya v. Turkey, supra note 73, para. 89. 
568 Tanlı v. Turkey App no 26129/95 (ECtHR, 10 April 2001), para. 150; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria App no 
55523/00 (ECtHR, 2007), para. 97. 
569 Kolevi v. Bulgaria App no 1108/02 (ECtHR, 5 November 2009), para. 201. 
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In relation to the duty to investigate for violations of the right to life, the most recent 
and famous case of Blackwater’s misconduct in Iraq is regarded as the new watershed towards 
regulation. In that case, the HRC denoted that: 
 
‘[the] State party should ensure that all cases of unlawful killing, […] or enforced 
disappearance are effectively, independently and impartially investigated, that perpetrators, 
including, in particular, persons in positions of command, are prosecuted and sanctioned, and 
that victims are provided with effective remedies. The responsibility of those who provided 
legal pretexts for manifestly illegal behavior should also be established’570.  
 
Thus, the USA was encouraged to adopt sufficient national mechanisms in order to 
prosecute private contractors for violations of the right to life. Moreover, with regard to 
violations of use of lethal force, the HRC suggested the USA has to: 
 
‘improve reporting of violations involving the excessive use of force and ensure that reported 
cases of excessive use of force are effectively investigated; that alleged perpetrators are 
prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions; that investigations are re-
opened when new evidence becomes available; and that victims or their families are provided 
with adequate compensation’571. 
 
Similarly, the Human Rights Council addressed this issue during the examination of 
the USA Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. More precisely, 
                                                          
570 See HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.N. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23/04/2014, para. 5. 
571 Ibid, para. 11. 
166 
 
since private contractors have been involved in more than two hundred shootings in Iraq from 
2005 to 2007572, the Human Rights Council recommended the USA to ‘take effective legal 
steps to halt human rights violations by its military forces and private security firms in 
Afghanistan and other states’ and also to ‘halt selective assassinations committed by 
contractors, and the privatization of conflicts with the use of private military companies’573. 
 
In 2007, following the fatally shooting of Iraqi unarmed civilians by Blackwater, the 
USA began to investigate impartially Blackwater's operations in Iraq. However this inquiry 
abandoned because Mr. Daniel Carroll, the Project Manager of Blackwater, did not give leave 
to Mr. Jean C. Richter, the investigator of the US State Department, to do so574.  Moreover, as 
Jean C. Richter afterwards submitted a report to US State Department officials in which he 
mentioned that Mr. D. Carroll threatened to kill him whether he would proceed with the 
investigations575.  
 
3.B. Prohibition of Torture 
3.B.1. Procedural Obligations to Prevent Torture or Cruel Treatment 
                                                          
572 See Committee of Oversight and Government Reform, Additional Information about Blackwater USA (2007). 
Retrieved from http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20071001121609.pdf. 
573 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, United States 
of America, G.A. A/HRC/16/11, (2011). p. 17. 
574 See James Risen, ‘Before Shooting in Iraq, a Warning on Blackwater’ (The New York Times, 29 June 2014) 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/us/before-shooting-in-iraq-warning-on-
blackwater.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=first-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. 
575 See Information Memorandum: Unclassified, Blackwater Contractor Performance in Iraq. (2007). Retrieved 
from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/30/us/30blackwater-documents.html?_r=0. 
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One of the most common reasons for using PMSCs is to manage detention centres and 
interrogate prisoners576. In 2004 two American PMSCs, CACI and L-3 Services Inc. were 
responsible to interrogate prisoners at Abu Ghraib prisons and to provide with translation 
services577. During their operation, private contractors were involved in torturing of Iraqi 
detainees578. Thus, a crucial aspect of human rights violations committed by private contractors 
is the acts of torture at detention centres.  
 
Similarly to the right to life, the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment corresponds a jus cogens rule; and pursuant to international human rights 
instruments, States should not refrain from this obligation even in times of emergency579. The 
HRC clarified that the ‘Art. 7 of the ICCPR reflects a non-derogable obligation for States with 
regard the prohibition of torture and all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’580. 
                                                          
576 Chesterman, supra note 526, p. 1061. 
577 It is worthy noted that in the aftermath of the incident at Abu Ghraib, the United States incorporated into the 
U. S. Code a provision regarding the interrogation of detainees by civilian contractors. This provision entails that 
any of the contractor personnel should not interrogate detainees. See 48 U.S. Code, para. 252.237-7010: 
Prohibition on interrogation of detainees by contractor personnel. 
578 See Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal. (2008). Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3701941.stm; Marcy Strauss, ‘The Lessons of Abu Ghraib’ [2005] 66 
Ohio State Law Journal, p. 1269; See also Articles 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade. (2004). 
Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf. 
579 Art. 4 of the ICCPR, Art. 15 of the ECHR and Art. 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). 
See also Erika De Wet, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications 
for National and Customary Law’ [2005] 15 (1) European Journal of International Law, p. 97. 
580 See HRC, Concluding Observations on Israel, U.N. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 18/08/1998. 
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The traditional obligation of a State to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights 
through the adoption of positive measures is complemented by the obligation to prevent torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment. The HRC reiterated that ‘[it] is also implicit in Art.  7 that 
States Parties have to take positive measures to ensure that private persons or entities do not 
inflict torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on others within their 
power’581. This duty includes not only the prevention of acts of torture may be committed by 
State agents, but also is extended to human rights abuses may be committed by PMSCs 
employees as well582.  
 
The same has been emphasized by the CAT. In the General Comment 2, the CAT 
stipulated that a State has the obligation to protect its individual from acts of torture or inhuman 
treatment, otherwise the State incurs ‘international responsibility for the acts and omissions of 
their officials and others, including agents, private contractors, and others acting in official 
capacity or acting on behalf of the State, in conjunction with the State, under its direction or 
                                                          
581 See HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004, para. 8.  Moreover, the United Nations Convention 
against Torture (CAT), states parties have the obligation to prevent torture and other forms of ill-treatment. In Art. 
2, it is stated that ‘[each] State party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its [jurisdiction]’. 
582 See HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7: Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 2: ‘[It] is the duty of the State party 
to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts 
prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity 
or in a private [capacity]’. Moreover, since 1989, the Constitution Court of Malta recognized that the prohibition 
of torture applies not only to State agents, but also to private actors. See Maltese Sunday Times (1989). 
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control, or otherwise under color of law’583. Through if a State fails to respond sufficiently to 
acts of torture by adopting appropriate legislation to prevent them, then a State is responsible 
for those violations beyond its control.  
 
For example, there are many reports of cases that affirming that individuals suffered by 
ill-treatment by private contractors during forced removals; the U.K. did not prevent these 
violations. Conversely, a Report published by the U.K.’s House of Commons Home Affairs 
Select Committee with regard to the treatment of people being deported, stated that lethal head-
down restraints may still be being used, even though they are not authorized. Therefore, the 
U.K. failed to undertake appropriate measures to refrain from acts of torture or inhuman 
treatment committed by PMSCs584.  
 
Likewise, the obligation to prevent the commission of torture and to protect individuals 
from such acts in new, even if the commission of such acts is attributable to private persons, 
was highly considered by regional human rights judicial bodies. In HLR, the ECtHR held that 
the obligations derived under the Art.  3 of the ECHR585 also apply when the acts of torture 
and/or inhuman treatment are committed by persons ‘who are not public officials’586. 
Moreover, the primary responsibility for the State is to secure that its individuals are not 
subjected to acts of ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment 
                                                          
583 See U.N. Committee against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP. 1/Rev.4, 24/01/2008, para. 15. 
584 Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Briefing to the UN Convention against Torture (50th Session, 2013). 
585 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 213 
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force 3 September 1953. 
586 See HLR v. France App no 24573/94 (ECtHR, 29 April 1997), para. 40. 
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administered by private individuals’587. The same was also recognised by Gezici; whereas the 
ECtHR reaffirmed that a State is not only responsible for human rights abuses committed by 
State organs, but also for acts of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment committed by 
third persons588.  
 
The ECtHR reached to that conclusion by examining the obligations under Art.  3 of 
the ECHR in conjunction with those under the Art.  1 of the ECHR.  Therefore, the ECtHR 
emphasized that ‘the obligation on High Contracting Parties under Art.  1 of the Convention 
to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction […], taken in conjunction with Art. 3, requires 
States to […] to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment’, including those committed by private persons/entities589. 
Furthermore, the IACtHR has developed its jurisprudence towards States’ procedural 
obligations to protect the inherent integrity of the persons and to prevent acts of torture or 
inhuman treatment committed by private actors590. Yet, the duty to prevent the commission of 
any act of torture by private contractors/groups has been emphasized in several cases, such as 
in cases of enforced disappearance591, custody592, formation of and/or support the creation of 
paramilitary groups593 and even in massacre cases594. 
                                                          
587 See Z. And Others v. the United Kingdom App no 29392/95 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001), para. 73. 
588 See Gezici v. Turkey App no 34594/97 (ECtHR, 17 March 2005), para. 49-54.  
589 See A. v. the United Kingdom (1998) ECHR Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, p. 2699, para. 22. 
590 Art. 5 of the ACHR. 
591 See Juan Humberto Sanchez case (2003) IACtHR, Series C, No. 99, para. 111; Durand and Ugarte case (2000) 
IACtHR, Series C, No. 68, para. 65. 
592 See Velasquez Rodriguez case, supra note 49. 
593 See Valle Jaramillo and Others case (2008) IACtHR, Series C, No. 192. 
594 Ibid. 
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3.B.2. Duty to Legislate the Prohibition of Torture 
The HRC highlighted that it is very important for States to adopt special measures in order to 
prevent any occurrence of acts of torture. According to Art. 7 of the ICCPR, the duty to legislate 
the prohibition of any forms of torture or inhuman treatment raised. Therefore, States have the 
obligation ‘to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary against the acts prohibited by Art. 7’595.  
 
Consequently, if a State fails to provide with adequate mechanisms to ensure that State 
or private agents not acting in violation of the Art.  7 of the ICCPR, for example by torturing 
detainees, then the State violates its procedural obligations under the ICCPR. Moreover, in that 
case, States have to adopt a proper national legislation to ensure that private contractors could 
be prosecuted effectively596.  
                                                          
595 See HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7: Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 2. The requirement to adopt a proper 
regulatory framework that prevents and totally prohibits the commission of acts of torture has been also 
emphasized by the ICTY. Specifically, in case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the ICTY argues that ‘[…]in the case 
of torture, the requirement that States expeditiously institute national implementing measures is an integral part 
of the international obligation to prohibit this practice. Consequently, States must immediately set in motion all 
those procedures and measures that may make it possible, within their municipal legal system, to forestall any act 
of torture or expeditiously put an end to any torture that is occurring […]’. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. 
IT-95-17/I-T, ICTY, (10 Dec. 1998) para. 149. 
596 For instance, according to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order No 17, the agreement that signed 
between the Iraqi government and the U.S. Department of Defense regarding the use of private contractors in 
military operations, ‘[…] Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the 
terms and conditions of their Contracts […]’. However, after the killing of the Iraqi unarmed civilians in 2007, 
the Iraqi government approved this agreement by ending private contractors’ immunities. In contradiction, in 
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The same issue has been highlighted by the CAT. In Hajrizi Dzemajl et al.597, the CAT 
considered that the lack of action to prevent acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or to prosecute private entities by enacting proper legislative measures giving rise 
to responsibility under the Convention against Torture598. In cases of the hosting State’s 
ineffective judicial system or immunities from the host State’s jurisdiction, the hiring State or 
the home State of the PMSCs has to prosecute private contractors for human rights violations. 
Otherwise when a State violates the duty to legislate, raises issues of international 
responsibility599.  
                                                          
Libya the United States manage to achieve immunities for all PMSCs’ employees. See more Christopher. M. 
Kovach, ‘Cowboys in the Middle East: Private Security Companies and the Imperfect Reach of the United States 
Criminal Justice System’ [2010] IX(2) The Quarterly Journal, p. 17. Nonetheless the United Nations Resolution 
1970 (2011) on Libya states that  the Security Council ‘decides that nationals, current or former officials or 
personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or 
omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the 
Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State’. See  S.C. Res. 1970, (26 
February 2011), para. 6 
597 HRC, Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia (Communication No. 161/2000).  
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2002), para. 8.5. 
598 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (New York, 10 
Dec. 1984) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified by 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), entered into force 26 
June 1987. 
599 For more regarding the failure of a State to investigate and prosecute PMSCs employees, see the analysis of 
Laura Dickinson concerning the status of Blackwater’s employees under U.S. legal order in Laura Dickinson, 
‘Accountability for Private Security Contractors under International and Domestic Jurisdiction’ [2007] 11 
American Society of International Law, p. 31.  
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Unlike the international instruments, the ECHR does not contain a specific provision 
regarding the duty to enact proper legislation to punish the perpetrators of torture. However, 
the Art.  7.2 of the ECHR indicates that there is no punishment without law600. Therefore, the 
obligation to legislate the prohibition of torture derives by the duty of States to protect their 
individuals and to investigate such allegations. In particular, the ECtHR emphasized that a 
State has an inherent obligation under Art. 3 of the ECHR to enforce legislative measures to 
punish acts of torture and to investigate them601.   
 
Analogous duties imposed on States under the ACHR602. States are bound by the ACHR 
to ‘adopt […] legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect’ to human rights 
and freedom set out by the Convention603. Therefore, States should be ‘capable of juridical 
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights’604. In parallel, the obligation to enact 
legislative measures specifically regarding the prohibition of acts of torture is highlighted by 
                                                          
600 ‘[…] This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at 
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations […]’. 
601 In M.C. for example, the ECtHR stressed out that ‘States have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 
8 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice 
through effective investigation and prosecution’. See M. C. v. Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (ECtHR, 4 December 
2003), para. 153. 
602 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force 18 
July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).  
603 Art. 2 of the ACHR.  
604 Velasquez Rodriguez case, supra note 49, para. 166. 
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the IACPPT605. The IACPPT develops further this obligation by considering that acts of torture 
and any attempts to committee torture or inhuman treatment should be punishable under 
national criminal laws606. It is worth mentioning that, the IACPPT establishes universal 
jurisdiction for acts of torture. It means that states have the obligation to carry out investigations 
for allegations of torture and/or to conduct criminal prosecutions regardless the nationality of 
the perpetrator – this obligation fully applies to PMSCs employees - and even more to extradite 
suspects for the commission of acts of torture607. 
 
Further in relation to the obligation of States to adopt legislative measures to prevent 
the acts of torture may be committed by private contractors, it is very interesting fact to include 
the attitude of the AComHPR. In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the AComHPR 
noticed that the prosecution and punishment of private actors who commit abuses like the 
commission of torture is one of the primary obligations for States under the African Charter608.   
 
3.B.3. Duty to Investigate, Prosecute and Punish Private Contractors for Acts of Torture 
Apart from the aforementioned obligations, States are also engaged with the obligation to 
provide effective remedies by conducting investigations for commissions of acts of torture by 
PMSCs’ employees and prosecuting those who are responsible. In this respect, the HRC held 
                                                          
605 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67, entered into force 28 
February 1987, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 83 (1992).  
606 Art. 6 of the IACPPT. 
607 Nigel S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (Second edition, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), p. 52. 
608 Decision Regarding Communication No. 245/02 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe) 
(AComHPR, 15 May 2006), para. 159. 
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that the obligations under Art. 7 should be examined in conjunction with Art.  2, para. 3609 
which obliges States parties to ‘ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms […] 
recognized (by the Covenant) are violated shall have an effective remedy’. Moreover, States 
should guarantee that they have already adopted proper legislative measures to terminate all 
the acts of torture as described in Art. 7 and appropriate redress; irrespectively whether these 
acts have been committed by persons on acting in their private capacity610. 
 
Even in cases of a State outsources its governmental functions to a private entity; the 
State does not absolve its obligations under the ICCPR. Thereby, in Mr. Carlos Cabal and Mr. 
Marco Pasini Bertran, the HRC argued that ‘[…] the contracting out to the private commercial 
sector of core State activities which involve the use of force and the detention of persons does 
not absolve a State party of its obligations under the Covenant, notably under Art. 7 and 10 
[…]’ 611, irrespectively where these activities took place612. 
 
Furthermore, the examination of complaints regarding violations of the prohibition of 
torture should be investigated promptly and impartially613; and also this duty continues to apply 
                                                          
609 See HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7: Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 14. 
610 Ibid, para. 2. 
611 See HRC, Mr. Carlos Cabal and Mr. Marco Pasini Bertran v. Australia (Communication No. 1020/2001). 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001, 2003, para. 7.2. 
612 See HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (Communication No. R. 12/52). U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 
176, 1981, para. 12.2. 
613 See HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7: Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 14. 
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‘a fortiori in cases in which the perpetrators of such violations have been identified’614. 
However, the HRC recognised that an investigation should not depend on the receipt of a 
complaint, but should be initiated as soon as there are grounds for believing that act of torture 
or inhuman treatment has occurred615. 
 
Additionally, the HRC repeatedly considers the importance of providing effective 
remedies to victims. Thus, in Rodriguez, the HRC reiterated that in order to ensure the victim’s 
right to redress, States parties have to adopt legislative measures to be able   
‘a) to carry out an official investigation into the […] allegations of torture, in order to identify 
the persons responsible for torture and ill-treatment and to enable (the victim) to seek civil 
redress; b) to grant appropriate compensation [...]; and c) to ensure that similar violations do 
not occur in the future’616.  
 
Thus, the HRC recognised that the obligation to prevent the reoccurrence of a violation 
falls under the obligation to redress for human rights abuses617.  
 
                                                          
614 See HRC, José Vicente and Amado Villafañe Chaparro, Luís Napoleón Torres Crespo, Angel María Torres 
Arroyo and Antonio Hugues Chaparro Torres v. Colombia (Communication No. 612/1995). 1994 
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, para. 8.8. 
615 HRC, Alzery v. Sweden (Communication No. 1416/2005). U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006), para. 
11.7. 
616 HRC, Rodríguez v. Uruguay (Communication No. 322/1988) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994), para. 
14. 
617 HRC, Karina Arutyunyan v. Uzbekistan (Communication No. 917/2000) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000 
(2004), para. 8. 
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In the absence of an a priori investigation procedure regarding the commission of acts 
of torture and inhuman treatment, it could be difficult to clarify whether an allegation of 
prohibition of tortured occurred.  To be more precise, in Teofila Casafranca de Gomez, the 
HRC considered that when a State party to the ICCPR failed to conduct an effective 
investigation and to provide ‘any additional information in this regard, or initiated an official 
investigation of the events described’618, it is a clear violation of Art. 7 of the Covenant. 
 
The procedural obligation to investigate, prosecute and redress is guaranteed more 
clearly in the Convention against Torture. The CAT argues that under the general obligation of 
the prohibition of torture, the obligation to investigate allegations of torture includes also the 
prosecution of those responsible for such acts619  and the providing of adequate redress to 
victims620. Moreover, according to Art. 12, reading together with Art. 1 of the CAT, States 
have the obligation to investigate promptly and impartially allegations of torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that have been committed by private 
contractors621. In case that there are reasonable grounds of believing that someone is involved 
                                                          
618 See HRC, Teofila Casafranca de Gomez v. Peru (Communication No. 981/2001) U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/981/2001, 2003, para. 7.1. 
619 Art. 12 of the Convention against Torture. 
620 Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture. See also CAT, Observations of the Committee against Torture on 
the Revision of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), CAT/C/51/4, 
14 Dec.2013, para. 4. 
621 See CAT, General Comment 3: Implementation of article 14 by States Parties, CAT/C/GC/3, 19 November 
2012, para. 23. 
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in acts of torture, this person should be suspended from its duties immediately in order to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the alleged act622.  
 
Moreover, other human rights judicial bodies, such as the ECtHR, recognized the 
obligation to investigate and prosecute private entities for breaches of Art. 3 of the ECHR623. 
For instance, in Assenov and Others, the ECtHR recognized that any individual claim for 
violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR by State or private organs requires an effective and official 
investigation into these allegations624. A potential failure on behalf of the State to conduct an 
effective investigation constitutes a procedural violation of Art. 3625. However, the obligation 
to conduct an effective investigation does not rest upon the submission of an official 
complaint626. ECtHR’s case-law has detailed several requirements regarding an effective 
                                                          
622 CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of the Plurinational State of Bolivia as approved 
by the Committee at its fiftieth session (6–31 May 2013), CAT/C/BOL/CO/2, 14 Jun. 2013, para 11. In Blanco 
Abad, the CAT considered that ‘[…] promptness is essential both to ensure that the victim cannot continue to be 
subjected to such acts and also because in general, unless the methods employed have permanent or serious 
effects, the physical traces of torture, and especially of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, soon disappear 
[…]’. See CAT, Blanco Abad v. Spain (Communication No 59/1996) CAT/C/20/D/59/1996, 14 May 1998, para. 
8.2. 
623 See Secic v. Croatia App no 40116/02 (ECtHR, 31 May 2007), para. 67. 
624 See Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria App no 90/1997/874/1086 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 102. 
625 See Kaya v. Turkey, supra note 73, para. 86; Libita v. Italy App no 26772/95 (ECtHR, 12 February 2000), para. 
131. 
626 In 97 members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 4 Others Case, the ECtHR stressed out 
that ‘[…] even in the absence of an express complaint, an investigation should be undertaken if there are other 
sufficiently clear indications that torture or ill-treatment might have occurred […]’. See 97 members of the Gldani 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 4 Others Case v. Georgia App no 71156/01 (ECtHR, 3 May 1997), 
para. 97. Similarly, Batı and Others v. Turkey Apps nos 33097/96 and 57834/00 (ECtHR, 3 June 2004), para. 136.  
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investigation into allegations of acts of torture. The victim for example has to have access to 
the investigatory procedure627. The investigation should be prompt628 and it should be carried 
out by independent persons629.  
 
Correspondingly, the IACtHR recognized that when an accusation of being subjected 
to torture occurs within the jurisdiction of a State, the latter has to conduct an effective 
investigation into the allegation and to enact the proper criminal process630. Thereby, in Vargas 
Areco, the IACtHR reaffirmed that ‘the duty to investigate is a compulsory obligation of the 
State’ under human rights law and there are no limitations from any other national 
legislation631. Since State perceives that an act of torture has occurred, obliges to react directly 
by beginning a serious investigation632. This investigation should be ‘carried out throughout 
all available legal means’ in order to achieve the prosecution and punishment of those who are 
responsible for such violations633.  
 
In contrast, the AComHPR has adopted a more restricted attitude towards the 
effectiveness of an investigation into acts of torture by private contractors. In Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum, the AComHPR held that an ineffective investigation does not 
                                                          
627 See Aksoy v. Turkey App no 21987/93 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996), para. 98. 
628 See Osman v. Bulgaria App no 43233/98 (ECtHR, 16 February 2006), para. 74. 
629 See Anghelescu v. Romania App no 46430/99 (ECtHR, 23 October 2004), para. 66. 
630 Art. 8 of the IACPPT. 
631 See Vargas Areco case (2006) IACtHR, Series C No. 155, para. 81. 
632 For an investigation to be serious and effective the IACtHR considered  that the investigation ‘[…] should take 
into consideration the international rules for documenting and interpreting forensic evidence elements regarding 
the commission of acts of torture […]’. Ibid, para. 93.  
633 See Servellón-García et al. case (20060 IACtHR, Series C, No. 152, para. 119. 
180 
 
constitute a failure to fulfil the obligation to investigate allegations of torture by itself. It is 
required to examine the measures that have been adopted by the State on a case by case basis 
in order to clarify and evaluate where the State failed to undertake the proper investigation634. 
Furthermore, the AComHPR affirmed that it does not require to examine all of the allegations 
of torture and assured that States are capable to prove that the ‘measures taken were 
proportionate’ to deal with the allegations635. 
 
 
4. Recent Steps to Comply with States’ Obligations to Regulate Private 
Military and Security Companies under Human Rights Law  
Despite the widespread use of PMSCs636, the policy environment remains inactive. The 
willingness of States to reinforce national regulatory frameworks was expressed during the 
Second UN Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group for a possible regulation of the 
PMSCs’ sector. All of the States focused on the issues of accountability of PMSCs and their 
employees for violations of human rights law637. During the discussions on that session, two 
                                                          
634 See Decision Regarding Communication No. 245/02 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe) 
(AComHPR, 15 May 2006), para. 158. 
635 Ibid, para. 210. 
636 See Avant, supra note 502, p. 8; Singer, supra note 498.   
637 For the Final Report of the session see Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider 
the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight 
of the activities of private military and security companies on its second session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/41 (2012). 
Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/189/42/PDF/G1218942.pdf?OpenElement. 
PMSCs’ violations of human rights were presented by the Executive Director of the Organization ‘’Rights and 
Accountability in Development’’, Mrs Patricia Feeney. For more regarding the growing awareness for human 
rights abuses by private contractors see Patricia Feeney, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Struggle for 
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groups of States were created. The first one, such as the USA and the UK, totally supported the 
reinforcement of national legislative polices based of the Montreux Document and the ICoC. 
On the other hand, there were some States, such as Russian Federation, China, Venezuela, 
South Africa and Egypt that were insisted on a binding normative framework due to the 
transnational nature of PMSCs operations638. 
 
At the same time, States started implementing the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework 
in order to reinforce a coherent legal framework on preventing human rights violations by 
PMSCs’ employees639. For instance, in 2013 the UK government adopted an action plan - 
‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’640- 
in order to demonstrate government’s commitment to integrate of human rights policies into 
                                                          
Accountability in the U.N. and the Future Direction of the Advocacy Agenda’ [2009] 11 (6) SUR – International 
Journal on Human Rights, p. 161. 
638 Additionally the non-binding nature of the already existing regulations postpones their implementation to the 
discretion of States. Concerning the Montreux Document, it is very difficult for most of the States to accept the 
narrow view of State responsibility, based only on the effective control between the State and PMSCs’ activities. 
It means that every time that a PMSCs’ conduct fail, the State holds responsibility for this failure. Moreover, the 
Montreux Document lacks of a reporting system, which could demonstrate the compliance of national regulations 
with the international standards. See more Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies under 
International Law (Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia, 2014), p. 123. 
639 U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 523, 3 
640 See HM Government, Good Business: Implementing the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command 
of Her Majesty, Cm 8695 (September 2013). 
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PMSCs operations641. Yet, the UK encouraged the development of the self-regulation policy 
by excluding a national licensing mechanism, as it is proposed by the Monteux Document642.  
 
Furthermore, in order to adapt the national legislation with the standards set out by the 
Montreux Document and the ICoC, the USA introduced the Civilian Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) to the Congress643. Even it is not enacted644; CEJA affirmed the USA 
Justice Department has jurisdiction over all private contractors that hired on behalf of the USA 
government. So the prosecution of PMSCs for certain crimes committed overseas is feasible645.  
 
                                                          
641 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-first-to-launch-action-plan-on-business-and-human-rights 
642 See Alexandra Bohm, Kerry Senior and Adam White, ‘The United Kingdom’, in Christine Bakker and Mirko 
Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Private Military and Security Contractors: the Interplay between 
International, European and Domestic Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 316. 
643 Assistant of Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer highlighted that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 
which passed in 2000, enforced only against contractors that were hired by the Department of Defense. To that 
extent, it means that certain U.S. Government employees can commit crimes overseas without been prosecuted. 
See Holding Criminals Accountable: Extending Criminal Jurisdiction for Government Contractors and Employees 
Abroad: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (2011). 
644 The CEJA was introduced as House Bill (H.R. 2136) by Representative Prince and as Senate Bill (S. 1145) by 
Senator Leahy; approved with amendments by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The final document of CEJA is 
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2136/text 
645 See Charles Doyle, Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: Federal Contractor Criminal Liability Overseas 
(Congressional Research Service, 2012); Laura A. Dickinson, ‘Outsourcing Covert Activities’ [2012] 5 Journal 
of National Security Law and Policy, p. 521; Human Rights First, The Case For the Civilian Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (CEJA): Why U.S. Needs to Clarify U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction over U.S. Contractors Fielded 
Abroad (2011), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/CEJA-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
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To-date the current debate has focussed on a compromise in order to seek to agree on a 
binding and consistent regulatory framework. When, in fact, in any event, human rights law 
contains all necessary elements in order to hold accountable private contractors for human 
rights violations646. For instance, the main parameter of a sufficient regulation of PMSCs’ 
activities and adjudication of their employees for their misconduct could be the effective 
participation of the State in planning their operations. In this regard, the State could have the 
primary responsibility for PMSCs to choose appropriate means and methods that do not violate 
human rights. Likewise this option was proposed by the international human rights monitoring 
bodies and courts in cases whereas fundamental human rights have been violated during 
security operations. In particular, the HRC emphasised that security forces violate the right to 
life whereas the methods and means that have been chosen for the operation are disproportional 
to the aims of the operation647.  
 
In parallel, the ECtHR pointed out the significant duty of the State to be involved into 
planning all of the security service648. Apart from the State’s participation, the ECtHR 
highlighted emerge need to oversee the training of private contractors. More specifically, in 
Avsar, the ECtHR held that the State should ‘establish the principles and procedures relating 
to temporary village guard’s appointments, training, duties and responsibilities, the areas 
                                                          
646 For further analysis regarding human rights violations by private contractors and their duties under human 
rights law see Ineta Ziemele, Human Rights Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The Case-Law of 
International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (EUI: Working Paper, 2009).  
647 See HRC, Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia (Communication No. 45/1979) 
CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (Jurisprudence), 31 March 1982, para. 13.3. 
648 See for example McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom App no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995); 
Ergi v. Turkey App no 23818/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998); Andronikou and Constantinou v. Cyprus App no 
25052/94 (ECtHR, 9 October 1997).  
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within which they shall perform their duties as well as their occupational rights and their 
dismissal from duty’649. 
 
The need of oversight, accountability and license mechanisms is indispensable towards 
to the creation of a common binding framework for PMSCs’ activities. The International 
Commission of Jurists emphasized that the establishment of clear responsibilities of national 
human rights institutions and Parliaments will be vital in controlling PMSCs650. Similarly, this 
approach is welcomed by the Human Rights Council.  In particular, the Human Rights Council 
suggested the establishment of independent bodies which are going to investigate allegation of 
torture and degrading punishment651. Likewise, during the exanimation of the German Report 
on the Universal Periodic Review, the Human Rights Council proposed the establishment of 
‘an independent body to promptly and thoroughly investigate all allegations of torture and ill-
treatment by the police’652. It means that the investigations for allegations of torture by police 
officers would be prompt, effective and sufficient and their prosecution and punishment would 
                                                          
649 See Avsar v. Turkey App no 25657/94 (ECtHR, 10 July 2001), para. 274. 
650 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Submission of the International Commission of Jurists to the Second Open-
ended Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) to consider the possibility of an international regulatory 
framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies 
(PMSCs). Geneva, 13-17 Aug. 2012, p. 14. 
651 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Germany, 
A/HRC/24/9, 08/07/2013, p. 24. 
652 Ibid. 
185 
 
be possible. These national independent bodies will be also responsible to confirm whether a 
PMSC meets the appropriate standards653.  
 
Since 2011, only the UK tries to establish PMSCs’ certification bodies with the 
coordination of PMSCs’ industry, in order to harmonize PMSCs’ activities according to the 
international standards. These initiatives still remain under discussion, because their 
establishment depends on the willingness of the PMSCs’ industry itself. So ambiguities may 
be raised in relation to the guarantee of their independent work654.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
In conclusion, human rights violations have drawn the attention of the international community 
to quell, scrutinize and seek to regulate and control PMSCs. Clearly, the absence of a coherent 
and binding international regulatory framework allows PMSCs’ employees to escape 
prosecution for violating fundamental human rights. Private contractors often seek to avoid 
prosecution because the chain of command was outside of the national military forces. For 
instance, regarding the killing of unarmed civilians in Iraq, the relationship between PMSCs 
operating in Iraq and the U.S. military described as an informal coordination655.  On the other 
                                                          
653 A similar oversight mechanism in established by the ICoC as well. Art.11 of the Articles of Association. For 
the Articles of ICoC Association see http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf. 
Regarding the functions of this oversight mechanism see Seiberth, supra note 1639, p. 191 
654 For a review against this UK initiative see http://waronwant.org/component/content/article/17897.  
655 See Contractors on the Battlefield, Field Manual 3-2001, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington 
D.C., 03/01/2003, 6-8.  
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hand, PMSCs’ employees who were involved in the Abu Ghraib incident might be under the 
supervision of governmental official656. 
 
To set aside those barriers, human rights law offers a framework of controlling PMSCs’ 
activities, accountability mechanisms for human rights abuses committed by private 
contractors and effective remedies for reparation of the victims. Despite there is no 
international legally binding instrument on private contractors’ responsibilities vis-à-vis human 
rights, States’ obligation to protect fundamental human rights and prevent and redress human 
rights violations committed by State agents and/or individuals could be applied to PMSCs.  
 
Observing that the existing international initiatives –the Montreux Document and the 
ICoC- are a restatement of well-establish principles of human rights law, the human rights 
bodies should have a decisive role to guide States to fulfil their obligations under human rights 
law. For Instance, in 2013 the CRC drafted a new General Comment on State Obligations 
regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights657. According to this General 
Comment, States have the obligation to ensure that all actors respect children’s rights ‘by 
adopting transparent business-related policies and legislative or administrative acts that 
consider the impact on the rights of the child’658. The CRC also highlights that a sufficient 
                                                          
656 In the Report of MG G. R. Fay ‘Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade’ it is stated that ‘[…] CACI employees were in positions of authority, and appeared to be 
supervising government personnel […]’. See Antony A. Jones and George R. Fay, Investigation of Intelligence 
Activities at Abu Ghraib (2004), p. 51. 
657 See CRC, General Comment  No. 16 on State Obligations regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on 
Children’s Rights, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16, 17/04/2013. 
658 Ibid, para. 26. 
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investigative procedure requires the adoption of child-sensitive mechanisms; civil criminal or 
administrative659. Therefore, human rights bodies are engaged with the challenge to deepen in 
States’ procedural obligations regarding the prevention of fundamental human rights abuses by 
PMSCs’ employees.  
 
Finally, human rights law seeks to impose duties not only on States, but also on 
individuals and business entities660. Thus, States and PMSCs have the obligation to take 
appropriate steps to prevent the commission of human rights violations by PMSCs and vice 
versa. Therefore, through the establishment of independent institutional bodies under which 
the government coordinates with and the PMSCs’ industry will be sufficient in investigating 
and punishing violations of human rights by PMSCs’ employees. Apart from that, Francioni 
argues that the inter-State cooperation is also necessary in order to prevent and investigate 
efficient whenever PMSCs are involved in international crimes661. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
659 Ibid, para. 30. 
660 This is one of the fundamental principles that were set out in Art.29 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights. (‘’everyone has duties to the community’’). 
661 See Francioni, supra note 514, p. 108. 
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PART B: PROSECUTING PRIVATE CONTRACTORS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: REALITY OR UTOPIA? 
 
It is well documented that the last two decades the international community has witnessed the 
rapid growth of the private military and security industry662. PMSCs are business entities 
providing land-based or maritime security and military services, such as to support regular 
armed forces in armed conflicts, to guard diplomats, to manage detention and interrogation 
centres upon the request of governments663, international organizations and other 
corporations664. In Latin America, DynCorp and Northrop Grumman are deployed to fight 
narco-traffickers665. In Somalia, governments deploy PMSCs, such as Sterling Corporate 
Services and Bancroft Global Development to protect shipments of humanitarian aid and fight 
                                                          
662 Elke Krahmann, Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence: A Case of Norm Change? 
(Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2009). Singer also emphasizes that ‘in the wake of globalization and the end 
of the Cold War, the private military market has expanded in a way not seen since the 1700s’. See Peter W. Singer, 
Corporate Warriors, The Rise of Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) p. 40. 
663 Lindsey Cameron, ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status under International Humanitarian Law and Its 
Impact on Their Regulation’ [2006] 88 International Review of Red Cross, p. 573. 
664 International Committee of Red Cross, ‘Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)’, August 29, 2012, 
available at https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/private-military-security-companies-glossary.htm 
(accessed on May 2016). Moreover according to their operation, Singer distinguished PMSCs into three different 
“sectors”: 1. military provider companies, which supply a State party to a conflict with direct, tactical and military 
assistance, 2. military consulting firms that advise and train members of the national armed forces, and 3. military 
support companies that are responsible to provide logistic maintenance and other services to armed forces. See 
Singer, supra note 663. 
665 Cyril Mychalejko, ‘Private Contractors and Covert Wars in Latin America’, Global Policy Forum (14 June 
2010), https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/state-sovereignty-and-private-security-
companies/49219.html?ItemID=724 (accessed on May 2016). 
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piracy666. Moreover, in 2010, the 54% of the workforce of the USA Department of Defense is 
consisted of private military and security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq667.  
 
Despite the fact that the use of PMSCs is a worldwide industry which provides States 
with military and security services, PMSCs were involved in several notorious human rights 
episodes668. Those incidents revealed that PMSCs may operate in a legal vacuum669. Yet many 
challenges have arisen in the field of human rights protection, democracy and the rule of law. 
In that regard, the CoE has already adopted a wide range of conventions and 
recommendations670 which are related to the PMSCs’ activities in the CoE member States. 
Thus, CoE has to play an important role in the preservation of the rule of law and the respect 
                                                          
666 Ivor Powell, ‘South Africa-Linked Military Firm Loses Anti-Piracy Contract’, Global Policy Forum (29 
September 2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51945-south-africa-linked-military-firm-loses-anti-
piracy-contract.html?itemid=id#50208 (accessed on May 2016). 
667 Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 
(Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2010).  
668 Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, Presentation given at a parallel meeting on occasion of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, Global Research (3 November 2010), available at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-privatization-of-war-mercenaries-private-military-and-security-companies-
pmsc/21826 (accessed on May 2016) 
669 Deborah V. Avant, ‘The Emerging Market for Private Military Services and the Problems of Regulation’, in 
Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private 
Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 181; Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Eden Cole, 
Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper –No 20, 2007), p. 4. 
670 It is important to mention that CoE Council of Ministers adopts CoE conventions which have a binding force 
for States Parties to those conventions. On the other hand, CoE Parliamentary Assembly makes Recommendations 
and adopts Resolutions that only have an advisory effect. 
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and protection of human rights in relation to violations which might be committed by 
corporations.   
 
The activities of the CoE regarding the issue of human rights and corporations are dated 
back to 2009, when the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE adopted the Recommendation 
1858 (2009)671 on private military and security firms and the erosion of the State monopoly on 
the use of force. The Parliamentary Assembly suggested the creation of an instrument which 
aims “at regulating the relations of its member States with PMSCs and laying down minimum 
standards for the activity of these private companies”672. It also pointed out the need to 
establish specific criteria with regard to the activities, duties, responsibilities, obligations and 
accountability for human rights abuses of PMSCs and to introduce registration and licensing 
systems for PMSCs. Finally, it set out the importance of an effective training system for 
PMSCs’ contractors and the establishment of an oversight mechanism for human rights 
violations that may be committed by private contractors. 
 
                                                          
671 The Recommendation 1858 (2009) on Private Military and Security Firms and Erosion of the State Monopoly 
on the Use of Force adopted at the 8th Sitting of Parliamentary Assembly of CoE on 29th of January 2009, 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta09/EREC1858.htm, (accessed on May 2016). 
672 Ibid, para. 12. 
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One year later, focusing on issues of businesses and human rights, the Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted the Resolution 1757673 and the Recommendation 1936674, in which the 
existing legal gaps in the protection of human rights during PMSCs’ activities are emphasized.  
More precisely, the Resolution 1757 emphasized the difficulties to bring an extraterritorial 
violation of human rights by PMSCs before the ECtHR or even the national courts, since 
‘’many of the alleged human rights abuses by businesses occur in third countries - especially 
outside Europe’’675. Moreover, it argued that “while […] an individual alleging a violation of 
his or her rights by a private company cannot effectively raise his or her claims before this 
jurisdiction”676. For this reason, the Recommendation 1936 (2010) on Human Rights and 
Business supported that the CoE should promote further the corporate responsibility in the area 
of human rights abuses by PMSCs. Therefore, two of the most important monitoring bodies of 
the CoE -the ECtHR and the European Committee of Social Rights677- have to play a more 
decisive role in the protection of individuals by human rights violations by PMSCs’ 
contractors678. 
                                                          
673 The Resolution 1757 (2010) on Human Rights and Business adopted at the 32nd Sitting of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of CoE on 6th of October 2010, 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1757.htm, (accessed on May 
2016) 
674 The Recommendation 1939 (2010) on Human Rights and Business adopted at the 32nd Sitting of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of CoE on 6th of October 2010. 
675 Resolution 1757 (2010),supra note 12, para. 3. 
676 Ibid, para. 4. 
677 The European Committee of Social Rights is the monitoring body of the European Social Charter; its main 
responsibility is to assess whether a State Party acts in conformity with the provisions of the European Social 
Charter.  
678 Recommendation 1363 (2010) on Human Rights and Business, para. 1. 
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Having noticed the challenges that the human rights law has to deal with PMSCs’ 
activities, either inside or outside of territory and/or jurisdiction of the CoE member States, the 
Parliamentary Assembly proposes the enforcement of the already existed mechanisms towards 
the protection of the rights of individuals from PMSCs misconduct and the elaboration of a 
complementary legal instrument, such as a convention or an additional protocol to the 
ECHR679. This chapter presents an in-depth analysis the positive obligations of States under 
the ECHR.  Moreover, it explicitly describes the obligations to prevent human rights violations 
of the hiring State680, host State681 and home State682 under the ECHR. Overall, this chapter 
explores the contribution of the case-law of the ECtHR – and  the other regional human rights 
bodies- in the harmonization process of the national legal orders towards the establishment of 
a common accountability mechanism addressing human rights abuses by PMSCs. 
 
1. States’ Obligations under European Convention on Human Rights to 
Prevent Human Rights Abuses by Private Contractors 
 
Similar to other human rights instruments, ECHR imposes on States the obligation to protect 
human rights leaving to them the choice of means683. Article 1 of the ECHR stipulates that ‘’the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
                                                          
679 Recommendation 1363 (2010) on Human Rights and Business, para. 2.2. 
680 Hiring States are States that directly contract PMSCs for military and security services.  
681 Host States are States on whose territory PMSCs operate. 
682 Home State is the State of nationality of a PMSC; for example where a PMSC is registered or incorporated. 
683 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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freedoms defined in […] this Convention’’684. There is also a longstanding discussion among 
scholars whether Article 1 of the ECHR imposes obligations between individuals. To that point, 
Clapham denotes that even if the ECHR creates obligations for violations by a State against an 
individual and not between individuals, it does not exclude the existence of obligations between 
individuals685. On the contrary, some other scholars argue that the ECHR and the case-law of 
the ECtHR does not recognize horizontal obligations between individuals and/or non-State 
actors as Article 1 of the ECHR only addresses States Parties686.   
 
Irrespective of this, the ECtHR has primarily focused on the interpretation of Article 1 
when complainants are within the jurisdiction of a State Party. In Costello-Roberts v. the United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR emphasized that ‘[a] State is engaged if a violation of one of the rights 
and freedoms defined in the Convention is the result of non-observance by that State of its 
obligation under Article 1 to secure those rights and freedoms in its domestic law to everyone 
within its jurisdiction’687. As a result, the ECtHR had to further elaborate on the concept of 
jurisdiction.  
 
To this extent, the ECtHR has adopted two main approaches; a national territorial 
approach and an extraterritorial one688. In Assanidze v. Georgia, the ECtHR emphasized that 
                                                          
684 Article 1 of the ECHR. 
685 Ineta Ziemele, Human Rights Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The Case-Law of International 
Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (EUI: Working Paper, 2009), p. 12. 
686 Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra Appl no 69498/01 (ECtHR, 13 July 2004). 
687 Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom App no 13134/87 (ECtHR, 25 March 1993), para. 26. 
688 Alastair R. Mowbray, Cases, Materials and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (Third 
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 64. 
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the government of a State Party is accountable for any human rights violation that occurs in all 
parts of its territory689. Moreover, in case that the activities of a State Party ‘performed, or 
producing effects, outside of its territory’690, the ECtHR highlighted that the State Party can 
still exercise jurisdiction over them within the meaning of Article 1 of ECHR691. Military 
occupation has been characterized as ‘an exceptional case’692. In fact, the ECtHR held that  
 
‘a State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of 
persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former 
State's authority and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully - in 
the latter State. […] Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory’693.  
                                                          
689 In particular, the ECtHR held that ‘[…] each State Party to the Convention nonetheless remains responsible 
for events occurring anywhere within its national territory. Further, the Convention does not merely oblige the 
higher authorities of the Contracting States to respect for their own part the rights and freedoms it embodies; it 
also has the consequence that, in order to secure the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, those authorities 
must prevent or remedy any breach at subordinate levels […]’. Assanidze v. Georgia Appl no 71503/01 (ECtHR, 
8 April 2004), para. 146. See also Ireland v. the United Kingdom Appl no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978), 
para. 239. 
690 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States Appl no 52207/99 (ECtHR Decision on the 
Admissibility, 12 December 2001), para. 67. See also Stephens v. Malta (no. 1) Appl no 11956/07 (ECtHR, 21 
April 2009), para. 57. 
691 Issa and Others v. Turkey Appl no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 19 November 2004), para. 68; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi 
Appl no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010).  
692 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) Appl no 15318/89 (1995), ECtHR series A No. 310, para. 62. 
693 Issa and Others v. Turkey Appl no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 19 November 2004), para. 71. 
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Hence, in the event that the activities of a State Party’s agents produce effect outside of 
its territory, then the State Party holds also liability for their misconduct. In Al-Skeini and others 
v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR described under which circumstances the State incurs 
responsibility extraterritorial activities. In particular, in case that a  
 
‘State, through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that 
individual’694. 
 
Thus, Article 1 - as read in conjunction with other articles – creates a number of implied 
positive obligations for State Parties with regard to actions of a State and of private persons. 
To that point, the ECtHR in Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom affirms that 
States should undertake appropriate measures to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms specified by the ECHR because the company was under the control of the State695.  
Those positive obligations include both procedural duties - as the States have the duty to carry 
out prompt and effective investigations into killings696 - and substantive duties - as to protect 
persons known to be at risk of unlawful killing by others697.  
                                                          
694 Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom Appl no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 07 July 2011), para. 137. 
695 Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom Appl no 7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECtHR, 13 August 1981), 
para. 49. 
696 Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom Appl no 30054/96 (ECtHR, 4 August 2001); McCann and Others v. 
the United Kingdom Appl no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995), para. 161. 
697 Opuz v. Turkey Appl no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 June 2009). 
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State Parties are also obliged to take preventive measures for human rights violations 
that may be committed against an individual by another individual. In Osman v. the United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that:  
 
‘the Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2§1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from 
the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within its jurisdiction. […] It is common ground that the State’s obligation in this 
respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective 
criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by 
law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of 
such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the 
Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at 
risk from the criminal acts of another individual’698. 
 
Pursuant to this view, a State would violate its positive obligation to respect and protect 
the right to life of the complainants and the State Party would incur international responsibility. 
Within the context of the positive obligations, the ECtHR also denoted that in case that  
 
‘the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a 
                                                          
698 Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 115. See also L.C.B. v. the 
United Kingdom Appl no 14/1997/798/1001 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998), para. 36.  
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third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk’699. 
 
So the State Party holds liability by failing to fulfil its positive obligations. Similarly, 
in Ergi v. Turkey the ECtHR found that the government failed to minimize the risk of civilian 
causalities caused by State agents during a counter-terrorism operation. Therefore, the State 
failed to take all reasonable precautions in the choice of means and methods to protect the 
civilian life700.  
 
To apply the concept of the positive obligations of States over PMSCs, the ECtHR has 
to examine its jurisdiction over their activities abroad and the attribution of such actions to a 
State Party to the ECHR. In two cases for example - Issa and others v. Turkey701 and Islamic 
Republic of Iraq Shipping Lines v. Turkey702-  the ECtHR highlighted that a State Party to the 
ECHR is not allowed to perpetrate human rights violations within the territory of another 
State703; therefore, the State has to preserve that its agents, natural persons and legal entities 
protect human rights when they operate abroad. Moreover, in order to define under which 
circumstances the actions of a legal entity could be attributed to a States Party, the ECtHR 
made a clear distinction between those legal entities which constitute governmental 
                                                          
699 Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 116. See also Kilic v. Turkey 
Appl no 22492/93 (ECtHR, 28 March 2000); Akkoc v. Turkey Appls nos 2947/93 and 22948/93 (ECtHR, 10 
October 2000). 
700 Ergi v. Turkey Appl no 23818/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998), para. 79 et seq. 
701 Issa and Others v. Turkey Appl no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 19 November 2004). 
702 Islamic Republic of Iraq v. Turkey Appl no 40998/998 (ECtHR, 13 December 2007). 
703 Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 702, para. 67. 
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organizations and those who are non-governmental. That happens because the ECtHR could 
extend its jurisdiction over legal entities that exercise governmental functions or carry out 
public services only under specific governmental control.  
 
In particular, the ECtHR has to examine further that ‘account must be taken of its legal 
status and, where appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries 
out and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the 
political authorities’704 in order to decide whether the legal entity exercises governmental 
functions or not. Therefore, to examine a case regarding human rights violations by PMSCs, 
the ECtHR has to clarify whether there is a connection with a State Party. That occurs because 
PMSCs are not traditional legal entities with commercial activities; yet, the nature of their 
activities distinguish them considerably from other businesses.  
 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned analysis on the positive obligations of 
States, this chapter examines further the positive obligations of the hiring State, the host State 
and the home State.   
 
1.1. Positive Obligations of the Hiring States 
Hiring States have the primary obligation to adopt positive measures to prevent, investigate, 
punish and redress for relevant misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel within their 
territory705. This general rule is stipulated in the Montreux Document. The Montreux 
                                                          
704 Islamic Republic of Iraq v. Turkey, supra note 703, para. 79. 
705 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Positive Human Rights Obligations of the Hiring State in Connection with the Provision of 
‘Coercive Services’ by a Private Military or Security Company’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti 
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Document illustrates that ‘Contracting States are responsible to implement their obligations 
under international human rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the 
obligation, in specific circumstances, to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and 
provide effective remedies for relevant misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel’706. Within 
the context of the ECHR, the positive obligation to prevent human rights abuses by private 
persons is also highly important. Thus, to comply with that duty, the hiring State has to adopt 
such a legal framework707 not only to prevent branches of human rights law, but also to 
investigate and punish the perpetrators708.  
 
That approach could prevent an anticipated violation, when the hiring State knows that 
a violation is likely to occur and States have to ensure that a breach does not take place709. In 
the constant case-law, the ECtHR emphasized that State Parties have to control individuals 
who are considered to be dangerous for the States and the society as a whole. For instance, in 
Mastromateo v. Italy, the ECtHR argued that:  
 
                                                          
(eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 111. 
706 The Montreux Document, Part I, para. 4. 
707 X. and Y v. the Netherlands Appl no 8978/80 (ECtHR, 26 March 1985), para. 23. 
708 Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria Appl no 90/1997/874/1086 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 102. 
709 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under 
Public International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 257. 
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‘[…] Article 2 may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on 
the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is 
at risk from the criminal acts of another individual […]’710. 
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR emphasized that States are not only responsible for the actions 
of their own organs, but also have to ensure that their individuals are not subjected to lethal 
attacks at the hands of third parties711. To that direction, in A v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
– by examining the Article 1 in conjunction with Article 3 – emphasized that the Article 3 of 
the ECHR imposes a positive duty on the State to protect its individuals, particularly those who 
are especially vulnerable, against abuse by third parties712. More precisely, the ECtHR held 
that, even during operations in detention services, every detainee has to be guaranteed 
conditions that preserve their human dignity713. Equally, Hoppe argues that the failure to fulfill 
the positive obligations under Article 3 would be fully applied over the inhuman practices that 
were committed by private contractors at Abu Ghraib prison714.  
 
                                                          
710 Mastromatteo v. Italy Appl no 37703/97 (ECtHR, 24 October 2002), para. 67. 
711 Gezici v. Turkey Appl no 34594/97 (ECtHR, 17 March 2005), paras 49 – 54. 
712 ‘[…] The obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires 
States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals […]’. See A. v. the United Kingdom Appl no 100/1997/884/1096 (ECtHR, 23 September 1998), para. 
22. 
713 Valasinas v. Lithuania Appl no 44558/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2001), paras. 102 – 106. 
714 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies’ [2008] 19 (5) 
European Journal of International Law 989, 1004. 
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Additionally to the compliance with the obligation to prevent and intervene when a 
human rights violation may occur, the hiring State is obliged to take positive steps to minimize 
any risk of life to the greatest extent possible715. In that case, a State has the primary obligation 
to plan and control all the security operations that are carried out by its forces in order to 
‘minimize, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force’716. The same is emphasized 
in the case of Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, whereas the ECtHR affirmed that  
 
‘where deliberate lethal force is used’’ the State has to take ‘’into consideration not only the 
actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding 
circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under 
examination’717.  
 
In any event, the nature of PMSCs’ activities –known as coercive services718- and the 
environment in which they operate, make them stand liable for violations of the most important 
fundamental human rights; the right to life and prohibition of torture. In order to fulfill the 
positive obligations under the ECHR, the hiring State should exercise effective and overall 
control over the activities of PMSCs, in order to prevent any possible human rights violation. 
Similarly, in Osman v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR suggested that ‘the State not only to 
                                                          
715 Hannah Tonkin, State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 216. 
716 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom Appl no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995), para. 194. 
717 Andronikou and Constantinou v. Cyprus Appl no 25052/91 (ECtHR, 9 October 1998), para. 171. See also Ergi 
v. Turkey Appl no 23818/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998), para. 81. 
718 Hoppe highlighted that the meaning of ‘coercive services’ includes the ‘element of compelling individuals or 
groups by force or authority’. Hoppe, supra note 715, p. 111. 
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refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’719. To this end, the national authorities have 
to undertake appropriate preventive measures to protect citizens whose lives are at risk.  
 
Even though the aforementioned cases argued the positive obligation of a State in 
relation to security services carried out by State agents, the ECtHR has also commented upon 
the use of civilians in quasi-security operations. For instance, in Avsar v. Turkey, the ECtHR 
argued that Turkey failed to train properly the civilian volunteers720. Therefore, Turkey incurs 
international responsibility for failing to comply with the obligation to plan and control the 
security operation721.   
 
1.2. Duty to Prevent Human Rights Abuses of the Host State 
States in which PMSCs perform their activities should also comply with the obligation to 
prevent any violation taking place within their territory722. The Montreux Document addresses 
that obligation directly to the host State by determining that:  
                                                          
719 Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 115. 
720 Avsar v. Turkey Appl no 25657/94 (ECtHR, 10 July 2001). Moreover, the ECtHR in McCann and Others v. 
the United Kingdom used the word of ‘’other agents’’ in order to describe those are taking part in a security 
operation. See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom Appl no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995), para. 
151. 
721 Avsar v. Turkey Appl no 25657/94 (ECtHR, 10 July 2001). 
722 Evgeni Moyakine, The Privatized Art of War: Private Military and Security Companies and State 
Responsibility for their Unlawful Conduct in Conflict Areas (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2015), p. 
367; Christine Bakker, ‘Duties to Prevent, Investigate, and Redress Human Rights Violations by Private Military 
and Security Companies: The Role of the Host State’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War 
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‘Territorial States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human 
rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, 
to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel’723.  
 
However, it is worth mentioning that the obligations of the host State are usually 
suspended when a foreign State exercises effective control over its territory and/or certain 
areas, such as prisons. Moreover, in some other cases, the host State may have lost control over 
a part of its territory, or lack the institutional capacity to control PMSCs’ contractors 
effectively. As a result, the host State cannot fully comply with the positive obligations under 
human rights law.  
 
Yet, the ECtHR emphasized that the host State is still under the positive obligation to 
take all the appropriate measures to prevent human rights violations within its power of 
circumstances724. In Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, the ECtHR has clarified that 
States have  
 
‘[positive] obligations to take appropriate steps to ensure respect for those rights and freedoms 
within its territory. Those obligations remain even where the exercise of the State's authority 
                                                          
by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 
146. 
723 The Montreux Document, Part I, para. 10. 
724 Tonkin, supra note 716, p. 154. 
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is limited in part of its territory, so that it has a duty to take all the appropriate measures which 
it is still within its power to take’725. 
 
Similarly, host States should adopt appropriate measures against those who present a 
danger to the society726 and should undertake appropriate measures to protect individuals 
whose lives are at risk. For instance, when the host State knows or is likely to know that the 
lives of its individuals are at risk, it should take adequate measures to protect their inherent 
right to life727. To this end, it is highly important for the host State to adopt such licensing and 
authorization regimes which could allow only PMSCs that are operating properly within its 
territory.  Thus, in case of misconduct, the host State could withdraw the license of that PMSC 
and their employees who were involved in human rights abuses728. For example, following a 
fatal and random shooting took place in Nisour Square in Baghdad and 17 Iraq civilians were 
killed and over 20 were injured by Blackwater’s personnel while they were escorting American 
diplomats in Iraq729. As a result, after this notorious episode, Iraq –as the host State- revoked 
Blackwater’s license. 
                                                          
725 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia Appl no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), para. 313. 
726 Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 115. 
727 According to the Osman v. the United Kingdom Case, the ECtHR noted that “the authorities have violated their 
positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress 
offences against the person”. See Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), 
para. 116 et seq. See also X and Y v. Netherlands Appl no 8978/80 (ECtHR (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 26 
March 1985), para. 23. 
728 Moyakine, supra note 723, p. 371. 
729 J. Glanz and S. Tavernise, ‘’Blackwater Shooting Scene was Chaotic’’, The New York Times, (28 September 
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/middleeast/28blackwater.html?_r=0 (accessed on 
May 2016) 
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1.3. The Role of the Home State in Preventing Human Rights Violations by 
Private Military and Security Companies 
Human rights law imposes numerous obligations on States in order to ensure and secure the 
enjoyment and the respect of human rights and the fundamental freedoms of individuals only 
within their jurisdiction. Similar to the hiring and host State, the home State has undertaken the 
obligation to prevent human rights abuses by enacting appropriate positive measures730. 
Similarly, the Montreux Document exhibits that:  
 
‘home States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human rights 
law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, to 
take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel’731.  
 
Nonetheless, home States are taken on the obligation, in cases where a PMSC is 
registered in one State and operates in the territory of another State, the first State –the home 
one – does not have any obligation under human rights law to take positive steps to prevent the 
company’s human rights abuses overseas732. In contrast, in Drozd and Janousek v. France and 
                                                          
730 Francesco Francioni, ‘The Role of the Home State in Ensuring Compliance with Human Rights by Private 
Military Contractors’, in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 93. 
731 The Montreux Document, Part I, para. 15. 
732 Tonkin, supra note 716, p. 256. Concerning the issues of jurisdictional control abroad, Ruggie noticed that 
‘States […] are not required to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses incorporated in their 
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Spain, the ECtHR emphasized that there is no limitation based on the territorial application of 
ECHR733. So, the responsibility of a State for any failure to prevent human rights abuses ‘can 
be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory’734.  
 
To set aside this legal barrier, Moyakine735 argues, that home States can control, 
monitor and oversee effectively the activities of PMSCs throughout their internal policies and 
laws.  One of the main key factors is to establish effective regulatory mechanisms with 
extraterritorial effect in order to achieve better control and monitoring of PMSCs wherever 
they operate736.  
 
 
2. The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Advocating Human 
Rights Allegations against Private Contractors 
                                                          
jurisdiction, nor are they generally prohibited from doing so provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis 
and that an overall test of reasonableness is met’ see John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Towards 
Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2004, para. 
15. However, in case of there is close link between the territory in which a PMSC operates and the home State, 
the States have to regulate the extraterritorial activities of those companies. Banković and Others v. Belgium and 
16 Other Contracting States Appl no 52207/99 (ECtHR Decision on the Admissibility, 12 December 2001), para. 
59; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom Appl no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010), para. 128 
733 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain Appl no 12747/87 (ECtHR Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 June 
1992). See also Sarah Miller, ‘Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction under the European Convention’ [2009] 20 (4) European Journal of International Law, p. 1223, 1241. 
734 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, supra note 734, para. 91.  
735 Moyakine, supra note 723, p. 378. 
736 Emmmanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Business Do to War: Private Military and Security Companies and International 
Humanitarian Law’ [2006] 863 International Review of Red Cross, p. 559. 
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To-date, States have no explicit obligation under their national laws to register PMSCs. 
Schutter noticed that it seems like ‘international law does not directly reach the corporate 
actor’737. However, in the absence of an obligation like that, the ECtHR has already examined 
cases concerning not only natural persons, but also legal entities738, such as media corporations, 
private banks, private hospitals and private schools, trade unions and environmental 
corporations739.  
 
In particular, Lόpez Ostra v. Spain demonstrated that health problems caused by a 
private waste-treatment plant had affected the right to privacy and family life740; the ECtHR 
further considered that  
 
                                                          
737 See Olivier de Schutter, ‘The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law’, 
in Philip Alston (eds.), Non-state Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 228. 
738 Islamic Republic of Iraq v. Turkey Appl no 40998/998 (ECtHR, 13 December 2007). 
739 For instance, in the case Castello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom found that the United Kingdom held 
responsibility regarding to corporal punishment in private schools Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom Appl 
no 13134/87 (ECtHR, 25 March 1993). Moreover, from a different perspective, the State incurred responsibility 
of nuisance from private airplanes that based at a private airport. See Powell and Ryaner v. the United Kingdom 
Appl no 9310/81 (ECtHR, 21 February 1991). Daniel Augenstein, State Responsibilities to Regulate and 
Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the European Convention on Human Rights, Submission to the 
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, April 2011 at 3. 
740 Lόpez Ostra v. Spain Appl no 16798/90 (ECtHR, 9 December 1994); Fadeyeva v. the Russian Federation Appl 
no 55273/04 (ECtHR, 9 June 2005). It is worth to be noticed that other bodies under CoE have focused on 
environmental issues and human rights abuses by corporations. See Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights 
v. Greece, Collective Complaint No. 30/2005, ECSR, Decision of 26th of December 2006. 
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‘[…] in the present case, even supposing that the municipality did fulfil the functions assigned 
to it by domestic law […] it need only establish whether the national authorities took the 
measures necessary for protecting the applicant’s right to respect for her home and for her 
private and family life […]’’741. 
 
Also, in Taşkin and Others v. Turkey, the ECtHR found that the gold mining company 
is responsible for the pollution of the local area, which means that Turkey has failed to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure individuals’ rights under the ECHR742. 
 
At the same time, in order to clarify the obligation of the State to prevent human rights 
abuses by private contractors, the ECtHR focuses more on the significance of Article 1 of the 
ECHR. Consequently, ECtHR highlights that States’ obligations are ranging from the 
prevention of any murder of a person743 to issues of disappearances by non-State actors744.  
 
Additionally, many questions have been raised with respect to the human rights 
violations that have been committed by PMSCs outside of Europe. In some cases, the victims 
reside outside of Europe and apparently fall out of the jurisdiction of the States. Howvwer, the 
ECtHR removed this limitations and - in Issa and Others v. Turkey – stated that  
 
                                                          
741 Lόpez Ostra v. Spain, supra note 746, para. 55. 
742 Taşkin and Others v. Turkey Appl no 46117/99 (ECtHR, 10 December 2004). 
743 Osman v. the United Kingdom Appl no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998). 
744 Osmanoglu v. Turkey Appl no 48804/99 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008). 
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‘the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of 
the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory”745.  
 
Besides, in certain cases, the States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction could apply, only if 
there is jurisdictional link between the PMSCs’ activities and the State Party to the ECHR746. 
In other words, the jurisdiction of a State Party to the ECHR is established only if the State has 
factual effective control over territory, an area, a place and/or an operation outside its own 
territory747. Otherwise, the ECtHR does not have competence in examining those cases748. 
 
Additionally, the ECtHR also highlighted the significant obligation of States to 
investigate, punish and redress human rights violations by private contractors within their 
jurisdiction. For instance, in Klass v. Germany, the ECtHR noted that the concept of access to 
effective remedies under Article 13 of the ECHR does not only include the prosecution of 
                                                          
745 Issa and Others v. Turkey Appl no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004), para. 71. 
746 Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom Appl no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011); Al Saadoon and Mufdhi 
v. the United Kingdom Appl no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009). 
747 See Markus Mayr, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Access 
to the Court for Victims of Human Rights Violations of ESDP Missions’ [2010] 7 BSIS Journal of International 
Studies, p. 7; Marko Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in 
Human Rights Treaties’ [2008] 8 Human Rights Law Review, p.  411. 
748 As the ECtHR emphasized in Ben El Mahi and Others v. Denmark, the applicants, who were resident in 
Morocco and complained that the Danish government had failed to intervene in publication of caricatures of the 
prophet Muhammad, lacked a jurisdictional link with Denmark, so the ECtHR dismissed as inadmissible the 
application under Article 9 of the Convention.  See Ben El Mahi and Others v. Denmark Appl no 5853/06 (ECtHR, 
11 December 2006).  
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perpetrators or the compensation to the victims, but also includes investigations for these 
violations749 and the appropriate national procedures to submit individual complaints750.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In the aftermath of the Montreux Document751, the CoE endeavoured to contribute further in 
the regulation of PMSCs’ activities and in the oversight and public control over their 
services752. Through the adoption of recommendations and resolutions, the CoE demonstrated 
that States have the obligation to protect human rights within their jurisdiction from activities 
of private legal entities. At the same time, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR highlights that States 
have the positive obligation to prevent human rights abuses that committed by ‘other agents’753. 
                                                          
749 Regarding the nature of the investigations, the ECHR stated that ‘the investigation into serious allegations of 
ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough’. See El-Marsi v. F.Y.R.O.M. Appl no 39630/09  (ECtHR, 13 
December 2012), para. 183. 
750 Klass and Others v. Germany Appl no 5029/71 (ECHR) Ser. A. No. 61 (1983), para. 113. 
751 The Montreux Document is the first international initiative that addresses directly obligations to States to 
regulate PMSCs and hold their contractors accountable for human rights’ violations. James Cockayne, ‘Regulating 
Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiations, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux 
Document’ [2008] 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p. 401. 
752 'Ad hoc terms of reference for the Council for Police Matters (PC-PM) relating to the regulation of private 
security services' CM 924th Meeting of Deputies, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 21-22 April 2005. 
753 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom Appl no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995), para. 151. 
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Moreover, it suggests that State Parties to the ECHR have to adopt adequate measures in order 
to prevent human rights violations, performed inside754 or outside755 of their territory.  
 
Despite the efforts made by the CoE and the ECtHR to set particular standards for the 
regulation of PMSCs, to improve the governance of military and security services in Europe 
and to outline the accountability of PMSCs in case of alleged human rights violations, the 
European countries have adopted differing national policies. For instance, some countries still 
have no specific operational framework for PMSCs, such as Serbia756. Other countries, as 
Germany and Austria, regulate the private military and security industry through their 
commercial frameworks. In this end, there is an increasing concern about how those 
commercial rules can protect effectively human rights757. On the other hand, there are some 
countries that have already enacted a precise framework for PMSCs’ activities –as France and 
the United Kingdom758.  
 
                                                          
754 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia Appl no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004). The ECtHR adopted the 
same attitude in Treska Case. See Treska v. Albania and Italy Appl no 26937/04 (ECtHR Decision of 
Admissibility, 29 June 2006). 
755 Kovaĉić v. Slovenia Appl no 24376/08 (ECtHR, 18 April 2013). See also Ranstev v. Cyprus and Russia Appl 
no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010). 
756 OSCE, Private Security Companies in Serbia: Friend or Foe? (Belgrade: GORAGRAF) 74. 
757 Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies under International Law (Cambridge-Antwerp-
Portland: Intersentia), p. 249. 
758 Alexandra Bohm, Kerry Senior and Adam White, ‘The United Kingdom’, in Christine Bakker and Mirko 
Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Private Military and Security Contractors: the Interplay between 
International, European and Domestic Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 316. 
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Regardless the existence or not of a coherent national framework for the regulation and 
monitoring of the activities of PMSCs, there are different national institutions which exercise 
oversight of PMSCs. For instance, the Italian the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for 
controlling the activities of PMSCs759 and in Luxembourg the Ministry of Justice. 
 
In conclusion, the ECtHR aims to harmonize the national laws and to create common 
regulatory standards regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
among Europe.  It is vital for the ECtHR to engage with a more decisive approach over the 
regulation of PMSCs’ contractors and their prosecution for human rights’ abuses. Therefore, 
the CoE has to put forward such initiatives, as for example the adoption of a new convention 
at regional level or even an additional protocol to the ECHR with respect to prevent human 
rights’ abuses by PMSCs. Consequently, the ECtHR will be the accountability mechanism not 
only for securing the human rights respect by PMSCs, but also specifying and clarifying that 
PMSCs’ activities do not contravene the norms of human rights law.  
 
Similar to the ECtHR, the other two regional human rights treaty bodies – the IACtHR 
and AComHPR - could undertake a significant role in adjudicating human rights allegations 
committed by private contractors. In Puablo Massacre Case, the IACtHR examined the 
responsibility of a State in failing to prevent violations by a paramilitary group. The AComHPR 
also emphasized the obligation of States to prevent and protect human rights regardless who 
the perpetrator is.  
                                                          
759 Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Provincial Prefect are responsible for controlling private security 
companies in Italy. Panoramic Overview of Private Security Industry in the 25 Member States of the European 
Union, http://www.coess.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/CoESS_Facts_and_Figures_2004_Part_1.pdf 
(accessed on May 2016). 
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Consequently, the European example could be constitute a positive precedent for the 
other regional bodies to undertake a more decisive role in order to exercise jurisdiction over 
cases involving PMSCs. Therefore, the establishment of a determining inter-regional 
cooperation could constitute a milestone for States – and particular the greatest exporters of 
PMCS, the USA, the UK, South Africa and Germany – to enact appropriate mechanisms to 
prevent human rights violations by PMSCs and their employees.  
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CHAPTER VII: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The use of PMSCs has become a very popular practice. PMSCs are deployed to carry out 
several tasks ranging from the training and advice to interrogation of prisoners. However, these 
services are usually accompanied by human rights violations: indiscriminate shooting of 
civilians, international killings, torture and/or degrading treatment of prisoners and sexual 
abuses. These breaches revealed the weakness of international norms and domestic legal orders 
to deal with the issue of PMSCs. Therefore, the main purpose of the present study is to 
investigate whether the human rights law imposes obligations on States to control, regulate and 
oversee PMSCs’ operations and also to prevent human rights violations committed by them. 
Thus, this research examines the existing international framework that governs PMSCs’ 
activities, the national legal frameworks that directly apply over the misconduct of PMSCs’ 
employees and assesses whether the jurisprudence of the human rights judiciary bodies apply 
over the PMSCs’ operations.  
 
Chapter four focuses on the obligations of States to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ 
activities derived by the Montreux Document. By considering the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights760, the Montreux Document constitutes 
the first initiative that is applicable to PMSCs’ operations. In particular, the Montreux 
Document provides a set of generally respected standards on which other regulatory initiatives 
                                                          
760 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations  and Other 
Business Enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 2008, at para. 92. 
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might be built. In other words, the Montreux Document is ‘persuasive in law’, but eventually, 
it suggests States to make it a ‘binding in law’761. 
 
However, the Montreux Document fails to address issues of application –and more 
particularly the extraterritorial application- of human rights law over PMSCs’ activities. 
Similarly, it adopts the approach of States’ ‘effective control’ instead of ‘overall control’ with 
respect to the operations of PMSCs. Yet, its non-binding nature creates only non-binding (soft-
law) commitments for States and PMSCs. Based on these commitments, the Montreux 
Document constitutes a vital guidance for both states and PMSCs to comply with the 
international law standards. Its importance lies also upon the recommendations –‘’Good 
Practices’’- which are suggested to States. By implementing those proposals, States could 
really achieve a high level of oversight and accountability framework for PMSCs’ conduct.  
 
At the same time, the ICoC came to fill these grey zones of regulation from an industry-
driven perspective. The ICoC provided with a detailed commitments for PMSCs and their 
employees. It also clarified the human rights expectations towards PMSCs, by stipulating a 
comprehensive catalogue of governance actions that should be taken at the company level. The 
main scope of the ICoC is the creation of an oversight system according to which PMSCs are 
                                                          
761 James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, 
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document’ (2008) 13:3 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 401. 
Besides, Cockayne emphasizes that in order to be transformed into a binding law, the Montreux document has to 
endorse several regulatory steps, such as the establishment of a peer review mechanism to oversee the States’ 
compliance with the provisions of the Montreux Document. See James Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces 
(New York: International Peace Institute, 2009). 
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going to act with its commitments. However, its non-binding nature does not affect a lot its 
implementations since it constitutes a kind of bylaw for the signatory PMSCs762.  
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the independent oversight mechanism hides some 
of deficiencies which PMSCs have to overpass through the ICoC’s incorporation within their 
internal policies. As it in analysed in chapter four, due to the complexities of the environments 
in which PMSCs operate, the ICoC Association does not specify the examination process for 
a complaint to be admissible or not; and  then  how the ICoC Association will proceed with 
further impartial investigation throughout PMSCs’ harmful activities. Moreover, another 
crucial weakness point is that it does not include any provision on remedies for PMSCs harmful 
activities. With respect to remedies procedure, the ICoC Association indicates then after the 
examination of the complaint, the victim/victims should be addressed to have access to 
effective remedies763.  
 
To overpass the aforementioned weaknesses of both international initiatives, a potential 
solution could be the adoption of an international legally binding document to ensure the 
application of minimum standards for regulation and monitoring of the operations of 
                                                          
762 Seibeth, supra note 18, at 225. 
763 ICoC’s Association, Article 13.2.2. 
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PMSCs764. Gómez del Prado765 argued that a binding initiative has some important advantages. 
Firstly, it has a broad applicability irrespectively the nature of the PMSC’s operation. It applies 
on land-based or maritime- based operations during wartime or peacetime as well. Secondly, 
apart from the states, it imposes obligations to regulate and monitor PMSCs’ operations to 
International Organisations, such as NATO766. Thirdly, it creates an international monitoring 
body to oversee states’ efforts to comply with its provisions, and also it establishes a complaint 
procedure – inter-sate and individual petition procedures.  
 
As a result, the Human Rights Council decided to establish an international mechanism 
regarding the regulation, oversight and monitoring of PMSCs’ activities767. However, this idea 
was not welcomed by the majority of the UN member States. But it has only been proposed by 
members of the U.K. House of Commons768 and by members of the Parliamentary Assembly 
                                                          
764 Perrin, ‘Searching for Accountability: the Draft U.N. International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight 
and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies’, 47 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (2009) 
299. Moreover, Percy argues that ‘’the international regulation has the capacity to protect States with weak judicial 
systems from potential problems caused by PMSCs; it can prevent PMSCs from moving abroad to avoid 
regulations; it can ensure that contracts between non—state actors and PMSCs adhere to minimum standards’’. 
See Percy, Regulating Private Security Industry, (2006). 
765 Gómez del Prado, ‘A U.N. Convention to Regulate PMSCs?’, 31 (3) Criminal Justice Ethics (2012) 262. 
766 Isenberg, The Many PMC Faces of NATO, (November 2012), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/the-many-pmc-faces-of-nato_b_2200697.html (last visited on 
May 2015). 
767 United Nations Resolution, A/RES/15/ 26; and United National Human Rights Council, A/HRC/15/25. 
768 Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, U.K. House of Commons (2001 02), Private Military 
Companies, HC 922, para. 25. 
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of the CoE769. The main reason is that the use of force and public security is a very sensitive 
issue, so they cannot leave corporations to decide without strict limitations of what are 
inherently state functions. Besides the UN Draft Convention promotes a more narrow 
understanding regarding the ‘inherent governmental functions’ instead of the Montreux 
Document and the ICoC do.  
 
Moreover, the adoption of a binding legal document shields another important danger. 
White770 indicated that the adoption of an international binding document ‘’will attract a 
different clientele of States’’ than the non-binding initiatives did. That is, States, who are high 
connected with the PMSC industry, might be strongly opposed to a binding regulatory 
framework, and those who are completely opposed to PMSCs’ activities as a modern form of 
mercenary would support it more. Moreover, even a non-binding document as ICoC is hardly 
implemented. To date, only the UK, Switzerland and Australia have already endorsed ICoC 
and they asked for membership.771 
 
Since the adoption of a binding document seems to be a longstanding and difficult 
process, it is worth a mention that the UN Draft Convention provides for a monitoring system 
for PMSCs at national level. In order to obtain an effective control and accountability of 
PMSCs, States have to establish a comprehensive national framework to regulation and 
oversight ‘[…] over the activities in (their) territory of PMSCs and their personnel including 
                                                          
769 Rapport de l’Office fe´de´rale de la justice concernant une e´ventuelle re`glementation sur les entreprises de 
se´curite´ prive´es ope´rant depuis la Suisse dans des zones de crise ou de conflit, December 30, 2010 
770 White, supra note 18, at 31. 
771 See footnote 869 in Seibeth, supra note 18, at 159. 
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all foreign personnel, in order to prohibit and investigate illegal activities as defined by this 
Convention as well as by relevant national laws […]’772. 
 
To that extent, chapter five explores the existing national legislative frameworks, under 
which private contractors may be held accountable for their misconducts. It considers that the 
absence of an international framework to punish private contractors for human rights violations 
allows for non-compliance with human rights law773. Similar to Seiberth’s774 view, the main 
aim of the Montreux Document was to raise awareness regarding the legal challenges posed by 
PMSCs and to make some non-exclusive recommendations on how domestic legal regimes 
could sufficiently respond to these challenges.  
 
Likewise, the UN ‘’Protect, Respect and Remedy’’ Framework775 -as a parallel process 
to the Montreux Document- highlights that States have to play the primary role in preventing 
                                                          
772 United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010, Annex, Art. 13. 
773 In particular the Montreux Document emphasised that ‘’[…] to provide for […] appropriate administrative 
and other monitoring mechanisms to ensure the proper execution of the contract and the accountability of 
contracted PMSCs and their personnel for their improper and unlawful conduct […]’’. See the Montreux 
Document, Part II, Good Practice No. 21. 
774 See Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies in International Law, (Intersentia, 2014) 256. 
775 Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of all human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights (A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008) <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-
and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf> accessed on January 2015.  
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and addressing human rights violations committed within their territory and/or jurisdiction.776 
Thus, States have to undertake all appropriate policies, regulations and adjudication measures 
to prevent human rights abuses, which may be committed by third parties –including those 
committed by PMSCs. Therefore, chapter five examines four different types of existing 
national accountability regimes that apply over private contractors (USA, UK, South Africa 
and Germany).  
 
This comparative analysis emphasizes the possible ineffectiveness of national 
regulations due to the transnational nature of PMSCs' operations. Singer also argues that in 
most cases PMSCs are registered in one country, they operate within the territory of another 
one and they hire contractors from a third State777. Consequently, thereafter, in the context of 
the absence of an international prosecution model for human rights violations by PMSCs, this 
chapter suggests a national prosecution model which may encourage States to fulfill their 
obligations under human rights law by better regulation of PMSCs’ operations. 
 
In this regard, the UK Private Security Industry Act could constitute a prime example. 
So that, such an example of a national initiative has to establish an independent oversight 
mechanism which:  
1. authorizes and/or appeals licenses of PMSCs and their employees; 
                                                          
776 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf> accessed on January 2015.  
777 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca:  Cornell University 
Press, 2004). 
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2. sets out the vetting and training standards of PMSCs’ employees according to 
the international principles of human rights law and humanitarian law; 
3.  monitors their activities through the submission of periodical reports; 
4. investigates allegations against PMSCs and their employees; 
5. establishes civil and criminal accountability for PMSCs and their employees; 
and, 
6. establishes an adequate compensation mechanism for victims of abuses 
committed by PMSCs and their employees irrespective of where the violations may have been 
committed.  
 
However, in the absence of relevant steps to incorporate international standards 
regarding the operation of PMSCs and their employees within their domestic legal order, States 
enriched with the obligation to regulate them under human rights law. For several human rights 
notorious episodes that took place in the meantime of a PMSC’ operation, it seems that States 
had authorized these activities. For instance, PMSCs’ employees who were involved in the Abu 
Ghraib incident might be under the supervision of governmental official778. 
 
in this regards, chapter six argues if human rights law constitutes an adequate 
framework of controlling the activities of PMSCs, and providing States with such 
accountability mechanisms for human rights abuses committed by private contractors and 
effective remedies for reparation of the victims. This is also the primary research question. So, 
                                                          
778 In the Report of MG G. R. Fay ‘Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade’ it is stated that ‘’CACI employees were in positions of authority, and appeared to be 
supervising government personnel’’. See Jones, A. R., Fay, G. R.(2004). Investigation of Intelligence Activities 
at Abu Ghraib, p. 51. 
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by observing that the existing international initiatives –the Montreux Document and the ICoC- 
are a restatement of well-establish principles of human rights law, chapter six argues that the 
human rights bodies should have a decisive role to guide States to fulfil their obligations under 
human rights law. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in 2013 the CRC drafted a new General Comment on State 
Obligations regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights779 which denotes 
that States have the obligation to ensure that all actors respect children’s rights ‘by adopting 
transparent business-related policies and legislative or administrative acts that consider the 
impact on the rights of the child’780. The CRC also highlights that a sufficient investigative 
procedure requires the adoption of child-sensitive mechanisms; civil criminal or 
administrative781. Therefore, human rights bodies are engaged with the challenge to deepen in 
States’ procedural obligations regarding the prevention of fundamental human rights abuses by 
PMSCs’ employees.  
 
Furthermore, human rights law imposes duties not only on States, but also on 
individuals and business entities782. Therefore, both States and PMSCs have the obligation to 
take appropriate steps to prevent the commission of human rights violations by PMSCs and 
vice versa. As a result, in the absence of a national regulatory framework, States still have to 
                                                          
779 See CRC, General Comment  No. 16 on State Obligations regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on 
Children’s Rights, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16, 17/04/2013. 
780 Ibid, para. 26. 
781 Ibid, para. 30. 
782 This is one of the fundamental principles that were set out in Art.29 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights. (‘’everyone has duties to the community’’). 
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establish an independent institutional body under which the government coordinates with and 
the PMSCs’ industry will be sufficient in investigating and punishing violations of human 
rights by PMSCs’ employees.  
 
Similarly, the present research illustrates that the European States -or much properly 
individuals within the territory and jurisdiction of the CoE- could bring a case in front of the 
ECtHR by claim human rights violation committed by PMSCs and their employees. Both CoE 
and the ECtHR had demonstrate the emerged need for regulation of the PMSCs’ activities. To 
be more precise, the CoE adopted a wide range of recommendations regarding the obligations 
of States to protect human rights within their jurisdiction from activities of private legal entities. 
 
Relying on the extensive and in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the 
thesis concludes that States have the positive obligation to prevent human rights abuses that 
committed by ‘other agents’783. Thus, I strongly believe that within the next five years, the 
State Parties to the ECHR are able to adopt adequate measures in order to prevent human rights 
violations, performed inside784 or outside785 of their territory by PMSCs. The present thesis 
also proposed that the bottom line for the ECtHR over PMSCs is the case Avsar v. Turkey, the 
                                                          
783 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 18984/91, ECtHR Judgment (27 September 1995), para. 
151. 
784 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia Appl. 48787/99, ECtHR Judgment (8 July 2004). The ECtHR adopted 
the same attitude in Treska Case. See Treska v. Albania and Italy, Appl. No. 26937/04, ECtHR Decision of 
Admissibility (29 June 2006). 
785 Kovaĉić v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 24376/08, ECtHR Judgment (18 April 2013). See also Ranstev v. Cyprus and 
Russia, Appl. No. 25965/04, ECtHR Judgment (7 January 2010). 
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ECtHR argued that a State has obligation to protect the rights of its individuals for security 
operations carried out by both State agents and/or civilians in quasi-security operations786.  
 
Therefore, the ECtHR aims to harmonize the national laws and to create common 
regulatory standards regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
among Europe.  It is vital for the ECtHR to engage with a more decisive approach over the 
regulation of PMSCs’ contractors and their prosecution for human rights’ abuses. So as, the 
CoE has to put forward such initiatives, as for example the adoption of a new convention or 
even an additional protocol to the ECHR with respect to prevent human rights’ abuses by 
PMSCs. Consequently, the ECtHR will be the accountability mechanism not only for securing 
the human rights respect by PMSCs, but also specifying and clarifying that PMSCs’ activities 
do not contravene the norms of human rights law.  
 
At the same time, the Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity 
in International Crimes emphasized that ‘’the rapid increase of private military companies and 
private security companies operating in areas of armed conflict is one example of how 
companies work in situations where they may become implicated in the perpetration of war 
crimes’’. This means that the absence of a coherent international legal framework of regulation 
PMSCs’ activities and adjudicating their personnel for their misconduct, in conjunction with 
the lack of national laws that are directly applied over private contractors help them to enjoy a 
kind of immunity for their involvement in the commission of international crimes. 
                                                          
786 Avsar v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25657/94, ECtHR Judgment (10 July 2001). Moreover, the ECtHR in McCann and 
Others v. the United Kingdom used the word of ‘’other agents’’ in order to describe those are taking part in a 
security operation. See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 18984/91, ECtHR Judgment (27 
September 1995), para. 151. 
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In conclusion, following the establishment of common regulation with regards to PMSCs 
under human rights law, the international community has also to elaborate towards the 
establishment of criminal liability of PMSCs and their employees. It means that States have to 
cooperate in order to advocate of individual criminal responsibility for private contractors as 
perpetrators, as instigators and/or persons who aid and assist the commission of an international 
crime and as commanders for the commission of war crimes and acts of aggression. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and 
good practices for States related to operations of private military and 
security companies during armed conflict (17 September 2008) 
 
Preface  
This document is the product of an initiative launched cooperatively by the Government of 
Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It was developed with the 
participation of governmental experts from Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, and the United States of 
America in meetings convened in January and November 2006, November 2007, and April and 
September 2008. Representatives of civil society and of the private military and security 
industry were consulted. The following understandings guided the development of this 
document:  
1. That certain well-established rules of international law apply to States in their relations with 
private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their operation during armed conflict, in 
particular under international humanitarian law and human rights law;  
2. That this document recalls existing legal obligations of States and PMSCs and their 
personnel (Part One), and provides States with good practices to promote compliance with 
international humanitarian law and human rights law during armed conflict (Part Two);  
3. That this document is not a legally binding instrument and does not affect existing 
obligations of States under customary international law or under international agreements to 
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which they are parties, in particular their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations 
(especially its articles 2(4) and 51);  
4. That this document should therefore not be interpreted as limiting, prejudicing or enhancing 
in any manner existing obligations under international law, or as creating or developing new 
obligations under international law;  
5. That existing obligations and good practices may also be instructive for post-conflict 
situations and for other, comparable situations; however, that international humanitarian law is 
applicable only during armed conflict;  
6. That cooperation, information sharing and assistance between States, commensurate with 
each State’s capacities, is desirable in order to achieve full respect for international 
humanitarian law and human rights law; as is cooperative implementation with the private 
military and security industry and other relevant actors;  
7. That this document should not be construed as endorsing the use of PMSCs in any particular 
circumstance but seeks to recall legal obligations and to recommend good practices if the 
decision has been made to contract PMSCs;  
8. That while this document is addressed to States, the good practices may be of value for other 
entities such as international organizations, NGOs and companies that contract PMSCs, as well 
as for PMSCs themselves;  
9. That for the purposes of this document:  
a) “PMSCs” are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in 
particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings 
and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and 
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.  
b) “Personnel of a PMSC” are persons employed by, through direct hire or under a contract 
with, a PMSC, including its employees and managers.  
c) “Contracting States” are States that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, including, 
as appropriate, where such a PMSC subcontracts with another PMSC.  
d) “Territorial States” are States on whose territory PMSCs operate.  
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e) “Home States” are States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered or 
incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one where it has its 
principal place of management, then the State where the PMSC has its principal place of 
management is the “Home State”.  
The participating States commend this document to the attention of other States, international 
organizations, NGOs, the private military and security industry and other relevant actors, which 
are invited to adopt those good practices that they consider appropriate for their operations. 
The participating States invite other States and international organizations to communicate 
their support for this document to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. 
The participating States also declare their readiness to review and, if necessary, to revise this 
document in order to take into account new developments.  
 
Part One Pertinent international legal obligations relating to private military and 
security companies 
Introduction  
The following statements aim to recall certain existing international legal obligations of States 
regarding private military and security companies. The statements are drawn from various 
international humanitarian and human rights agreements and customary international law. This 
document, and the statements herein, do not create legal obligations. Each State is responsible 
for complying with the obligations it has undertaken pursuant to international agreements to 
which it is a party, subject to any reservations, understandings and declarations made, and to 
customary international law.  
A. Contracting States  
1. Contracting States retain their obligations under international law, even if they contract 
PMSCs to perform certain activities. If they are occupying powers, they have an obligation to 
take all measures in their power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, i.e. exercise vigilance in preventing violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law.  
2. Contracting States have an obligation not to contract PMSCs to carry out activities that 
international humanitarian law explicitly assigns to a State agent or authority, such as 
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exercising the power of the responsible officer over prisoner-of-war camps or places of 
internment of civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. 
3. Contracting States have an obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law by PMSCs they contract, in particular to:  
a) ensure that PMSCs that they contract and their personnel are aware of their obligations and 
trained accordingly;  
b) not encourage or assist in, and take appropriate measures to prevent, any violations of 
international humanitarian law by personnel of PMSCs;  
c) take measures to suppress violations of international humanitarian law committed by the 
personnel of PMSCs through appropriate means, such as military regulations, administrative 
orders and other regulatory measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or judicial 
sanctions, as appropriate.  
4. Contracting States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human 
rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, 
to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel.  
5. Contracting States have an obligation to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional Protocol I, and have an obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches and bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before their own courts. They 
may also, if they prefer, and in accordance with the provisions of their own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another State concerned, provided such State has made out a 
prima facie case, or to an international criminal tribunal.  
6. Contracting States also have an obligation to investigate and, as required by international 
law, or otherwise as appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having 
committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking, in 
accordance with their obligations under international law. Such prosecutions are to be carried 
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out in accordance with international law providing for fair trial, mindful that sanctions be 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime.  
7. Although entering into contractual relations does not in itself engage the responsibility of 
Contracting States, the latter are responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, 
human rights law, or other rules of international law committed by PMSCs or their personnel 
where such violations are attributable to the Contracting State, consistent with customary 
international law, in particular if they are:  
a) incorporated by the State into their regular armed forces in accordance with its domestic 
legislation;  
b) members of organized armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the 
State;  
c) empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority if they are acting in that capacity 
(i.e. are formally authorized by law or regulation to carry out functions normally conducted by 
organs of the State); or  
d) in fact acting on the instructions of the State (i.e. the State has specifically instructed the 
private actor’s conduct) or under its direction or control (i.e. actual exercise of effective control 
by the State over a private actor’s conduct).  
8. Contracting States have an obligation to provide reparations for violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law caused by wrongful conduct of the personnel of 
PMSCs when such conduct is attributable to the Contracting States in accordance with the 
customary international law of State responsibility.  
B. Territorial States  
9. Territorial States have an obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law by PMSCs operating on their territory, in particular to:  
a) disseminate, as widely as possible, the text of the Geneva Conventions and other relevant 
norms of international humanitarian law among PMSCs and their personnel;  
b) not encourage or assist in, and take appropriate measures to prevent, any violations of 
international humanitarian law by personnel of PMSCs;  
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c) take measures to suppress violations of international humanitarian law committed by the 
personnel of PMSCs through appropriate means such as military regulations, administrative 
orders and other regulatory measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or judicial 
sanctions, as appropriate.  
10. Territorial States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human 
rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, 
to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel.  
11. Territorial States have an obligation to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional Protocol I, and have an obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches and bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before their own courts. They 
may also, if they prefer, and in accordance with the provisions of their own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another State concerned, provided such State has made out a 
prima facie case, or to an international criminal tribunal.  
12. Territorial States also have an obligation to investigate and, as required by international 
law, or otherwise as appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having 
committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking, in 
accordance with their obligations under international law. Such prosecutions are to be carried 
out in accordance with international law providing for fair trial, mindful that sanctions be 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime.  
13. In situations of occupation, the obligations of Territorial States are limited to areas in which 
they are able to exercise effective control.  
C. Home States  
14. Home States have an obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law by PMSCs of their nationality, in particular to:  
a) disseminate, as widely as possible, the text of the Geneva Conventions and other relevant 
norms of international humanitarian law among PMSCs and their personnel;  
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b) not encourage or assist in, and take appropriate measures to prevent, any violations of 
international humanitarian law by personnel of PMSCs;  
c) take measures to suppress violations of international humanitarian law committed by the 
personnel of PMSCs through appropriate means such as administrative or other regulatory 
measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or judicial sanctions, as appropriate.  
15. Home States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human 
rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, 
to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel.  
16. Home States have an obligation to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and, where applicable, Additional Protocol I, and have an obligation to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches 
and bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before their own courts. They may also, 
if they prefer, and in accordance with the provisions of their own legislation, hand such persons 
over for trial to another State concerned, provided such State has made out a prima facie case, 
or to an international criminal tribunal.  
17. Home States also have an obligation to investigate and, as required by international law, or 
otherwise as appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having 
committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking, in 
accordance with their obligations under international law. Such prosecutions are to be carried 
out in accordance with international law providing for fair trial, mindful that sanctions be 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 
D. All other States  
18. All other States have an obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law. They have an obligation to refrain from encouraging or assisting in 
violations of international humanitarian law by any party to an armed conflict.  
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19. All other States are responsible to implement their obligations under international human 
rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to these obligations.  
20. All other States have an obligation to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional Protocol I, and have an obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches and bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before their own courts. They 
may also, if they prefer, and in accordance with the provisions of their own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another State concerned, provided such State has made out a 
prima facie case, or to an international criminal tribunal.  
21. All other States also have an obligation to investigate and, as required by international law, 
or otherwise as appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having 
committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking, in 
accordance with their obligations under international law. Such prosecutions are to be carried 
out in accordance with international law providing for fair trial, mindful that sanctions be 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 
E. PMSCs and their personnel  
22. PMSCs are obliged to comply with international humanitarian law or human rights law 
imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as other applicable national law such 
as criminal law, tax law, immigration law, labour law, and specific regulations on private 
military or security services.  
23. The personnel of PMSCs are obliged to respect the relevant national law, in particular the 
national criminal law, of the State in which they operate, and, as far as applicable, the law of 
the States of their nationality.  
24. The status of the personnel of PMSCs is determined by international humanitarian law, on 
a case-by-case basis, in particular according to the nature and circumstances of the functions 
in which they are involved.  
25. If they are civilians under international humanitarian law, the personnel of PMSCs may not 
be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.  
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26. The personnel of PMSCs:  
a) are obliged, regardless of their status, to comply with applicable international humanitarian 
law;  
b) are protected as civilians under international humanitarian law, unless they are incorporated 
into the regular armed forces of a State or are members of organized armed forces, groups or 
units under a command responsible to the State; or otherwise lose their protection as 
determined by international humanitarian law;  
c) are entitled to prisoner-of-war status in international armed conflict if they are persons 
accompanying the armed forces meeting the requirements of article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva 
Convention;  
d) to the extent they exercise governmental authority, have to comply with the State’s 
obligations under international human rights law;  
e) are subject to prosecution if they commit conduct recognized as crimes under applicable 
national or international law.  
F. Superior responsibility  
27. Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as:  
a) governmental officials, whether they are military commanders or civilian superiors, or  
b) directors or managers of PMSCs, may be liable for crimes under international law committed 
by PMSC personnel under their effective authority and control, as a result of their failure to 
properly exercise control over them, in accordance with the rules of international law. Superior 
responsibility is not engaged solely by virtue of a contract. 
 
Part Two  
Good practices relating to private military and security companies  
Introduction  
This Part contains a description of good practices that aims to provide guidance and assistance 
to States in ensuring respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law and 
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otherwise promoting responsible conduct in their relationships with PMSCs operating in areas 
of armed conflict. They may also provide useful guidance for States in their relationships with 
PMSCs operating outside of areas of armed conflict. The good practices do not have legally 
binding effect and are not meant to be exhaustive. It is understood that a State may not have 
the capacity to implement all the good practices, and that no State has the legal obligation to 
implement any particular good practice, whether that State is a Contracting State, a Territorial 
State, or a Home State. States are invited to consider these good practices in defining their 
relationships with PMSCs, recognizing that a particular good practice may not be appropriate 
in all circumstances and emphasizing that this Part is not meant to imply that States should 
necessarily follow all these practices as a whole. The good practices are intended, inter alia, to 
assist States to implement their obligations under international humanitarian law and human 
rights law. However, in considering regulation, States may also need to take into account 
obligations they have under other branches of international law, including as members of 
international organizations such as the United Nations, and under international law relating to 
trade and government procurement. They may also need to take into account bilateral 
agreements between Contracting States and Territorial States. Moreover, States are encouraged 
to fully implement relevant provisions of international instruments to which they are Parties, 
including anti-corruption, anti-organized crime and firearms conventions. Furthermore, any of 
these good practices will need to be adapted in practice to the specific situation and the State’s 
legal system and capacity.  
A. Good practices for Contracting States  
States contemplating to contract PMSCs should evaluate whether their legislation, as well as 
procurement and contracting practices, are adequate for contracting PMSCs. This is 
particularly relevant where Contracting States use the services of a PMSC in a State where law 
enforcement or regulatory capacities are compromised. In many instances, the good practices 
for Contracting States may also indicate good practices for other clients of PMSCs, such as 
international organizations, NGOs and companies. In this sense, good practices for Contracting 
States include the following:  
I. Determination of services  
1. To determine which services may or may not be contracted out to PMSCs; in determining 
which services may not be contracted out, Contracting States take into account factors such as 
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whether a particular service could cause PMSC personnel to become involved in direct 
participation in hostilities.  
II. Procedure for the selection and contracting of PMSCs  
2. To assess the capacity of the PMSC to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant 
national law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, taking into 
account the inherent risk associated with the services to be performed, for instance by:  
a) acquiring information relating to the principal services the PMSC has provided in the past;  
b) obtaining references from clients for whom the PMSC has previously provided similar 
services to those the Contracting State is seeking to acquire;  
c) acquiring information relating to the PMSC’s ownership structure and conducting 
background checks on the PMSC and its superior personnel, taking into account relations with 
subcontractors, subsidiary corporations and ventures.  
3. To provide adequate resources and draw on relevant expertise for selecting and contracting 
PMSCs.  
4. To ensure transparency and supervision in the selection and contracting of PMSCs. Relevant 
mechanisms may include:  
a) public disclosure of PMSC contracting regulations, practices and processes;  
b) public disclosure of general information about specific contracts, if necessary redacted to 
address national security, privacy and commercial confidentiality requirements;  
c) publication of an overview of incident reports or complaints, and sanctions taken where 
misconduct has been proven; if necessary redacted to address national security, privacy and 
commercial confidentiality requirements;  
d) oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or notification of 
particular contracts to such bodies. 
III. Criteria for the selection of PMSCs  
5. To adopt criteria that include quality indicators relevant to ensuring respect for relevant 
national law, international humanitarian law and human rights law, as set out in good practices 
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6 to 13. Contracting States should consider ensuring that lowest price not be the only criterion 
for the selection of PMSCs.  
6. To take into account, within available means, the past conduct of the PMSC and its 
personnel, which includes ensuring that the PMSC has:  
a) no reliably attested record of involvement in serious crime (including organized crime, 
violent crime, sexual offences, violations of international humanitarian law, bribery and 
corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or its personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct, 
has appropriately remedied such conduct, including by effectively cooperating with official 
authorities, taking disciplinary measures against those involved, and, where appropriate and 
consistent with findings of wrongdoing, providing individuals injured by their conduct with 
appropriate reparation;  
b) conducted comprehensive inquiries within applicable law regarding the extent to which any 
of its personnel, particularly those who are required to carry weapons as part of their duties, 
have a reliably attested record of not having been involved in serious crime or have not been 
dishonourably discharged from armed or security forces;  
c) not previously been rejected from a contract due to misconduct of the PMSC or its personnel. 
7. To take into account the financial and economic capacity of the PMSC, including for 
liabilities that it may incur.  
8. To take into account whether it and its personnel possess or are in the process of obtaining 
requisite registrations, licenses or authorizations.  
9. To take into account whether it maintains accurate and up-to-date personnel and property 
records, in particular, with regard to weapons and ammunition, available for inspection on 
demand by the Contracting State and other appropriate authorities.  
10. To take into account that the PMSC’s personnel are sufficiently trained, both prior to any 
deployment and on an ongoing basis, to respect relevant national law, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law; and to establish goals to facilitate uniformity and 
standardization of training requirements. Training could include general and task- and context-
specific topics, preparing personnel for performance under the specific contract and in the 
specific environment, such as: 
a) rules on the use of force and firearms;  
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b) international humanitarian law and human rights law;  
c) religious, gender, and cultural issues, and respect for the local population;  
d) handling complaints by the civilian population, in particular by transmitting them to the 
appropriate authority;  
e) measures against bribery, corruption, and other crimes. Contracting States consider 
continuously reassessing the level of training by, for example, requiring regular reporting on 
the part of PMSCs.  
11. To take into account whether the PMSC:  
a) acquires its equipment, in particular its weapons, lawfully;  
b) uses equipment, in particular weapons, that is not prohibited by international law;  
c) has complied with contractual provisions concerning return and/or disposal of weapons and 
ammunition.  
12. To take into account the PMSC’s internal organization and regulations, such as:  
a) the existence and implementation of policies relating to international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, especially on the use of force and firearms, as well as policies against 
bribery, corruption, and other crimes;  
b) the existence of monitoring and supervisory as well as internal accountability mechanisms, 
such as:  
i. internal investigation and disciplinary arrangements in case of allegations of wrongdoing by 
its personnel;  
ii. mechanisms enabling persons affected by the conduct of the personnel of the PMSC to lodge 
a complaint, including both third party complaint mechanisms and whistle-blower protection 
arrangements; and  
iii. regular performance reporting, specific incident reporting, and reporting on demand to the 
Contracting State and under certain circumstances other appropriate authorities;  
iv. requiring PMSC personnel and its subcontracted personnel to report any misconduct to the 
PMSC’s management or a competent authority.  
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13. To consider the respect of the PMSC for the welfare of its personnel, as protected by labour 
law and other relevant national law. Relevant factors may include:  
a) providing personnel a copy of any contract to which they are party in a language they 
understand;  
b) providing personnel with adequate pay and remuneration arrangements commensurate to 
their responsibilities and working conditions;  
c) adopting operational safety and health policies;  
d) ensuring personnel unrestricted access to their own travel documents; and  
e) preventing unlawful discrimination in employment.  
IV. Terms of contract with PMSCs  
14. To include contractual clauses and performance requirements that ensure respect for 
relevant national law, international humanitarian law and human rights law by the contracted 
PMSC. Such clauses, reflecting and implementing the quality indicators referred to above as 
selection criteria, may include:  
a) past conduct (good practice 6);  
b) financial and economic capacity (good practice 7);  
c) possession of required registration, licenses or authorizations (good practice 8);  
d) personnel and property records (good practice 9);  
e) training (good practice 10);  
f) lawful acquisition and use of equipment, in particular weapons (good practice 11);  
g) internal organization and regulation and accountability (good practice 12);  
h) welfare of personnel (good practice 13);  
Contractual clauses may also provide for the Contracting State’s ability to terminate the 
contract for failure to comply with contractual provisions. They may also specify the weapons 
required for contract performance, that PMSCs obtain appropriate visas or other authorizations 
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from the Territorial State, and that appropriate reparation be provided to those harmed by the 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel.  
15. To require by contract that the conduct of any subcontracted PMSC is in conformity with 
relevant national law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
including by:  
a) establishing the criteria and qualifications for the selection and ongoing employment of 
subcontracted PMSCs and personnel;  
b) requiring the PMSC to demonstrate that subcontractors comply with equivalent 
requirements as the PMSC initially contracted by the Contracting State;  
c) ensuring that the PMSC is liable, as appropriate and within applicable law, for the conduct 
of its subcontractors.  
16. To require, if consistent with force protection requirements and safety of the assigned 
mission, that the personnel of the PMSC be personally identifiable whenever they are carrying 
out activities in discharge of their responsibilities under a contract. Identification should:  
a) be visible from a distance where mission and context allow, or consist of a non-transferable 
identification card that is shown upon demand;  
b) allow for a clear distinction between a PMSC’s personnel and the public authorities in the 
State where the PMSC operates. The same should apply to all means of transport used by 
PMSCs.  
17. To consider pricing and duration of a specific contract as a way to promote relevant 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. Relevant mechanisms may include:  
a) securities or bonds for contractual performance;  
b) financial rewards or penalties and incentives; c) opportunities to compete for additional 
contracts.  
18. To require, in consultation with the Territorial State, respect for relevant regulations and 
rules of conduct by PMSCs and their personnel, including rules on the use of force and firearms, 
such as:  
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a) using force and firearms only when necessary in self-defence or defence of third persons; b) 
immediate reporting to and cooperation with competent authorities, including the appropriate 
contracting official, in the case of use of force and firearms.  
V. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability  
19. To provide for criminal jurisdiction in their national legislation over crimes under 
international law and their national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel and, in 
addition, to consider establishing:  
a) corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by the PMSC, consistent with the 
Contracting State’s national legal system;  
b) criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by PMSC personnel abroad.  
20. To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms for improper or unlawful conduct 
of PMSCs and their personnel, including:  
a) contractual sanctions commensurate to the conduct, including :  
i. immediate or graduated termination of the contract;  
ii. financial penalties;  
iii. removal from consideration for future contracts, possibly for a set time period;  
iv. removal of individual wrongdoers from the performance of the contract;  
b) referral of the matter to competent investigative authorities; c) providing for civil liability, 
as appropriate.  
21. To provide for, in addition to the measures in good practices 19 and 20, appropriate 
administrative and other monitoring mechanisms to ensure the proper execution of the contract 
and the accountability of contracted PMSCs and their personnel for their improper and 
unlawful conduct; in particular to:  
a) ensure that those mechanisms are adequately resourced and have independent audit and 
investigation capacity;  
b) provide Contracting State government personnel on site with the capacity and authority to 
oversee proper execution of the contract by the PMSC and the PMSC’s subcontractors;  
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c) train relevant government personnel, such as military personnel, for foreseeable interactions 
with PMSC personnel;  
d) collect information concerning PMSCs and personnel contracted and deployed, and on 
violations and investigations concerning their alleged improper and unlawful conduct;  
e) establish control arrangements, allowing it to veto or remove particular PMSC personnel 
during contractual performance;  
f) engage PMSCs, Territorial States, Home States, trade associations, civil society and other 
relevant actors to foster information sharing and develop such mechanisms.  
22. When negotiating agreements with Territorial States which contain rules affecting the legal 
status of and jurisdiction over PMSCs and their personnel:  
a) to consider the impact of the agreements on the compliance with national laws and 
regulations;  
b) to address the issue of jurisdiction and immunities to ascertain proper coverage and 
appropriate civil, criminal, and administrative remedies for misconduct, in order to ensure 
accountability of PMSCs and their personnel.  
23. To cooperate with investigating or regulatory authorities of Territorial and Home States, as 
appropriate, in matters of common concern regarding PMSCs.  
B. Good practices for Territorial States  
The following good practices aim to provide guidance to Territorial States for governing the 
supply of military and security services by PMSCs and their personnel on their territory. 
Territorial States should evaluate whether their domestic legal framework is adequate to ensure 
that the conduct of PMSCs and their personnel is in conformity with relevant national law, 
international humanitarian law and human rights law or whether it needs to establish further 
arrangements to regulate the activities of PMSCs. Acknowledging the particular challenges 
faced by Territorial States in armed conflict, Territorial States may accept information provided 
by the Contracting State concerning the ability of a PMSC to carry out its activities in 
conformity with international humanitarian law, human rights law and relevant good practices. 
In this sense, good practices for Territorial States include the following:  
I. Determination of services  
286 
 
24. To determine which services may or may not be carried out on their territory by PMSCs or 
their personnel; in determining which services may not be carried out, Territorial States take 
into account factors such as whether a particular service could cause PMSC personnel to 
become involved in direct participation in hostilities.  
II. Authorization to provide military and security services  
25. To require PMSCs to obtain an authorization to provide military and security services in 
their territory (“authorization”), including by requiring:  
a) PMSCs to obtain an operating license valid for a limited and renewable period (“corporate 
operating license”), or for specific services (“specific operating license”), taking into account 
the fulfilment of the quality criteria set out in good practices 31 to 38; and/or;  
b) individuals to register or obtain a license in order to carry out military or security services 
for PMSCs.  
III. Procedure with regard to authorizations  
26. To designate a central authority competent for granting authorizations.  
27. To allocate adequate resources and trained personnel to handle authorizations properly and 
timely.  
28. To assess, in determining whether to grant an authorization, the capacity of the PMSC to 
carry out its activities in conformity with relevant national law, international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law, taking into account the inherent risk associated with the 
services to be performed, for instance by:  
a) acquiring information relating to the principal services the PMSC has provided in the past;  
b) obtaining references from clients for whom the PMSC has previously provided similar 
services or clients in the Territorial State;  
c) acquiring information relating to the PMSC’s ownership structure and conduct background 
checks on the PMSC and its personnel, taking into account relations with subcontractors, 
subsidiary corporations and ventures, or obtain information from the Contracting State on these 
matters.  
29. To ensure transparency with regard to authorizations. Relevant mechanisms may include:  
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a) public disclosure of authorization regulations and procedures;  
b) public disclosure of general information on granted authorizations, including on the identity 
of authorized PMSCs and their number of personnel, if necessary redacted to address national 
security, privacy and commercial confidentiality requirements;  
c) publication of an overview of incident reports or complaints, and sanctions taken where 
misconduct has been proven; if necessary redacted to address national security, privacy and 
commercial confidentiality requirements;  
d) oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or notification of 
particular contracts to such bodies;  
e) publishing and adhering to fair and non-discriminatory fee schedules for authorizations.  
IV. Criteria for granting an authorization  
30. To ensure that PMSCs fulfil certain quality criteria relevant for the respect of relevant 
national law, international humanitarian law and human rights law by the PMSC and its 
personnel, including those set out below.  
31. To require that the conduct of PMSCs and of any PMSC subcontracted is in conformity 
with relevant national law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
which includes ensuring that:  
a) the PMSC notifies any subcontracting of military and security services to the authorization 
authority;  
b) the PMSC can demonstrate that its subcontractors comply with equivalent requirements as 
the PMSC which initially obtained an authorization by the Territorial State;  
c) the subcontractor is in possession of an authorization;  
d) the PMSC initially granted authorization is liable, as appropriate and within applicable law, 
for the conduct of its subcontractors.  
32. To take into account, within available means, the past conduct of the PMSC and its 
personnel, which includes ensuring that the PMSC has:  
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a) no reliably attested record of involvement in serious crime (including organized crime, 
violent crime, sexual offences, violations of international humanitarian law, bribery and 
corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or its personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct, 
has appropriately dealt with such conduct, including by effectively cooperating with official 
authorities, taking disciplinary measures against those involved, and where appropriate and 
consistent with findings of wrongdoing, providing individuals injured by their conduct with 
appropriate reparation;  
b) conducted comprehensive inquiries within applicable law regarding the extent to which any 
of its personnel, particularly those who are required to carry weapons as part of their duties, 
have a reliably attested record of not having been involved in serious crime or have not been 
dishonourably discharged from armed or security forces;  
c) not previously had an operating license revoked for misconduct of the PMSC or its 
personnel.  
33. To take into account the financial and economic capacity of the PMSC, including for 
liabilities that it may incur.  
34. To take into account whether the PMSC maintains accurate and up-to-date personnel and 
property records, in particular, with regard to weapons and ammunition, available for 
inspection on demand by the Territorial State and other authorities.  
35. To take into account that the PMSC’s personnel are sufficiently trained, both prior to any 
deployment and on an ongoing basis, to respect relevant national law, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law; and to establish goals to facilitate uniformity and 
standardization of training requirements. Training could include general and task- and context-
specific topics, preparing personnel for performance under the specific contract and in the 
specific environment, such as:  
a) rules on the use of force and weapons;  
b) international humanitarian law and human rights law;  
c) religious, gender, and cultural issues, and respect for the local population;  
d) complaints handling;  
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e) measures against bribery, corruption, and other crimes. Territorial States consider 
continuously reassessing the level of training by, for example, requiring regular reporting on 
the part of PMSCs. 36. Not to grant an authorization to a PMSC whose weapons are acquired 
unlawfully or whose use is prohibited by international law.  
37. To take into account the PMSC’s internal organization and regulations, such as:  
a) the existence and implementation of policies relating to international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, especially on the use of force and firearms, as well as policies against bribery 
and corruption;  
b) the existence of monitoring and supervisory measures as well as internal accountability 
mechanisms, such as:  
i. internal investigation and disciplinary arrangements in case of allegations of wrongdoing by 
its personnel;  
ii. mechanisms enabling persons affected by the conduct of the personnel of the PMSC to lodge 
a complaint, including both third party complaints mechanisms and whistleblower protection 
arrangements;  
iii. regular reporting on the performance of the assignment and/or specific incident reporting; 
iv. requiring PMSC personnel and its subcontracted personnel to report any misconduct to the 
PMSC’s management or a competent authority.  
38. To consider the respect of the PMSC for the welfare of its personnel.  
39. To take into account, in considering whether to grant a license or to register an individual, 
good practices 32 (past conduct) and 35 (training). 
 V. Terms of authorization  
40. To include clauses to ensure that the conduct of the PMSC and its personnel is continuously 
in conformity with relevant national law, international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law. The authorization includes, where appropriate, clauses requiring the PMSC 
and its personnel to implement the quality criteria referred to above as criteria for granting 
general and/or specific operating licenses and relating to:  
a) past conduct (good practice 32);  
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b) financial and economic capacity (good practice 33);  
c) personnel and property records (good practice 34);  
d) training (good practice 35);  
e) lawful acquisitions (good practice 36);  
f) internal organization and regulation and accountability (good practice 37);  
g) welfare of personnel (good practice 38);  
41. To require the PMSC to post a bond that would be forfeited in case of misconduct or 
noncompliance with the authorization, provided that the PMSC has a fair opportunity to rebut 
allegations and address problems.  
42. To determine, when granting a specific operating license, a maximum number of PMSC 
personnel and equipment understood to be necessary to provide the services.  
VI. Rules on the provision of services by PMSCs and their personnel  
43. To have in place appropriate rules on the use of force and firearms by PMSCs and their 
personnel, such as:  
a) using force and firearms only when necessary in self-defence or defence of third persons;  
b) immediately reporting to and cooperation with competent authorities in the case of use of 
force and firearms.  
44. To have in place appropriate rules on the possession of weapons by PMSCs and their 
personnel, such as:  
a) limiting the types and quantity of weapons and ammunition that a PMSC may import, 
possess or acquire;  
b) requiring the registration of weapons, including their serial number and calibre, and 
ammunition, with a competent authority;  
c) requiring PMSC personnel to obtain an authorization to carry weapons that is shown upon 
demand;  
d) limiting the number of employees allowed to carry weapons in a specific context or area;  
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e) requiring the storage of weapons and ammunition in a secure and safe facility when 
personnel are off duty;  
f) requiring that PMSC personnel carry authorized weapons only while on duty;  
g) controlling the further possession and use of weapons and ammunition after an assignment 
is completed, including return to point of origin or other proper disposal of weapons and 
ammunition.  
45. To require, if consistent with force protection requirements and safety of the assigned 
mission, that the personnel of the PMSC be personally identifiable whenever they are carrying 
out activities in discharge of their responsibilities under a contract. Identification should:  
a) be visible from a distance where mission and context allow, or consist of a non-transferable 
identification card that is shown upon demand;  
b) allow for a clear distinction between a PMSC’s personnel and the public authorities in the 
State where the PMSC operates. The same should apply to all means of transportation used by 
PMSCs.  
VII. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability  
46. To monitor compliance with the terms of the authorization, in particular:  
a) establish or designate an adequately resourced monitoring authority;  
b) ensure that the civilian population is informed about the rules of conduct by which PMSC 
have to abide and available complaint mechanisms;  
c) requesting local authorities to report on misconduct by PMSCs or their personnel;  
d) investigate reports of wrongdoing.  
47. To provide a fair opportunity for PMSCs to respond to allegations that they have operated 
without or in violation of an authorization.  
48. To impose administrative measures, if it is determined that a PMSC has operated without 
or in violation of an authorization; such measures may include:  
a) revocation or suspension of the authorization or putting the PMSC on notice of either of 
these steps in case remedial measures are not taken within a set period of time;  
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b) removing specific PMSC personnel under the penalty of revoking or suspending the 
authorization;  
c) prohibition to re-apply for an authorization in the future or for a set period of time;  
d) forfeiture of bonds or securities; e) financial penalties.  
49. To provide for criminal jurisdiction in their national legislation over crimes under 
international law and their national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel and, in 
addition, to consider establishing corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by the 
PMSC, consistent with the Territorial State’s national legal system.  
50. To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms for improper and unlawful conduct 
of PMSC and its personnel, including:  
a) providing for civil liability;  
b) otherwise requiring PMSCs, or their clients, to provide reparation to those harmed by the 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel.  
51. When negotiating agreements with Contracting States which contain rules affecting the 
legal status of and jurisdiction over PMSCs and their personnel:  
a) to consider the impact of the agreements on the compliance with national laws and 
regulations;  
b) to address the issue of jurisdiction and immunities to ascertain proper coverage and 
appropriate civil, criminal, and administrative remedies for misconduct, in order to ensure 
accountability of PMSCs and their personnel.  
52. To cooperate with investigating and regulatory authorities of Contracting and Home States 
in matters of common concern regarding PMSCs. 
C. Good practices for Home States  
The following good practices aim to provide guidance to Home States for governing the supply 
of military and security services by PMSCs and their personnel abroad (“export”). It is 
recognized that other good practices for regulation – such as regulation of standards through 
trade associations and through international cooperation – will also provide guidance for 
regulating PMSCs, but have not been elaborated here. In this understanding, Home States 
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should evaluate whether their domestic legal framework, be it central or federal, is adequately 
conducive to respect for relevant international humanitarian law and human rights law by 
PMSCs and their personnel, or whether, given the size and nature of their national private 
military and security industry, additional measures should be adopted to encourage such respect 
and to regulate the activities of PMSCs. When considering the scope and nature of any licensing 
or regulatory regime, Home States should take particular notice of regulatory regimes by 
relevant Contracting and Territorial States, in order to minimize the potential for duplicative or 
overlapping regimes and to focus efforts on areas of specific concern for Home States. In this 
sense, good practices for Home States include the following:  
I. Determination of services  
53. To determine which services of PMSCs may or may not be exported; in determining which 
services may not be exported, Home States take into account factors such as whether a 
particular service could cause PMSC personnel to become involved in direct participation in 
hostilities. II. Establishment of an authorization system  
54. To consider establishing an authorization system for the provision of military and security 
services abroad through appropriate means, such as requiring an operating license valid for a 
limited and renewable period (“corporate operating license”), for specific services (“specific 
operating license”), or through other forms of authorization (“export authorization”). If such a 
system of authorization is established, the good practices 57 to 67 set out the procedure, quality 
criteria and terms that may be included in such a system.  
55. To have in place appropriate rules on the accountability, export, and return of weapons and 
ammunition by PMSCs.  
56. To harmonize their authorization system and decisions with those of other States and taking 
into account regional approaches relating to authorization systems. III. Procedure with regard 
to authorizations  
57. To assess the capacity of the PMSC to carry out its activities in respect of relevant national 
law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, taking into account the 
inherent risk associated with the services to be performed, for instance by:  
a) acquiring information relating to the principal services the PMSC has provided in the past;  
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b) obtaining references from clients for whom the PMSC has previously provided similar 
services or clients in the Territorial State;  
c) acquiring information relating to the PMSC’s ownership structure and conduct background 
checks on the PMSC and its personnel, taking into account relations with subcontractors, 
subsidiary corporations and ventures.  
58. To allocate adequate resources and trained personnel to handle authorizations properly and 
timely.  
59. To ensure transparency with regard to the authorization procedure. Relevant mechanisms 
may include:  
a) public disclosure of authorization regulations and procedures;  
b) public disclosure of general information on specific authorizations, if necessary redacted to 
address national security, privacy and commercial confidentiality requirements;  
c) oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or notification of 
particular contracts to such bodies;  
d) publishing and adhering to fair and non-discriminatory fee schedules.  
IV. Criteria for granting an authorization  
60. To take into account the past conduct of the PMSC and its personnel, which include 
ensuring that the PMSC has:  
a) no reliably attested record of involvement in serious crime (including organized crime, 
violent crime, sexual offences, violations of international humanitarian law, bribery and 
corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or its personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct, 
has appropriately dealt with such conduct, including by effectively cooperating with official 
authorities, taking disciplinary measures against those involved, and where appropriate and 
consistent with findings of wrongdoing, providing individuals injured by their conduct with 
appropriate reparation;  
b) conducted comprehensive inquiries within applicable law regarding the extent to which its 
personnel, particularly those who are required to carry weapons as part of their duties, have a 
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reliably attested record of not having been involved in serious crime or have not been 
dishonourably discharged from armed or security forces;  
c) not previously had an authorization revoked for misconduct of the PMSC or its personnel.  
61. To take into account the financial and economic capacity of the PMSC, including for 
liabilities that it may incur.  
62. To take into account whether the PMSC maintains accurate and up-to-date personnel and 
property records, in particular, with regard to weapons and ammunition, available for 
inspection on demand by competent authorities.  
63. To take into account that the PMSC’s personnel are sufficiently trained, both prior to any 
deployment and on an ongoing basis, to respect relevant national law, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law; and to establish goals to facilitate uniformity and 
standardization of training requirements. Training could include general and task- and context-
specific topics, preparing personnel for performance under the specific contract and in the 
specific environment, such as:  
a) rules on the use of force and firearms;  
b) international humanitarian law and human rights law;  
c) religious, gender, and cultural issues, and respect for the local population;  
d) complaints handling;  
e) measures against bribery, corruption and other crimes.  
Home States consider continuously reassessing the level of training by, for example, requiring 
regular reporting on the part of PMSCs.  
64. To take into account whether the PMSC’s equipment, in particular its weapons, is acquired 
lawfully and its use is not prohibited by international law.  
65. To take into account the PMSC’s internal organization and regulations, such as:  
a) the existence and implementation of policies relating to international humanitarian law and 
human rights law;  
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b) the existence of monitoring and supervisory as well as internal accountability mechanisms, 
such as:  
i. internal investigation and disciplinary arrangements in case of allegations of wrongdoing by 
its personnel;  
ii. mechanisms enabling persons affected by the conduct of the personnel of the PMSC to lodge 
a complaint, including both third party complaints mechanisms and whistleblower protection 
arrangements.  
66. To consider the respect of the PMSC for the welfare of its personnel as protected by labour 
law and other relevant national law.  
V. Terms of authorization granted to PMSCs  
67. To include clauses to ensure that the conduct of the PMSC and its personnel respect relevant 
national law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Such clauses, 
reflecting and implementing the quality criteria referred to above as criteria for granting 
authorizations, may include:  
a) past conduct (good practice 60);  
b) financial and economic capacity (good practice 61); c) personnel and property records (good 
practice 62);  
d) training (good practice 62);  
e) lawful acquisitions (good practice 64);  
f) internal organization and regulation and accountability (good practice 65);  
g) welfare of personnel (good practice 66).  
VI. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability  
68. To monitor compliance with the terms of the authorization, in particular by establishing 
close links between its authorities granting authorizations and its representatives abroad and/or 
with the authorities of the Contracting or Territorial State.  
69. To impose sanctions for PMSCs operating without or in violation of an authorization, such 
as:  
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a) revocation or suspension of the authorization or putting the PMSC on notice of either of 
these steps in case remedial measures are not taken within a set period of time;  
b) prohibition to re-apply for an authorization in the future or for a set period of time;  
c) civil and criminal fines and penalties.  
70. To support Territorial States in their efforts to establish effective monitoring over PMSCs.  
71. To provide for criminal jurisdiction in their national legislation over crimes under 
international law and their national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel and, in 
addition, consider establishing:  
a) corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by the PMSC, consistent with the 
Home State’s national legal system;  
b) criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by PMSC personnel abroad.  
72. To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms for improper and unlawful conduct 
of PMSCs and their personnel, including:  
a) providing for civil liability;  
b) otherwise requiring PMSCs to provide reparation to those harmed by the misconduct of 
PMSCs and their personnel.  
73. To cooperate with investigating or regulatory authorities of Contracting and Territorial 
States, as appropriate, in matters of common concern regarding PMSCs. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (September 2010) 
 
A. Preamble 
1. Private Security Companies and other Private Security Service Providers (collectively 
“PSCs”) play an important role in protecting state and non-state clients engaged in relief, 
recovery, and reconstruction efforts, commercial business operations, diplomacy and military 
activity.  In providing these services, the activities of PSCs can have potentially positive and 
negative consequences for their clients, the local population in the area of operation, the general 
security environment, the enjoyment of human rights and the rule of law. 
2. The Montreux Document On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices 
for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed 
Conflict recognizes that well-established rules of international law apply to States in their 
relations with private security service providers and provides for good practices relating to 
PSCs. The “Respect, Protect, Remedy” framework developed by the Special Representative of 
the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, and welcomed by 
the UN Human Rights Council, entails acting with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights 
of others.  
3. Building on these foundations, the Signatory Companies to this International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (the “Code”) endorse the principles of the 
Montreux Document and the aforementioned “Respect, Protect, Remedy” framework as they 
apply to PSCs.  In so doing, the Signatory Companies commit to the responsible provision of 
Security Services so as to support the rule of law, respect the human rights of all persons, and 
protect the interests of their clients. 
4. The Signatory Companies affirm that they have a responsibility to respect the human rights 
of, and fulfil humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected by their business 
activities, including Personnel, Clients, suppliers, shareholders, and the population of the area 
in which services are provided. The Signatory Companies also recognize the importance of 
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respecting the various cultures encountered in their work, as well as the individuals they come 
into contact with as a result of those activities.  
5. The purpose of this Code is to set forth a commonly-agreed set of principles for PSCs and 
to establish a foundation to translate those principles into related standards as well as 
governance and oversight mechanisms.   
6. Signatory Companies commit to the following, as set forth in this Code: 
a) to operate in accordance with this Code; 
b) to operate in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and in accordance with 
relevant corporate standards of business conduct; 
c) to operate in a manner that recognizes and supports the rule of law; respects human rights, 
and protects the interests of their clients; 
d) to take steps to establish and maintain an effective internal governance framework in order 
to deter, monitor, report, and effectively address adverse impacts on human rights; 
e) to provide a means for responding to and resolving allegations of activity that violates any 
applicable national or international law or this Code; and 
f) to cooperate in good faith with national and international authorities exercising proper 
jurisdiction, in particular with regard to national and international investigations of violations 
of national and international criminal law, of violations of international humanitarian law, or 
of human rights abuses.  
7. Those establishing this Code recognize that this Code acts as a founding instrument for a 
broader initiative to create better governance, compliance and accountability. Recognizing that 
further effort is necessary to implement effectively the principles of this Code, Signatory 
Companies accordingly commit to work with states, other Signatory Companies, Clients and 
other relevant stakeholders after initial endorsement of this Code to, within 18 months: 
a) Establish objective and measurable standards for providing Security Services based upon 
this Code, with the objective of realizing common and internationally-recognized operational 
and business practice standards; and 
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b) Establish external independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight, which 
will include Certification of Signatory Companies’ compliance with the Code’s principles and 
the standards derived from the Code, beginning with adequate policies and procedures, 
Auditing and Monitoring of their work in the field, including Reporting, and execution of a 
mechanism to address alleged violations of the Code’s principles or the standards derived from 
the Code; and thereafter to consider the development of additional principles and standards for 
related services, such as training of external forces, the provision of maritime security services 
and the participation in operations related to detainees and other protected persons.  
8. Signature of this Code is the first step in a process towards full compliance. Signatory 
Companies need to: (1) establish and/or demonstrate internal processes to meet the 
requirements of the Code’s principles and the standards derived from the Code; and (2) once 
the governance and oversight mechanism is established, become certified by and submit to 
ongoing independent Auditing and verification by that mechanism.  Signatory Companies 
undertake to be transparent regarding their progress towards implementing the Code’s 
principles and the standards derived from the Code.  Companies will not claim they are 
certified under this Code until Certification has been granted by the governance and oversight 
mechanism as outlined below. 
 
B. Definitions 
These definitions are only intended to apply exclusively in the context of this Code. 
 Auditing – a process through which independent auditors, accredited by the governance and 
oversight mechanism, conduct on-site audits, including in the field, on a periodic basis, 
gathering data to be reported to the governance and oversight mechanism which will in turn 
verify whether a Company is meeting requirements and if not, what remediation may be 
required. 
Certification – a process through which the governance and oversight mechanism will certify 
that a Company’s systems and policies meet the Code’s principles and the standards derived 
from the Code and that a Company is undergoing Monitoring, Auditing, and verification, 
including in the field, by the governance and oversight mechanism. Certification is one element 
of a larger effort needed to ensure the credibility of any Implementation and oversight initiative. 
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Client – an entity that hires, has formerly hired, or intends to hire a PSC to perform Security 
Services on its behalf, including, as appropriate, where such a PSC subcontracts with another 
Company. 
Company – any kind of business entity or form, such as a sole proprietorship, partnership, 
company (whether public or private), or corporation, and “Companies” shall be interpreted 
accordingly. 
Competent Authority – any state or intergovernmental organization which has jurisdiction over 
the activities and/or persons in question and “Competent Authorities” shall be interpreted 
accordingly. 
Complex Environments – any areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, 
whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule of law has been substantially 
undermined, and in which the capacity of the state authority to handle the situation is 
diminished, limited, or non-existent.  
Implementation – the introduction of policy, governance and oversight mechanisms and 
training of Personnel and/or subcontractors by Signatory Companies, necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the Code’s principles and the standards derived from this Code.  
Monitoring – a process for gathering data on whether Company Personnel, or subcontractors, 
are operating in compliance with the Code’s principles and standards derived from this Code. 
Personnel – persons working for a PSC, whether as employees or under a contract, including 
its staff, managers and directors. For the avoidance of doubt, persons are considered to be 
personnel if they are connected to a PSC through an employment contract (fixed term, 
permanent or open-ended) or a contract of assignment (whether renewable or not), or if they 
are independent contractors, or temporary workers and/or interns (whether paid or unpaid), 
regardless of the specific designation used by the Company concerned. 
Private Security Companies and Private Security Service Providers (collectively “PSCs”) – any 
Company (as defined in this Code) whose business activities include the provision of Security 
Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such Company 
describes itself. 
Reporting – a process covered by necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure arrangements 
through which companies will submit to a governance and oversight mechanism a written 
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assessment of their performance pursuant to a transparent set of criteria established by the 
mechanism. 
Security Services –  guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, 
designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for 
which the Personnel of Companies are required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance 
of their duties.   
Signatory Companies – are PSCs that have signed and agreed to operate in compliance with 
the Code’s principles and the standards derived from the Code and “Signatory Company” shall 
be interpreted accordingly. 
 
C. Implementation 
9. In recognition of the additional steps to be taken to support the Implementation of this Code 
– in particular the development of standards based on the Code (“standards”) and an 
independent governance and oversight mechanism (“the mechanism”) as outlined in the 
Preamble – Signatory Companies intend to, along with other interested stakeholders, convene 
regularly to review progress toward those steps.  
10. Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and other stakeholders will undertake to 
work with national standards bodies as appropriate to develop standards, with the intent that 
any national standards would eventually be harmonized in an international set of standards 
based on the Code. 
11. Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and other stakeholders will appoint a 
multi-stakeholder steering committee of 6-9 members who will function as a “temporary 
board”. This steering committee will be responsible for developing and documenting the initial 
arrangements for the independent governance and oversight mechanism, including by-laws or 
a charter which will outline mandate and governing policies for the mechanism. The Steering 
Committee will endeavour to complete a work plan for constituting the mechanism before the 
end of March 2011, and further to develop the bylaws/charter by the end of July 2011 and an 
operational plan before the end of November 2011. 
12. After the independent governance and oversight mechanism has been constituted (by the 
adoption of bylaws/charter), the governance and oversight mechanism shall accept 
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responsibility for maintenance and administration of the Code, and shall determine whether 
and how it is appropriate for the mechanism and standards to be reflected in the text of the 
Code itself. 
 
D. General Provisions 
13. This Code articulates principles applicable to the actions of Signatory Companies while 
performing Security Services in Complex Environments. 
14. This Code complements and does not replace the control exercised by Competent 
Authorities, and does not limit or alter applicable international law or relevant national law. 
The Code itself creates no legal obligations and no legal liabilities on the Signatory Companies, 
beyond those which already exist under national or international law. Nothing in this Code 
shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of 
international law. 
15. This Code may be modified in accordance with procedures to be established by the 
governance and oversight mechanism. 
 
E. General Commitments 
16. Signatory Companies agree to operate in accordance with the principles contained in this 
Code. Signatory Companies will require that their Personnel, and all subcontractors or other 
parties carrying out Security Services under Signatory Company contracts, operate in 
accordance with the principles contained in this Code. 
17. Signatory Companies will implement appropriate policies and oversight with the intent that 
the actions of their Personnel comply at all times with the principles contained herein.  
18. Signatory Companies will make compliance with this Code an integral part of contractual 
agreements with Personnel and subcontractors or other parties carrying out Security Services 
under their contracts. 
19. Signatory Companies will adhere to this Code, even when the Code is not included in a 
contractual agreement with a Client.  
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20. Signatory Companies will not knowingly enter into contracts where performance would 
directly and materially conflict with the principles of this Code, applicable national or 
international law, or applicable local, regional and international human rights law, and are not 
excused by any contractual obligation from complying with this Code. To the maximum extent 
possible, Signatory Companies will interpret and perform contracts in a manner that is 
consistent with this Code. 
21. Signatory Companies will comply, and will require their Personnel to comply, with 
applicable law which may include international humanitarian law, and human rights law as 
imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as all other applicable international and 
national law. Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence to ensure compliance with the 
law and with the principles contained in this Code, and will respect the human rights of persons 
they come into contact with, including, the rights to freedom of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly and against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy or deprivation of 
property. 
22. Signatory Companies agree not to contract with, support or service any government, person, 
or entity in a manner that would be contrary to United Nations Security Council 
sanctions.  Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, 
participate in, encourage, or seek to benefit from any national or international crimes including 
but not limited to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, enforced 
disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, sexual or gender-based violence, 
human trafficking, the trafficking of weapons or drugs, child labour or extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions. 
23. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, invoke 
contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as an armed conflict 
or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national or international security, internal political 
instability, or any other public emergency, as a justification for engaging in any of the conduct 
identified in paragraph 22 of this Code. 
24. Signatory Companies will report, and will require their Personnel to report, known or 
reasonable suspicion of the commission of any of the acts identified in paragraph 22 of this 
Code to the Client and one or more of the following: the Competent Authorities in the country 
where the act took place, the country of nationality of the victim, or the country of nationality 
of the perpetrator. 
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25. Signatory Companies will take reasonable steps to ensure that the goods and services they 
provide are not used to violate human rights law or international humanitarian law, and such 
goods and services are not derived from such violations. 
26. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, consistent with 
applicable national and international law, promise, offer, or give to any public official, directly 
or indirectly, anything of value for the public official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the public official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties if such inducement is illegal.  Signatory Companies will not, and will require 
their Personnel do not, solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of value in exchange 
for not complying with national and international law and/or standards, or with the principles 
contained within this Code. 
27. Signatory Companies are responsible for establishing a corporate culture that promotes 
awareness of and adherence by all Personnel to the principles of this Code. Signatory 
Companies will require their Personnel to comply with this Code, which will include providing 
sufficient training to ensure Personnel are capable of doing so. 
 
F. Specific Principles regarding the Conduct of Personnel 
General Conduct  
28. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, treat all persons humanely 
and with respect for their dignity and privacy and will report any breach of this Code. 
  
Rules on the Use of Force  
29. Signatory Companies will adopt Rules for the Use of Force consistent with applicable law 
and the minimum requirements contained in the section on Use of Force in this Code and agree 
those rules with the Client. 
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Use of Force 
30. Signatory Companies will require their Personnel to take all reasonable steps to avoid the 
use of force. If force is used, it shall be in a manner consistent with applicable law. In no case 
shall the use of force exceed what is strictly necessary, and should be proportionate to the threat 
and appropriate to the situation. 
31. Signatory Companies will require that their Personnel not use firearms against persons 
except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious 
injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to 
life.  
32. To the extent that Personnel are formally authorized to assist in the exercise of a state's law 
enforcement authority, Signatory Companies will require that their use of force or weapons 
will comply with all national and international obligations applicable to regular law 
enforcement officials of that state and, as a minimum, with the standards expressed in the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (1990). 
  
Detention 
33. Signatory Companies will only, and will require their Personnel will only, guard, transport, 
or question detainees if: (a) the Company has been specifically contracted to do so by a state; 
and (b) its Personnel are trained in the applicable national and international law.  Signatory 
Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, treat all detained persons humanely and 
consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law or international 
humanitarian law, including in particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
  
Apprehending Persons 
34. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, not take or hold any persons 
except when apprehending persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat 
of violence, or following an attack or crime committed by such persons against Company 
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Personnel, or against clients or property under their protection, pending the handover of such 
detained persons to the Competent Authority at the earliest opportunity.  Any such 
apprehension must be consistent with applicable national or international law and be reported 
to the Client without delay. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel to, 
treat all apprehended persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under 
applicable human rights law or international humanitarian law, including in particular 
prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
  
Prohibition of Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment 
35. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel not, engage in torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For the avoidance of doubt, 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as referred to here, 
includes conduct by a private entity which would constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment if committed by a public official. 
36. Contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as an armed 
conflict or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national or international security, internal 
political instability, or any other public emergency, can never be a justification for engaging in 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
37. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, report any acts of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, known to them, or of which 
they have reasonable suspicion.  Such reports will be made to the Client and one or more of 
the following: the competent authorities in the country where the acts took place, the country 
of nationality of the victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator. 
  
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse or Gender-Based Violence 
38. Signatory Companies will not benefit from, nor allow their Personnel to engage in or benefit 
from, sexual exploitation (including, for these purposes, prostitution) and abuse or gender-
based violence or crimes, either within the Company or externally, including rape, sexual 
harassment, or any other form of sexual abuse or violence.  Signatory Companies will, and will 
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require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence 
and, where discovered, report such instances to competent authorities. 
  
Human Trafficking 
39. Signatory Companies will not, and will require their Personnel not to, engage in trafficking 
in persons. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for 
all instances of trafficking in persons and, where discovered, report such instances to 
Competent Authorities.  For the purposes of this Code, human trafficking is the recruitment, 
harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for (1) a commercial sex act 
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has 
not attained 18 years of age; or (2) labour or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery. 
  
Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour 
40. Signatory Companies will not use slavery, forced or compulsory labour, or be complicit 
in any other entity’s use of such labour. 
  
Prohibition on the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
41. Signatory Companies will respect the rights of children (anyone under the age of 18) to be 
protected from the worst forms of child labour, including: 
a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, 
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in provision of armed services; 
b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography 
or for pornographic performances; 
c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production 
and trafficking of drugs; 
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d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm 
the health, safety or morals of children. 
Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, report any instances of the 
activities referenced above that they know of, or have reasonable suspicion of, to Competent 
Authorities. 
  
Discrimination 
42. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, discriminate on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, social origin, social status, indigenous status, 
disability, or sexual orientation when hiring Personnel and will select Personnel on the basis of 
the inherent requirements of the contract. 
  
Identification and Registration 
43. Signatory Companies, to the extent consistent with reasonable security requirements and 
the safety of civilians, their Personnel and Clients, will: 
a) require all Personnel to be individually identifiable whenever they are carrying out activities 
in discharge of their contractual responsibilities; 
b) ensure that their vehicles are registered and licensed with the relevant national authorities 
whenever they are carrying out activities in discharge of their contractual responsibilities; and 
c) will ensure that all hazardous materials are registered and licensed with the relevant national 
authorities. 
 
G. Specific Commitments regarding Management and Governance 
Incorporation of the Code into Company Policies 
44. Signatory Companies will incorporate this Code into Company policies and internal control 
and compliance systems and integrate it into all relevant elements of their operations.  
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Selection and Vetting of Personnel 
45. Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the selection of Personnel, including 
verifiable vetting and ongoing performance review of their Personnel.  Signatory Companies 
will only hire individuals with the requisite qualifications as defined by the applicable contract, 
applicable national law and industry standards, and the principles contained in this Code. 
46. Signatory Companies will not hire individuals under the age of 18 years to carry out 
Security Services. 
47. Signatory Companies will assess and ensure the continued ability of Personnel to perform 
their duties in accordance with the principles of this Code and will regularly evaluate Personnel 
to ensure that they meet appropriate physical and mental fitness standards to perform their 
contracted duties. 
  
48. Signatory Companies will establish and maintain internal policies and procedures to 
determine the suitability of applicants, or Personnel, to carry weapons as part of their duties.  At 
a minimum, this will include checks that they have not:  
a) been convicted of a crime that would indicate that the individual lacks the character and 
fitness to perform security services pursuant to the principles of this Code; 
b) been dishonourably discharged; 
c) had other employment or engagement contracts terminated for documented violations of one 
or more of the  principles contained in this Code; or 
d) had a history of other conduct  that, according to an objectively reasonable standard, brings 
into question their fitness to carry a weapon.  
For the purposes of this paragraph, disqualifying crimes may include, but are not limited to, 
battery, murder, arson, fraud, rape, sexual abuse, organized crime, bribery, corruption, perjury, 
torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking or trafficking in persons. This provision shall not override 
any law restricting whether a crime may be considered in evaluating an applicant. Nothing in 
this section would prohibit a Company from utilizing more stringent criteria. 
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49. Signatory Companies will require all applicants to authorize access to prior employment 
records and available Government records as a condition for employment or engagement.  This 
includes records relating to posts held with the military, police or public or Private Security 
Providers.  Moreover, Signatory Companies will, consistent with applicable national law, 
require all Personnel to agree to participate in internal investigations and disciplinary 
procedures as well as in any public investigations conducted by competent authorities, except 
where prohibited by law. 
  
Selection and Vetting of Subcontractors 
50. Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the selection, vetting and ongoing 
performance review of all subcontractors performing Security Services. 
51. In accordance with principle 13 of this Code, Signatory Companies will require that their 
Personnel and all subcontractors and other parties carrying out Security Services under the 
contract, operate in accordance with the principles contained in this Code and the standards 
derived from the Code.  If a Company contracts with an individual or any other group or entity 
to perform Security Services, and that individual or group is not able to fulfil the selection, 
vetting and training principles contained in this Code and the standards derived from the Code, 
the contracting Company will take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that all selection, 
vetting and training of subcontractor’s Personnel is conducted in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Code and the standards derived from the Code. 
  
Company Policies and Personnel Contracts 
52. Signatory Companies will ensure that their policies on the nature and scope of services they 
provide, on hiring of Personnel and other relevant Personnel reference materials such as 
Personnel contracts include appropriate incorporation of this Code and relevant and applicable 
labour laws.  Contract terms and conditions will be clearly communicated and available in a 
written form to all Personnel in a format and language that is accessible to them. 
53. Signatory Companies will keep employment and service records and reports on all past and 
present personnel for a period of 7 (seven) years. Signatory Companies will require all 
Personnel to authorize the access to, and retention of, employment records and available 
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Government records, except where prohibited by law. Such records will be made available to 
any compliance mechanism established pursuant to this Code or Competent Authority on 
request, except where prohibited by law. 
54. Signatory Companies will only hold passports, other travel documents, or other 
identification documents of their Personnel for the shortest period of time reasonable for 
administrative processing or other legitimate purposes. This paragraph does not prevent a 
Company from co-operating with law enforcement authorities in the event that a member of 
their Personnel is under investigation. 
  
Training of Personnel 
55. Signatory Companies will ensure that all Personnel performing Security Services receive 
initial and recurrent professional training and are also fully aware of this Code and all 
applicable international and relevant national laws, including those pertaining to international 
human rights, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and other relevant 
criminal law. Signatory Companies will maintain records adequate to demonstrate attendance 
and results from all professional training sessions, including from practical exercises. 
  
Management of Weapons 
56. Signatory Companies will acquire and maintain authorizations for the possession and use 
of any weapons and ammunition required by applicable law. 
57. Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that their Personnel do not, possess nor 
use weapons or ammunition which are illegal under any applicable law.  Signatory Companies 
will not, and will require that their Personnel not, engage in any illegal weapons transfers and 
will conduct any weapons transactions in accordance with applicable laws and UN Security 
Council requirements, including sanctions.  Weapons and ammunition will not be altered in 
any way that contravenes applicable national or international law. 
58. Signatory Company policies and proceedures for management of weapons and 
ammunitions should include: 
a) secure storage; 
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b) controls over their issue; 
c) records regarding to whom and when weapons are issued; 
d) identification and accounting of all ammunition; and 
e) verifiable and proper disposal. 
  
Weapons Training 
59. Signatory Companies will require that: 
a) Personnel who are to carry weapons will be granted authorization to do so only on 
completion or verification of appropriate training with regard to the type and model of weapon 
they will carry.  Personnel will not operate with a weapon until they have successfully 
completed weapon-specific training. 
b) Personnel carrying weapons must receive regular, verifiable and recurrent training specific 
to the weapons they carry and rules for the use of force. 
c) Personnel carrying weapons must receive appropriate training in regard to rules on the use 
of force.  This training may be based on a variety of relevant standards, but should be based at 
a minimum on the principles contained in this Code and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), and national laws or regulations in 
effect in the area duties will be performed. 
  
Management of Material of War 
60. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel to, acquire and maintain all 
authorizations for the possession and use of any materiel of war, e.g. hazardous materials and 
munitions, as required by applicable law. 
61. Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that their Personnel will neither, possess 
nor use any materiel of war, e.g. hazardous materials and munitions, which are illegal under 
any applicable law.  Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel not 
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engage in any illegal material transfers and will conduct any materiel of war transactions in 
accordance with applicable laws and UN Security Council requirements, including sanctions. 
62. Signatory Company policies or procedures for management of materiel of war, e.g. 
hazardous materials and munitions, should include: 
a) secure storage; 
b) controls over their issue; 
c) records regarding to whom and when materials are issued; and 
d) proper disposal procedures. 
  
Incident reporting 
63. Signatory Companies will prepare an incident report documenting any incident involving 
its Personnel that involves the use of any weapon, which includes the firing of weapons under 
any circumstance (except authorized training), any escalation of force, damage to equipment 
or injury to persons, attacks, criminal acts, traffic accidents, incidents involving other security 
forces, or such reporting as otherwise required by the Client, and will conduct an internal 
inquiry in order to determine the following: 
a) time and location of the incident; 
b) identity and nationality of any persons involved including their addresses and other contact 
details; 
c) injuries/damage sustained; 
d) circumstances leading up to the incident; and 
e) any measures taken by the Signatory Company in response to it. 
Upon completion of the inquiry, the Signatory Company will produce in writing an incident 
report including the above information, copies of which will be provided to the Client and, to 
the extent required by law, to the Competent Authorities. 
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Safe and Healthy Working Environment 
64. Signatory Companies will strive to provide a safe and healthy working environment, 
recognizing the possible inherent dangers and limitations presented by the local environment. 
Signatory Companies will ensure that reasonable precautions are taken to protect relevant staff 
in high-risk or life-threatening operations.  These will include: 
a) assessing risks of injury to Personnel as well as the risks to the local population generated 
by the activities of Signatory Companies and/or Personnel; 
b) providing hostile environment training; 
c) providing adequate protective equipment, appropriate weapons and ammunition, and 
medical support; and 
d) adopting policies which support a safe and healthy working environment within the 
Company, such as policies which address psychological health, deter work-place violence, 
misconduct, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual harassment and other improper behaviour. 
  
Harassment 
65. Signatory Companies will not tolerate harassment and abuse of co-workers by their 
Personnel. 
  
Grievance Procedures 
66. Signatory Companies will establish grievance procedures to address claims alleging failure 
by the Company to respect the principles contained in this Code brought by Personnel or by 
third parties. 
67. Signatory Companies will: 
a) establish procedures for their Personnel and for third parties to report allegations of improper 
and/or illegal conduct to designated Personnel, including such acts or omissions that would 
violate the principles contained in this Code.  Procedures must be fair, accessible and offer 
effective remedies, including recommendations for the prevention of recurrence.  They shall 
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also facilitate reporting by persons with reason to believe that improper or illegal conduct, or a 
violation of this Code, has occurred or is about to occur, of such conduct, to designated 
individuals within a Company and, where appropriate, to competent authorities; 
b) publish details of their grievance mechanism on a publically accessible website; 
c) investigate allegations promptly, impartially and with due consideration to confidentiality; 
d) keep records about any such allegations, findings or disciplinary measures.  Except where 
prohibited or protected by applicable law, such records should be made available to a 
Competent Authority on request; 
e) cooperate with official investigations, and not participate in or tolerate from their Personnel, 
the impeding of witnesses, testimony or investigations; 
f) take appropriate disciplinary action, which could include termination of employment in case 
of a finding of such violations or unlawful behaviour; and 
g) ensure that their Personnel who report wrongdoings in good faith are provided protection 
against any retaliation for making such reports, such as shielding them from unwarranted or 
otherwise inappropriate disciplinary measures, and that matters raised are examined and acted 
upon without undue delay.   
68. No provision in this Code should be interpreted as replacing any contractual requirements 
or specific Company policies or procedures for reporting wrongdoing. 
  
Meeting Liabilities 
69. Signatory Companies will ensure that they have sufficient financial capacity in place at all 
times to meet reasonably anticipated commercial liabilities for damages to any person in 
respect of personal injury, death or damage to property.  Sufficient financial capacity may be 
met by customer commitments, adequate insurance coverage, (such as by employer’s liability 
and public liability coverage appropriately sized for the scale and scope of operations of the 
Signatory Company) or self-insurance/retention. Where it is not possible to obtain suitable 
insurance cover, the Signatory Company will make alternative arrangements to ensure that it 
is able to meet such liabilities. 
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H. Review 
70. The Swiss Government will maintain a public list of Signatory Companies and convene an 
initial review conference with a view to reviewing the Code after governance and oversight 
mechanisms (as referenced in the Preamble and Section C “Implementation” to this Code) are 
developed. 
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